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New Religious Movements in Nigeria.

Profile:

Kenneth Onwuka Dike: Pioneer Africanist and Historian.

Editor: Sola Akinrinade

Editorial Note

Our Mission

More than at any other time, the discipline of history today in Nigeria, is under severe stress. Perplexed by economic crises of immense proportions and dominated by the craze for money and by the politics of the moment, we have become distorted in our orientation and deluded of any deep consciousness of history. We live as if all that matters is today. In private and in public, our citizens are routinely treated to dreary lectures on the irrelevance and insignificance of a systematic knowledge of our past. In our quest for survival we associate modernisation only with science and technology. We remain completely oblivious of the fact that modernization can never take place in a vacuum. We seemed determined to go on record as the first nation to make a meaningful progress without reference to the accumulated values, experiences and culture of yesteryears. We forget that today is a product of yesterday and that a nation that has no sense of history has put its future on the lines. No wonder we make the same mistakes again and again.

The discipline of history is routinely dismissed as dispensable. History which used to be an attractive subject has dropped to the bottom of the ladder of priorities for intending undergraduates. Historians receive little or no regard in a society that is in a haste to modernise and that places emphasis solely on science and the acquisition of material wealth. *The Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* which in the last two decades has appeared only erratically has virtually ceased publication. Even *Tarikh*, another publications of the Historical Society of Nigeria, meant to take advances in historical research to the level of high school students and laymen, has become a thing of the past.

It is against this background of a distorted and perverted notion of modernisation and a misguided conception of the relevance of history to the nation building that the *Ife Journal of History* is being launched. The Journal aims at making historical research pleasurable. It is meant to fill a gap, an important gap, which has been created in the negative attitude to, and the practice of history and history education in Nigeria.

This point must be stressed because it is of universal significance. As the Russian emigre, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, warned in 1972 while receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature, the excision of the memory of any people "is not only their personal misfortune but a calamity for the whole humanity". Twelve years earlier, in 1960, the year of Nigerian independence, Professor Kenneth Onwuka Dike, the first African Professor of African History at Ibadan, had voiced a similar opinion: the need to create in our people a deep and enduring sense of history, if we will ever make it as a nation because, "a study of the past illuminates the problems of our day". Thirty-two years after Dike spoke and eight years after his death, his seminal words remain valid. They were even echoed just recently by no less a person than President Ibrahim Babangida himself who, alarmed at the pervasive negative attitude to the nation's cultural heritage, warned of the dire

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consequences awaiting a nation that fails to appropriate for its present and future lessons from a conscious study of its past: "We should cultivate a keen sense of history. Really we have no choice if we are to attain a respectable position in the world. We shall continue to expose ourselves to international ridicule if we have no heritage to fall back on".

Professor Dike was indeed far-sighted. It is for his abiding commitment to the relevance of history to nation-building, his unshaken belief in the validity of African history, as well as his pioneering intellectual contributions to the evolution of African historiography that this maiden issue of the *Ife Journal of History* is being dedicated to the memory of Professor Kenneth Onwuka Dike and all he stood for.

Contributions

Contributions are invited from scholars all over the world, particularly from Africa. The journal accepts works which are inter- and multi-disciplinary in the humanities and social sciences. Articles should have bias for the application of historical methodology. The principal regional focus is Africa, articles focusing on other regions but with relevance for African and other third world problems will also be considered.

Articles which would be typed double-spaced (endnotes and box quotations inclusive) should be submitted in duplicate and conform to the Chicago Manual of Style. All references and notes should be listed serially on a separate sheet and included at the end of the article. Articles should be approximately 5,000 words in length although manuscripts which are less or slightly longer would be accommodated if high quality is sustained throughout. Book Reviews should be between 800 and 1,000 words and ideally should cover two or more related recent works. Review and Feature articles should not exceed 2,000 words. All articles will be assessed by neutral person(s). All manuscripts and books for review should be sent to, Dr. Sola Akinrinade, Editor, *Ife Journal of History*, Department of History, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ife-Ife, Nigeria. One copy each of all articles received, published or not, will be retained in the records of the Editor. Contributors who would like the other copy returned should include self-addressed, appropriately stamped envelope.

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Yorubaland before Oduduwa

By I.A. Akinjogbin*

In the third number of *Odu: Journal of Yoruba and Related Studies* published around 1958, H. U. Beier suggested that "there are sufficient myths of war and conquest linked with the Oduduwa immigration to prove that there must have been people living in the country before who were driven out, or absorbed, or assimilated by the Yorubas".¹ In a subsequent number of the same Journal, Olanipekun Esan in an attempt to support Beier's position quoted the *Orile of Oba Ile near Akure*, and concluded that the people of Oba must have been one of such earlier than Oduduwa people. In 1976, Isola Olomola returned to the same topic in a paper which he titled "Eastern Yorubaland before Oduduwa".² Olomola's evidence on Ekiti, Akure and Owo is exhaustive and thorough. Indeed, his definition of Eastern Yorubaland was so elastic as to cover Ijebu and the only reason for returning to this topic now under a more general title is to amplify, with the aid of fresh information, some of the tentative conclusions reached by these earlier authors.

For, in spite of these three articles, Yoruba scholars have generally ignored any probability of there having been a pre-Oduduwa Yoruba Society and have proceeded to repeat the general belief that Yoruba Society started with Oduduwa who is regarded as their progenitor, that life was peopled only with the arrival of Oduduwa, either from heaven or from Mecca or from Meroe or from around the confluence of Nigeria or, in extreme cases, that the whole world started with the descent of Oduduwa to life from heaven. So powerful and effective has been the force of post Oduduwa Yoruba historical account, one might even say propaganda, that any attempt to go beyond and behind Oduduwa had been well nigh impossible. However, the more one reads any historical document, oral traditions included, the more one understands and is able to benefit from, not only what is said, but also what is left unsaid. It is the constant re-reading of the traditions that have been collected as well as the collection and collation of fresh ones which will now aid us in seeing what evidence there is for Beier's, Esan's and Olomola's postulation.

The already known sources are contained in the local historical tracts, some of which are well known.³ The new ones are mainly re-enactment ceremonies that are being collected by the ongoing Yoruba History Research Project in the Department of History of the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife.⁴ One class of new evidence which promises a rich mine is the *Ikedu*.⁵ So far what we have from it is limited but valuable. Another probably valuable source is the *Iken*, but apart from the mere name, and the knowledge that it was an ancient school for teaching history, nothing has yet come from that source.⁶

* Professor Akinjogbin was, until his retirement at the end of October 1990, a professor in the Department of History, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.

Perhaps we should first clear up some difficulties. Were there Yoruba and therefore Yorubaland before Oduduwa? Some would even ask whether there was a single name Yoruba after Oduduwa. To the latter question our answer has been generally yes, because there was a general consciousness of what today we would recognise as 'Yoruba', even though the name may have been different at different periods, and there were certain specific names applied to different sub-divisions. Answering the former question is a little difficult, because we know so little as yet about the period. However, for purposes of labelling and purely for the sake of convenience we would use the term Yoruba for these pre-Oduduwa people particularly as their descendants came to be known as Yoruba. At the appropriate place we will consider what names they called themselves. Because we would call them Yoruba, we would accept there was a "Yorubaland" before Oduduwa, though the boundaries of that land we do not yet know. Later we would also consider whether these pre-oduduwa people had an idea of their territory and what they called it.

Since all historical accounts relating to Yorubaland start with Ife, Ife is therefore the natural place to start to consider whether there were any inhabitants in Yorubaland before Oduduwa. It has been suggested⁷ that the historical traditions of Ife that are most widely known are probably three independent traditions rolled into one. This first component of this composite whole probably represents the traditions of the earliest settlers in the marshy lands of Ife whose main occupation was fishing. The second relates to the traditions of the first organised society, albeit small, and probably pre-iron age, represented in the later traditions by Obatala, who was probably one of the last great personage of that period. It was probably this age that was overthrown and replaced by the followers of Oduduwa group who in an attempt to preserve unity and continuity, merged all the traditions of all the previously existing societies into the one body of traditions that we now know. Isola Olomola, working with the Ekiti oral traditions also came to the conclusion that there were probably three layers of settlement in North-East Yorubaland.⁸ If all these suppositions are true, then the period we should look into for evidence of pre-Oduduwa society is the one represented by Obatala in the life traditions and the second layer in the traditions of the peoples of North-East Yoruba.

A more than casual look at the well known traditions of Ife will reveal that even they admit that there was a pre-Oduduwa society in Ife. The traditions relate that on the way from heaven to the earth, Oduduwa seized authority from Obatala because the latter was drunk from palm wine and slept off. This immediately suggests that there was a knowledge of palm trees and that tappers were available in Ife before Oduduwa's arrival. If we add to this, the knowledge that palm trees are supposed to be "secondary bush", then we may suggest that indeed, agriculture had been practised well before Oduduwa's arrival. The traditions go on to say that as soon as Oduduwa descended into Ife by means of a chain, he encountered a stiff resistance by a people or society called Igbo.⁹ The life traditions remember some of the *dramatis personae* in this war. Obameri is remembered as being on Oduduwa's side, Obawinri and Obatala were the leaders of the Igbo. The dispute was apparently a prolonged and dicey affair.

The evidence indicates that soon after the first initial successes of Oduduwa and this group, the displaced powers regrouped and attacked periodically. The Oduduwa group appeared to be at their wit's end when Moremi, apparently a pre-Oduduwa Ife woman volunteered to find out the tactical secrets of the Igbo. She conspired to be captured by the Igbo, warmed her way into becoming a favourite wife of the leader, got the secrets of their success and escaped back to Ife. Her exploits enabled the Oduduwa group finally to conquer the resistance group and become master of Ife.¹⁰ That was after a reconciliation in which a man named Ojumu served as arbitrator.

When we look at other Ife sources, the picture becomes clearer still. These traditions relate that before Oduduwa, Ife consisted of thirteen villages. The names, which are still remembered were Ido, Iloromu, Ideta, Odin, Iloran, Oke-Oja, Imojubi, Iraye, Ijugbe, Oke-Awo, Iwinrin, Parakin and Omologun.¹¹ Each of them presumably had a head, but there would appear to be an overall head, called Oghene, whose authority covered and went beyond the thirteen villages. These villages were taken over and presumably fused into one composite town by Oduduwa and his followers. Oduduwa probably succeeded to the power and authority of the overall ruler, the Oghene.

Three re-enactment ceremonies in Ife-life preserve the processes of this take-over and the re-action of the vanquished. The first is the Edi festival, already partly referred to, which commemorates the Moremi episode. The whole annual re-enactment now lasts seven days. On one of the days, the *Ooni* would stage a mock fight with one of his chiefs and would conquer. This commemorates Oduduwa's victory. On another day, flaming torches would be carried round the town in commemoration of how the Igbo resistance was overcome through the burning of Oluyare masks. On the last day, *Tele* would carry all the evils away from the town, probably signifying the final settlement and the return of peace.

The second re-enactment ceremony is the installation of the Obalesun, otherwise called Obalale, head of the Ideta community. This is not an annual affair, but only occurs occasionally whenever there is a vacancy. An Obalesun was installed in 1969, and his installation, watched by this writer, was celebrated like that of a head chief, if not a king. The ceremonies were performed by his own minor chiefs who later paid obeisance to him, as happens when an Oba is being installed. One interesting observation during the long ceremony, complete with dances, merriment and songs, was the absence of palm wine. Obalesun and his chiefs were forbidden, at least during that ceremony, to drink palm wine. The only drinks allowed was *eko* mashed in cold water.¹²

The forbidding of alcohol ties up with another incident during another re-enactment ceremony, the Obatala festival.¹³ On one of the days during this festival, the devotees go round certain parts of Ife town. At a particular place, the Oduduwa people would throw some quantity of palm wine on the ground along the path of the Obatala celebrants, who would avoid stepping the spot as if they were avoiding poison. Someone watching it would get the impression that the Obatala people were being reminded of the supposed cause of their defeat by the Oduduwa people, a cause they would rather forget.

Ijesa kingdom is that Owa Obokun one of Oduduwa's children returned to Ife from the coast where he had been fetching brine water for his father's eye ailment, only to find that his other brothers had left to found their own kingdoms. He immediately followed and after sojourning in various places, finally settled at the present Ilesa.

However, the picture remembered in the extant traditions is much more complicated than that. It is related that before Owa Obokun Ajibogun came to the present Ijesa kingdom, the area was dotted with a number of settlements, each one having its ruler. In the present Ilesa area, there were Itaji (headed by the Onitaji), Ikogun (headed by the Akogun), Iboisrin (headed by the Labosirin) and Okesa (headed by the Obanla). In Ijesa north, there were Ilumure, Ilare, Ipesi and Omu (now called Ijaregbe).¹⁵ All these had their rulers before the arrival of Oduduwa group.

In his *Iwe Itan Ilesa*, J. D. Abiola¹⁶ admitted in a number of places that Owa Ajibogun had to fight and conquer the pre-Oduduwa group before he could settle. Abiola attributed Ajibogun's victory to the power of Ida Ajase given by Oduduwa. Some of the battle ground recorded by Abiola were at Idode, Omi Iso and Igbaide. He also mentioned the war against Ilare and Obokun Kingdoms. In a personal interview with the immediate late Owa, Oba Peter Agunlejika, this writer was told that the war between the Oduduwa group and the pre-Oduduwa element was bitter, and that the pre-Oduduwa group were mercilessly massacred as to make the memory repulsive even today.

In what is now the Ondo kingdom a similar picture is given of Oduduwa group superceding a pre-existing society. There were probably three groups of pre-Oduduwa settlement at the least. Those usually mentioned are the Idoko, the Ijamo and the Ifore. Whether each settlement is a town or village or represents a group of towns and villages is not clear. The Idoko would appear to be living in or around the site of the present Epe where the Oduduwa group, under Pupupu, met and settled with them. The Ifore were probably living around the present site of Ode Ondo and it was thither that the Pupupu group finally went to settle when they left Epe. We are told in the traditions that when Pupupu got to Idoko (modern Epe) he met and married Yangede, who must have been a man of some substance, probably the ruler of the settlement, since Pupupu was a princess from Ife. When the group later got to Ifore, they met Ekiri and Olotu Agbede who might have been the rulers of the settlement. Later they met one Onu, one of their party from Ife who had preceded them to Ifore.¹⁷ In the enactment ceremonies performed when the last Osemawe Itiade Adekolurejo ascended the throne in 1976, the ruler of Epe played an important symbolic role as the original owners of the land on which the Oduduwa group settled at Ode Ondo. It must be added however, that on that occasion, Christian symbols, rather than traditional ones, were used because the Epe authorities said "the world is now civilized and Christian". They admitted however that previously other traditional symbols were used.

It is also said, though there is no way of proving it, that the heads of all the dead Osemawe were sent to Epe for burial in order to emphasise the point that Oduduwa group first settled there before proceeding to Ode Ondo. It is

During the same procession, the Obatala people would continue to shout the word "Are" in a nostalgic way.¹⁴ Presumably it was with the seizure of the Are that Oduduwa finally wrested authority from Obatala, whose descendants have continued to regret the loss. Up till today, during the coronation ceremonies a new Ooni moves to the palace immediately after the "Are" crown is placed on his head in the Obatala shrine, as if to re-enact what happened during the ancient encounter. Until today, there is a kind of ritual feud between the Obatala and the Oduduwa peoples - the former feigning refusal to accept that the latter ever existed. Indeed, at the Obatala shrine, it is forbidden to mention the name Oduduwa. All these go to reinforce the suggestion that there was a well organised society in Ife before Oduduwa.

It is not yet clear whether Obalesun and Obatala were two heads of two of the thirteen settlements or whether they represented the same group. If they were two different persons, then Obatala would clearly be the more important of the two, and probably the most important ruler of the thirteen settlements encountered by Oduduwa, at least as at the time of the encounter. For his name is very prominent in the traditions and it was the seizure of the Are from him that assured Oduduwa's ascendancy. Alternately, Obatala might be the foremost deity being worshipped by the pre-Oduduwa society, which sanctioned all political decisions.

All these tend to show that in spite of what is contained in the popular myths, the traditions have indeed not forgotten that Oduduwa's ascendancy at Ife was by grim conquest, and that the losers, though integrated, have not totally forgotten their defeat.

Perhaps the most detailed account, and the one that gives depth to the length of history of the pre-Oduduwa Yoruba society in Ife is the Ikedu traditions. After recounting how Ife was founded it proceeded to say that as many as ninety-seven Oghene reigned before Oduduwa. Now this is an almost incredible number and probably contains some exaggeration. If we remember that from Oduduwa take-over, which may have taken place in about the ninth or tenth century A.D., only fifty Ooni have been recorded, ninety-seven Oghene before Oduduwa would, by analogy, indicate twice as long a period. That will amount to saying that two thousand years before Oduduwa, i.e. about 1000 B.C., Ife was being ruled by a monarch titled Oghene. However, we are in no position to say whether the ninety-seven rulers represented the total number of rulers of the thirteen settlements throughout their history, or whether they represent the names of the recognised leaders, those who were at different times *primus inter pares*, of the settlements. If the latter case was the practice, we do not know whether the leadership was rotated from settlement to settlement or whether it was permanent in one settlement. Whatever the case, even if we concede half the number of Oghenes, we would already be talking in terms of B.C. dates for the rulers of Ife before Oduduwa. What we cannot do is to dismiss the whole story, for the names of some of the rulers are remembered, and some of their actions as will be recounted later in this paper are also remembered.

When we move from Ife to Ilesa, a similar picture of a pre-Oduduwa society emerges. The well-known post Oduduwa story of the foundation of the

that *Ogborogan nida* (tr. a man with a big and strong sword), grandson of Oduduwa, came to Ijebu-Ode and conquered the successor of Olu-Iwa, who was called Osimore. After that, he was given the title Obanta.

The same picture of a Pre-Oduduwa society is clear when we look at the traditions of Akure, Ekiti, Idanre, Owo, Igboina and Benin. We can quickly run through them. In Akure, before the arrival of the Oduduwa group, led by either Ajapada or Udeji, there probably were Oba, Idopetu, Igan, Ileru and Upalefa.²¹ There may have been more communities that we do not yet know. The original traditions of Oba (before the craze to prove their right to the Oduduwa crown), relate that the people did not remember coming from anywhere.²² On the other hand, Idopetu, and Igan remembered coming from Epe before Oduduwa group got there. Idopetu was founded by Ourokutu (tr. very early morning) and Igan founded by Omololu, both brothers.²³ Two other villages, Ileru and Upalefa derived from Igan. An interesting development here is that the traditions recall that Igan, Ileru and Upalefa came under the authority of Omololu, who assumed the title of Alakunre. From Alakunre, the Oduduwa group took over power after a struggle.

In Ado, there was the Ilesun community consisting of not only Ilesun (Ulesun) but also Ulero, Isinla, Ilamaji, Aso, Asa, Ukere and Agbaun, all under the Elesun,²⁴ who was conquered by the Oduduwa group. The name Ilesun reminds one of the name of one of the thirteen pre-Oduduwa communities in Ife. In Ijero, there was Ouku, ruled by Olouku, and Apa, both of which were conquered by the Ajero. In Idanre, there was the Isedale group,²⁴ whose real name may have been forgotten. In Owo area, there were Upa, Afo, Ilale, Isijogun, Ijegumo, Amurin and Ilemo.²⁴ In Ikole there was Oke Isolo. In Isanlu, there was an Oba, which name is not only similar to the one near Akure, but whose tradition also relates that it came from nowhere else but the ground. Thus they are referred to as Omo Ere (children of the mud).²⁵ Finally the case of Benin with the Ogiso rulers had been fully treated.²⁶ That Oranmiyan had to fight various battles before finally overcoming their resistance is enshrined in the enactment ceremonies of the installation of the Oba of Benin.

In the Savannah area of Yorubaland, particularly in the areas occupied later by Oyo, there are traditions of previous settlements that had to be overcome before the Oduduwa group could settle.²⁷ Those settlements were sometimes said to be Bariba or Tapa. However, if we go by the evidence we have been discussing, they might not be different in culture from all the other settlements in the forest area. The names Tapa or Bariba may be no more than a convenient label to indicate difference.

All the evidence thus point to the conclusion that all over Yorubaland, there was a society already well established when Oduduwa seized authority in Ife and his "sons", who may have included his followers, waged wars all over Yorubaland and seized authority in various places as well. A number of questions however arise. Who were these people, how large were their towns and villages and for how long had they existed before Oduduwa and his group came? What kind of society did they fashion in the political organisation, their economic, religious and cultural attainments? Why were they conquered and

noteworthy that traditions of war between the pre-Oduduwa and the Oduduwa group have not been recorded in Idoko, Ifore and Ijamo. This may be due either to the effectiveness of the post Oduduwa traditions of wanting to de-emphasize conflict and promote harmony among the two groups, or to the dynastic link forged between Yangede and Pupupu, which gave the latter some of the former's rights and privileges.

Ijebu traditions have not yet been exhaustively collected. From the little that is known, two distinct strands are discernible. There is the Olu-Iwa tradition and there is the Obanta tradition. The Olu-Iwa tradition is the pre-Oduduwa and the Obanta the Oduduwa strand. In the traditions recorded by J.A. Olusola¹⁹ in which the author was concerned mainly with giving the meaning and origins of the quarters in Ijebu-Ode, he lists thirteen out of the twenty-five quarters in Ijebu-Ode as having existed before the arrival of the Oduduwa group, led by Obanta. If we go by the examples elsewhere, these quarters were probably separate settlements before the arrival of Obanta. The pre-Obanta quarters he mentioned were Idele, Imepe, Ijada, Ikanigbo, Isado, Isola, Imupa, Ita Ajana, Mobayegun, Mobegelu, Ita Alapo, Isasa and Ojofa. An analysis of the provenance of these pre-Obanta settlements is even more interesting because they show a pattern of population movement that must have pre-dated Oduduwa. Of the thirteen, two, Imepe and Isado are recorded by Olusola as coming from life before Obanta; one, Idele, came from Ijamo (now Ondo); one, Ita Alapo came from Oye Ekiti; one, Ojofa came from Owu Ipolo and one from Kabba.

In Ijebu-Ode, there was a titled leader, Olotu Ifore, the last holder of which died a few years ago and no new one has yet been appointed. However, the existence of such a title is an indication of the previous existence of the Ifore people in or around Ijebu-Ode. Whether this points to some form of connection with the Ifore in Ondo is an issue that should be further investigated. The issue is made more intriguing by the traditions of Ago Iwoye, which make reference to close connection between it and Ondo and point to the names Esemawe (Osemawe) and Ebumawe (the title of the ruler of Ago) as being the names of the twins one of whom settled in Ondo and the other at Ago Iwoye.

Finally there are the Agemo in Ijebu. Exactly how many they are is not certain - some say nine, others say sixteen. Much more to our purpose however is what they represent. Some say they were the pre-Oduduwa rulers of Ijebu before Obanta came and conquered their communities. They were therefore sent out of Ijebu-Ode area and distributed far away from one another so they might not constitute a danger to the new rulers, with the agreement that once a year, they would all meet at Ijebu - Ode to bless the Awujale and perhaps renew whatever their agreements were. Others however say that the Agemo were the commanders of Obanta's army, who having helped him to conquer a territory, were sent out of the town so they might not become overmighty subjects.¹⁹ More researches will have to be done here.

Even in these two versions, the suggestion is clear that Obanta had to fight the local community before he took control. In an article recounting Ijebu traditions published in the *Sunday Concord* of 8th February 1981, the Awujale of Ijebu-Ode, Oba Sikiru Adetona, repeated this element of conquest.²⁰ He said

what finally happened to them? Finally, can we sketch their history during the period of their existence? Most of these questions cannot yet be satisfactorily answered and will have to wait until more researches have been carried out. From the scrappy evidence some attempt can however be made.

From the evidence so far adduced, it is clear that the people bore their local names, the names of the towns and the people being the same. Thus we have such people as the Idita in Ife, the Idoko and the Ijamo in Ondo, the Oba and Idopetu in Akure, the Isedale in Idanre, Ouku in Ijero and so on. However, the evidence also point to the very high probability of mutual intelligibility in language, similar social and political organisation and an awareness of belonging to a higher socio-political entity than that of their immediate environment. The way in which population was able to move from one settlement to another, across long distances, is a pointer to all these.

The Ikedu tradition tends to suggest that the entire society was stratified into three groups that were known across the entire country. The three groups were called the Omolufe, the Ehele and the Igbo. The Ikedu tradition relates that the Omolufe were regarded as the ruling group, that the Ehele were the largest in number and that both the Ehele and the Igbo were divided into two classes. The first was the free man or the free citizen called Oma, and the second was the servile citizen whose title has not been preserved. The evidence that we have seen are quite clear that they were a village dwelling people, and that some of the villages could have had substantial population.

When we come to consider the length of their history before the Oduduwa take-over, we can only infer from the little we know of the Oduduwa period authority. As said earlier, it is not certain whether the number of **Oghene** (ninety seven) meant all the rulers of the thirteen Ife villages, or whether the number refers to the recognised *primus inter pares*. The fact that the names referred to **Oghene** would suggest that it referred to a supreme head of all the settlements. Even if we concede half this number and accept there were fifty we would already be saying that at least for a thousand years before Oduduwa arrived, there was a society in Ife under a ruler titled **Oghene**. This is an awfully long time, the outlines of which can now be delineated only by archaeology.

Outside Ife, we are not sure for how long the society existed. The impression given in the various local traditions is that the first ruler of the settlement was still ruling or sometimes that there was only one single inhabitant when the Oduduwa group arrived.²⁸ This is not quite likely from the evidence and can only result from collapsing of the evidence or subsequent political propaganda. Available evidence would indicate that most of the names of the rulers of the towns taken over by Oduduwa were conveniently forgotten in subsequent years. In any case, once the political order changed, the need to preserve the names of previous rulers was no longer felt, except for purposes of family genealogy.

To have had such well populated villages, agriculture must have been well developed. We do not know whether they were an iron-using group, but the probabilities are that if they were originally non-iron using, some knowledge of

iron must become available to them by the ninth century A.D., when the Oduduwa group took over. That the economy was higher than mere subsistence is shown by the **Irogbo** system.²⁹ This was a system in which the rich came together and contributed sums of money which they kept in a house known as **Owio**. Such money was then lent out to borrowers after adequate security must have been taken. We are not however told what such money consisted of - whether they were cowries, iron bits, gold or pieces of cloth.

The religious system would appear to have consisted of a belief in one supreme God, the **Orisanobu Oghene**, whose servants, also worshipped, were the sun and the sea. We are not told what names these latter two were called. The earth was also worshipped as the mother of all living things. From the way Moremi was said to have promised river Esinminrin her only son if the river would aid her venture, we can also infer that the spirit of prominent physical features were worshipped. All these appear reasonable as the essential spirits that a simple agricultural society would need to propitiate for a good harvest. The mention of the sea is a little bit intriguing but the Ikedu tradition indeed says that the sea was believed to be the source of rains and that two images were made to it - one at Ife and a bigger one by the seaside.

Part of the belief was belief in the duality of existence. Every living thing, every physical object was believed to have a spirit equivalent which could not be seen by the naked eye. Thus it was that for everyone born into the world, his/her original or copy remained behind in the spirit world. When twins of the same sex were born therefore, it was believed that both the original and the copy had accidentally come into the world, and that was regarded as a bad omen. Both were therefore sent back (killed). If the twins were of different sexes, they were spared since the duplicate of each one was still in the spirit world. The killing of identical twins did not appear to them to be cruel since it was believed that each person had seven **alowa** (re-incarnations). The length of time in the previous **alowa** is cumulatively added, and the more the number of years, the wiser, the cleverer and maturer a person became. After the seventh **alowa**, the person became immortal with the **orisa**.

As was pointed out earlier, the form of government was monarchical. What changes took place during the long period we do not know, but it would seem that the country was well organised under the monarchy. Each village had a headman, called **Uhodo** who might or might not be from Ife, but he was supposed to be responsible to the **Oghene**. Under him in the village were the **Uko** who served as policemen. All the other citizens were organised into age grades called **Egbengben**, the highest or oldest of which formed the village council over which the **Uhodo** presided.

Apparently the villages were also grouped into provinces with a recognised capital. The ruler of this capital was called **Olotu** or **Otu**. In each provincial capital, there was a council called **Petele**, which was both a political and judicial body. During each meeting, the provincial council sat in grades on what is called **Ukpoko** or terraces. The **Otu** himself sat on the lowest **Ukpoko** flanked by royal members from Ife (Ife) when available. The elders and the wisemen sat on the next **Ukpoko**, followed by **Uko** from the villages and finally by youngmen. All

Odara. Esumare had been told of this invasion by the oracle and had prepared for it. He personally led the defending forces which conquered the invaders. Idunsumyi, Esumare's successor, had a long peaceful reign, but he too had to defend the territory towards the latter part of this reign against another invading army led by Ajaba.

Ekenwa, the next ruler was noted for his economic, industrial and artistic achievements. He was remembered as the Oghene who replaced the old kind of money made of Ogho with red beads and he encouraged the use of Erehe or copper as a means of exchange called *Odigbo*. What the red beads were then used for is not quite clear. He was said to have made wide roads all over the country. Of particular note is the tradition that relates that brass and bronze art work reached a high level of artistic excellence under his reign. Salt industry was also developed. He held the *Ekila* (something resembling trade fairs) regularly in which the best industrial products were exhibited, and he encouraged the families that brought the best products, giving them something that may be called a royal monopoly of such products.

Three kings reigned after Ekenwa, but their names have not been preserved. The fourth king was Ere who died of small pox. A long interregnum ensued, and from then on, the country started to decline. Apparently an effective cure had not been found against small pox and the disease continued to take a heavy toll on the population year after year. Between Ere and Ogun, who, we are told "received the ancestors of the Edos and Yoruba", forty other Oghene reigned, but none was able to recapture the old power and glory of the Oghene. Ogun or Ogunje was a regent; the line of Awire Oghene being apparently unable to provide a ruler. It was in this state of weakness that the Oduduwa group rose and seized power.

From the sketchy evidence, a number of factors would seem to be responsible for the success of Oduduwa and his group wherever they went. Chief among these factors was the use of iron war implements. If the pre-Oduduwa people knew about iron, which we are told was discovered by Ogunjo during Orodu's reign, then they had not adverted their minds to its military possibilities. Wherever Oduduwa sons went, their most prominent possession recorded by the tradition was the sword. Thus Owa Ajibogun had the *Ida Alase* which Oranyan also had. Orangun had the *Ogbe*, a type of iron cutlass and the name or *oriki* of Oduduwa's grandson who successfully invaded Ijebu was *Ogborogan nida*. The second factor would appear to be a clear objective and good organisation among the Oduduwa group. Ife having been successfully taken over, his sons and followers went away determined to repeat the same experiment, which succeeded in most cases. There was no doubt that they were absolutely determined to succeed if the stubborn resistance of the pre-Oduduwa Ijesa is an example. The third reason for the success of the Oduduwa group was a measure of political weakness and the existence of power vacuum in a large number of the pre-Oduduwa societies. Both in Ife and Ijebu-Ode, they struck during a period of interregnum. In Ijesa area, they struck during a civil disturbance. From the evidence, it does not appear that the Oduduwa group possessed superiority in numbers, and in the final settlements, the previous ruling groups were integrated, though given subordinate or ritual positions.

issues affecting the lives of the citizens in the province were discussed at the *Petele* and the representatives of each village took reports and decisions back. How many of these provinces there were, we do not know.

From the Ikedu tradition, the impression is powerfully given that even at this period, all the provincial rulers looked up to the Oghene of Ife as the supreme ruler, and they regarded Ife as the headquarters of all the provinces. The most prominent traditions were those of the Oghene of Ife some of which will now be briefly mentioned.

Awire Oghene is remembered as the first Oghene of Ife (Ife), and Ogunje was said to be the regent when Oduduwa took over. Between the two of them there were said to be ninety-five Oghene. Not all the names are remembered and not all whose names are remembered have their actions preserved. Awire was said to have been followed by Oghenerewan, Renewe, Eroger, Erogho, Owusu, Nyanike, Giesse, and Kafigide Elesiwa. Not much is remembered of the events of their reigns.

Emeaha was next remembered, and it is said that during his reign, the first organised migration from Ife took place. Each migrating group was led by one of his sons, and was not to stop until after ten days journey from Ife in whatever direction they went. Where they finally settled and how many kingdoms they eventually founded, the traditions do not say. But the traditions remember that after the departure of these groups, Emeaha created more provinces and founded more than two hundred villages.

Emeaha was succeeded by two of his sons. Orodu, who was not remembered for anything spectacular and Aihesun, during whose reign one Ogunjo was said to have discovered iron. Aihesun was remembered as inaugurating the age system and as having legislated against weaning children before they were four years old. The traditions relate that more than twenty Oghene reigned after him before another noteworthy one came on the scene.

He was Elesiwa Mogbe otherwise called the first Omegberaiye. He was born a twin but was saved because his maternal grandfather hid the twins. He had the reputation of being a powerful king. He abolished the system of killing twins. One of the most important contribution he is remembered for is his fight to get a cure for small pox in which he probably achieved a limited success. Tradition remembers that during his reign, a large migration of people came from Egypt under a leader called Iwase. Omegberaiye managed to contain them but they started getting out of hand under his son and successor, Ojere. Ojere was followed by eight other Oghene who were regarded as weak, and by the reign of the forty-sixth Oghene, the Iwase group wanted to have their own ruler. This put the back of the Ife up, and led by a man called Orebe, the population demanded that all foreigners must go (*echoji rie o*). Eventually, continues the tradition, a large part of the Iwase group withdrew back to Egypt. Having lived so long in Ife however, they never really forgot the place, particularly as some continued to have family connections with Ife. The Iwase group was said to be the fore-runner of later migration by Oduduwa.

Esumare succeeded as the forty-seventh Oghene. Under his reign the country was invaded by an army led by two men, one called Ubi and the other

Notes

1. H.U. Beier: "Before Oduduwa" in *Odu: Journal of Yoruba and Related Studies* (ed. S.O. Biobaku, H.U. Beier and L. Lewi) No. 3 n.d. p.25
2. I. Olomola "The Eastern Yoruba country before Oduduwa, a Re-assessment" in the *Proceedings of the Conference in Yoruba civilization* (Ed. I.A. Akinjobin and G.O. Ekemode) Vol. 1 1976 pp.34 - 37.
3. These are the local histories which are collections of traditions. They will be referred to specifically in the following pages.
4. The project is funded by the University of Ife and has visited Ife, Okiti Pupa and Ondo Kingdoms. Students are encouraged to collect local traditions of various areas in Yorubaland, both for the undergraduate and postgraduate essays.
5. The late Mr. I.B. Odukoya was the main source of what we have now. Other persons in Ife, notably Mr. J.L. Adeniran, admitted knowing about the source.
6. This may well be the root of the word "Arokin" the Oyo court historians. Although we have heard of the people who are members of the Iken, we have not met anyone of them yet.
7. I.A. Akinjobin: "The Concept of Origin in Yoruba History: The Ife Example," *Ifé History Seminar* 1979/80.
8. I. Olomola: "The Eastern Yoruba country..." 1976 p.38
9. This generally known Ife tradition has been collected and reduced to writing, though still in manuscripts, by Chief M.A. Fabunmi, Chief Fasogbon and Others.
10. This episode is re-enacted every year in the area of the old Ife kingdom and also at Offa. It is the subject of a popular play titled *Moremi* by the late Duro Ladipo.
11. O. Eluyemi: *Oba Aderemi: 50 years in the History of Ife Ife* (Ife, Ogumbiyi Printing Works, 1980), p.21.
12. The whole of this ceremony was watched in 1969 by the present writer. Unfortunately, the motion picture and tape recordings done with the aid of personnel from the Institute of African Studies, cannot now be traced.
13. This ceremony was also watched by the present writer and recorded in 1958. The tapes are in the archives of the Yoruba History Research Scheme.
14. *Are* is both the symbol of authority and that part of the Oni's crown which symbolises the highest authority. The *Are* crown is worn only three times a year.
15. I. Olomola: "Eastern Yoruba Country..." p. 49; J.D. Abiola: *Iwe Ife Ijesa*, pp.21-27; Personal communication with G. O. Ekemode, who has been collecting Ijesa traditions.
16. J.D. Abiola, *Iwe Ife Ijesa*, pp. 21-23.
17. Jerome O. Ojo: *History and Traditions of Ondo* (Typescript University of Ife Library); A.F. Bridges: *Ondo: Intelligence Report 1934-35* (Typescript. University of Ife Library), pp 2-3.
18. J. A. Olusola: *Ancient Ijebu-Ode* 1968, pp. 9-29
19. Personal communication with Professor Oyin Ogunba who has been working on the dramatic aspects of the Agemo.
20. *Sunday Concord* (Lagos), 8 February, 1981.
21. S.O. Ojo, *An analysis and comparison of the legends of Origin of Akure* (B.A. History original Essay) 1966 pp. 26-29. T.S. Adeboye "The traditions of Origin of Akure" in *The Origin and Development of the monarchy in Akure from the earliest times to 1997*. University of Ife M.A. thesis 1980.
22. S.O. Arifalo, "An analysis..." H.U. Beier "Before Oduduwa" p. 30.
23. T.S. Adeboye, "The traditions..."
24. I. Olomola, "The Eastern Yoruba Country..."
25. S.F. Abiayan, *The Traditions of Origin and Growth of Isin* (B.A. History Original Essay, University of Ife, 1980), p. 2.
26. J. U. Eghareba: *History of Benin*
27. S.O. Ojo, *Bada of Saki: Iwe Ife Ijesa*, n. d. p. 10.
28. I. Olomola "The Eastern Yoruba Country..." p.51 *Sunday Concord*, 4th February, 1981.
29. From here till the end of the paper, all the evidences are derived from the *Ikodu* traditions as recorded by I.B. Odukoya in "Ancient Empire of the West Coast Kingdom of Oghene."

The Sokoto Jihad and the Fall of Oyo: Another Interpretation

Joseph Kenny, O.P.*

The Jihad of Uthman dan Fodiye in Hausaland and the rise of the Sokoto Federation of emirates has been studied from the point of view of the background of jihad movements throughout 18th and 19th century West Africa, the historical succession of events in the Sokoto jihad itself,² the Islamic ideology underlying these jihads,³ and the social grievances particularly of the Fulani herdsmen against the Hausa rulers.⁴ Likewise the story of Oyo's succumbing to a jihad waged from Ilorin has been told and the reasons debated.⁵

To my knowledge, however, the link between Hausaland and Oyo has not yet been explored from the standpoint of the economic dynamics of West African politics. The links were there in the 18th century before the Sokoto jihad. The Sokoto state, I will argue, arose in response to the Oyo state in a contest over control of the Atlantic trade. Oyo lost, but other factors prevented Sokoto from pursuing its victory to fruition. I have no new historical facts to present, but utilize the monumental works of D. Murray Last⁶ and Robin Law⁷ along with many less known references. It is only a question of gathering and utilizing the facts in the new synthesis. It will be necessary to summarize Oyo and Sokoto history as already established, along with the interpretations of it that have been advanced in the course of doing so, and in the last section, I will present my own interpretation.

The Political Economy of Oyo until the Jihad⁸

The Expansion of Oyo

Whatever may be said of Ife as the "Cradle of the Yoruba" or the greater early importance of other Yoruba states, old Oyo was the paramount Yoruba power from the 17th to the early 19th century. The capital, called Katunga in the time of Clapperton and otherwise known as Oyo Ile, was dangerously exposed to Borgu and Nupe enemies. In spite of its destruction in the 16th century it was re-occupied because of its commercial advantages which outweighed the risk its site presented.⁹ It lay within the savanna zone where horses could be kept for easy communication with Nupe, Borgu and other Sudanic kingdoms to the north, with the forest kingdoms to the southeast and the coastal kingdoms of Ardrah and Whydah which were accessible through a corridor of savanna reaching to the sea.

Horses obtained from Borno gave the Alafins the military capability to secure their borders against raids from Borgu and Nupe and to consolidate and expand their territory towards the south. The Oyo heartland supplied foodstuffs,

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notably grains and cattle, in the northern parts and yams and palm oil in the southern parts, in iron tools and weapons, pottery, and cotton cloth.¹⁰ Such tribute enabled the Alafins to maintain a staff and an army, the populace, in return, enjoyed security and the prosperity generated by a wider market.

In the first half of the 17th century in the Alafins tried to expand into Ijesa Ekiti and other Yoruba Kingdoms to the southeast. They were unsuccessful, because the forest terrain was unsuitable for cavalry, and in the rains the tsetse fly was especially dangerous for the horses. The motive for attempting to subjugate the forest states must have been to exploit their agricultural products which were different from those of the savanna. Ijesa kola nuts were particularly valuable for resale to the north in competition with the Gonja supply although Yoruba production of the preferred *nitida* variety of kola was not very important until colonial times.¹¹

In the second half of the 17th century Oyo began to expand to the southwest, all the way to the coast. The savanna condition permitted the employment of cavalry, but the tsetse fly and the problem of providing fodder for the horses prevented Oyo from permanently conquering or occupying widespread territory in the south.¹² Yet some colonization of the coastal routes did take place, first in the Ango area, west of the river Yewa between Badagry and Porto Novo, at the beginning of the 18th century, then in the mid-18th century in the north of Egbado country, and finally in southern Egbado, including the towns of Ijanna and Ilaro.¹³

Oyo's first dealings with the Atlantic trade were through the independent kingdoms of Allada, Porto Novo and Hueda (Whydah). Oyo raided Allada several times in the late 17th century,¹⁴ presumably to secure better conditions for its own trading activity. Trade continued to be hampered, however, because Allada and Whydah were at war with each other from 1712 to 1722,¹⁵ and in 1717-18 they declared royal monopolies over the slave trade in their respective ports. This action provoked Dahomey to annex Allada in 1724 and Whydah in 1727.¹⁶ Dahomian control of these port kingdoms was a threat to Oyo's interests, and Oyo responded in two ways. First, it campaigned against Dahomey from 1727 to 1730 until Dahomey agreed to become a tributary state, keeping the whole of Whydah and most of Allada except Ajase, (a Yoruba name for Porto Novo).¹⁷ Secondly, because of the recurring instability of Whydah and Allada, it developed easterly trade routes leading to Badagry and Lagos through Egbado country.

Motives for Expansion to the Atlantic

If we look for the motive of Oyo's intervention in or occupation of these coastal areas we find different opinions. For P. Morton-Williams, the reason is simple; it was to "participate in the coastal trade in slaves with the Europeans".¹⁸ The same opinion was expressed by R. Smith: "The Oyo had become by the late seventeenth century exporters on a large scale of slaves for the Atlantic trade."¹⁹ In spite of the evidence which these authors offer, I.A. Akinjogbin rejects this view altogether. He says, "While Oyo would have derived certain economic advantages from its conquests, it does not appear to have benefited much from the slave trade with the Europeans in the 17th century... For Oyo at that date the coast was really a backwater."²⁰ Akinjogbin does, however, admit that Oyo

was heavily engaged in slave trading in the late 18th century.²¹ He says: "The Oyo derived their wealth largely from the export of slaves, a trade which, since the beginning of the reign of Abiodun seems to have been the main prop of Oyo economy."²²

The more recent work of Robin Law argues more closely the case that Oyo's expansion to the Atlantic was motivated by the slave trade. The witness of Dapper in the 1640s, as well as documents of 1723, 1727 and 1753, refer to the Kingdom of "Olukumi" (or one of its variants), meaning a Yoruba Kingdom, likely Oyo, as a supplier of the considerable volume of slaves sold through Allada.²³ This evidence confirms the theory that Oyo had little local economic advantage to gain by annexing or exerting influence over neighbouring states towards the coast, since the products of these states were not significantly different from those of the Oyo heartland (apart from salt from evaporated sea water), all these states bring in a savanna region. The only advantage of any consequence from this reach to the sea was the booming Atlantic trade.

This argument is bolstered by further documentation and activity which has no plausible explanation apart from Oyo's interest in the slave trade. Oyo's intervention against Dahomey in 1726 to 1730 made good sense as a way of reopening Oyo's access to the sea which Dahomey's annexation of Allada and Whydah had cut off. The resumption of Oyo's supply of slaves to Whydah is indicated by a 1754 document blaming a slump in trade to political troubles within Oyo.²⁴ Other documents refer to the slave trade in the 1770s.²⁵ In the 1780 the Dahomians closed their ports again to Oyo traders, forcing them to move to the newer ports which had arisen in the west: Epe (not the Nigerian Epe, but present-day Cotonou) in the 1720s, Badagry in 1736, Porto Novo in the 1750s, and Lagos in the 1760s. Between 1760 and 1770 Portuguese ships stopping at Principe include 13 from Epe, 12 from Porto Novo, 14 from Badagry and 2 from Lagos.²⁶ At first this trade passed through the kingdom of Weme. Then, as we have seen, to have more direct control of the routes to the new ports Oyo colonized southern Egbado in the 1770s and 1780s.²⁷ Dahomian attacks on Epe in 1782, Badagry in 1784, and Weme in 1786 only served to make Whydah languish and to drive the bulk of the slave trade to Porto Novo and Lagos. Lagos became the most important port in the 1790s, with supply routes coming by lagoon from Porto Novo and eventually Oyo, or from Ikosi and Ikorodu and eventually the Ijebu Kingdom. The Ijebu slaves were obtained either by condemning local criminals or by purchase from Oyo.

The slaves sold by Oyo were from four different sources: 1) native criminals, who were not so numerous, 2) war captives, who were the majority,²⁸ 3) slaves given in tribute by vassal states, such as Dahomey, who were not so many, and 4) slaves bought from Nupe, Borgu and even the Hausa states and Borno, especially in the late 18th century. Adams (1786-1800) refers to the large numbers of Hausa slaves for sale at Porto Novo.²⁹

Oyo paid for slaves and horses from the north with European goods obtained from the coast, particularly cowry shells, but also iron bars, cloth, earthenware, beads, rum and guns.³⁰ Guns, however, were not of much use in Oyo which relied mainly on cavalry and did not know how to use firearms effectively.³¹ On the coast, slaves were almost the only commodity the

European traders were interested in, although Oyo may also have sold a little cloth, ivory and palm oil.³²

The main beneficiaries of Oyo's economic system were the Alafin, the trading magnates at their hangers-on. The majority farmer people benefited from the empire mainly because its peace and security permitted local markets to prosper. They were not heavily taxed, since the Alafin got food supplies for his retainers and the army from farms run by slaves. Ordinary people also could obtain imported iron for tools and cloth in exchange for kola and palm oil. Some found their fortune by joining the army or becoming retainers of big traders.

Any conclusion about Oyo's involvement in the Atlantic slave trade rests not merely on direct evidence but also on the principle explained earlier that economic interest is at the base of economic political expansion. Simple ethnic togetherness or the glory and prestige of the nation or even the spread of a religion are not enough. The export of slaves to the coast is the most plausible explanation of Oyo's military and political action in the coastal region, even when we have no record of the deliberations and planning behind this action.³³

As a powerful middleman between the north and the Atlantic, Oyo had to maintain an efficient trading complex which we could name "Oyo Incorporated". The centralization that this required led, from the beginning of the 18th century, to a greater concentration of power in the hands of the Alafin and a curtailing of the power of the metropolitan nobles or **Oyomesi**.³⁴ The inbuilt human weakness of the whole system appeared in a power struggle between these two parties. The issue was one of free business interest versus government restrictions, and not of military expansionism versus trading interest, as Akinjogbin maintains,³⁵ because expansion of the empire could serve its economic interests, both by widening the trading zone and by capturing slaves which could be sold. The question was how would the profits of the trading operations be shared. Would most go to the Alafin whose central authority ensured the unity of the empire and the possibility of long-distance trade, or would the provincial governors take a larger share, and thereby weaken the imperial trading network by introducing their own tolls and restrictions on the traders?

The Fall of Oyo

The struggle between the Alafins and the **Oyomesi** came to a head in 1754 when the Basorun Gaha (Gaa) grabbed effective power and took over administration of the empire. The Alafin Abiodun dislodged him only in 1774 by enlisting the support of the provincial towns. All was not yet well, however, and Nupe and Borgu took advantage of the disturbed situation to launch several successful attacks on Oyo in the 1780s. When the Alafin Abiodun died in 1789, according to the chronology accepted by Akinjogbin and Law,³⁶ his children were driven out of Oyo and the secession went to the weak Awole, whom the **Oyo mes**i thought they could manipulate. Instead, Awole proceeded to quarrel not only with the **Oy mes**i but also with the provincial governors, notably with their leader, Afonja of Ilorin.

Awole's plot to get rid of Afonja by ordering him to attack the impregnable town of Iwere backfired when Afonja marched on Oyo instead. Awole was therefore compelled to commit ritual suicide; this was in 1796, according to the afore-mentioned chronology. Another Alafin named Adebo was installed, but

lasted only 120 days, another named Maku lasted three months. The military then ruled for five years, that is, to 1802 when the Alafin Majotu took power. During all this time Afonja grew stronger in Ilorin and the surrounding area. Oyo and Ilorin held each other at bay until 1817, when Ilorin launched a successful Muslim rebellion against Oyo. Internal dissension and external aggression were to bring Oyo down.³⁷

Afonja was not a Muslim himself, but found his opportunity to break the stalemate with Oyo by exploiting the sentiments of the considerable Muslim community living within Oyo territory. These included: 1) Hausa, Fulani and Arab clerics and traders from the north who had settlements all along the trade routes to the coast; 2) Fulani herdsmen, who at least from ethnic solidarity would support a jihad led by Fulani clerics; 3) an important group of Yoruba Muslim traders who worked hand in hand with the Northerners, and 4) a large slave population of Muslims from the north.

Afonja invited a fulani cleric named Salih, also called Alimi, to rally these Muslim group against Oyo. Salih proclaimed a jihad, which greatly distributed normal life all the way to the Oyo capital. The Alafin responded by executing many of the Muslims in Oyo Ile, but this was only a momentary reprisal, Muslim traders and clerics were soon freely moving again within Oyo Ile and its dependencies. Fulani bands, however, continued to raid the countryside, creating many abandoned towns and making life insecure and intolerable in the Oyo hearthland.

Meanwhile Afonja ran into difficulty with his Muslim allies. Salih apparently had died when his son Abdassalam declared his allegiance to Sokoto and was in return recognized as "Emire of Yoruba" in 1823 or 1824. Either before or after this event, Afonja became alarmed and tried to get the Fulani and Hausa to leave Ilorin and settle elsewhere. They then rose up and killed him together with his Yoruba Muslim assistant Solagberu. The Fulani Muslims were thenceforward in charge of Ilorin.

With this successful challenge to Oyo so close to its capital, the vassal kingdoms and provincial towns gradually broke away. Consequently the long distance trade routes from the Atlantic to the north, on which the economy of the empire depended, were gradually cut off. Oyo's export of slaves dropped dramatically, and its inability to import horses crippled its cavalry force. International trade began to bypass Oyo, moving instead through Borgu and Dahomey to Whydah, or through Nupe, Ilorin and Ijebu to Lagos. Oyo continued to suffer from internal dissension and from Fulani attacks until 1833, when Ilorin forces conquered the capital and forced the inhabitants to profess Islam. Ilorin then proceeded to occupy the whole hearthland of the Oyo kingdom. The now tributary Oyo leadership staged one more effort to strike back at Ilorin with the help of Borgu. Gwandu, headquarters of the Western part of the Sokoto caliphate, sent Nupe troops for the final assault on Oyo in 1836.³⁸ The Borgu leaders were killed and the Alafin Oluwewu was captured and executed. Oyo Ile was then abandoned and the new Alafin Atiba established himself at Ago Oja, which was renamed the new Oyo. Nominally his rule extended over nearby towns such as Ibadan, which was founded by Oyo refugees, but effectively the Oyo empire had come to an end.

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Ilorin attempted to extend its conquests over the whole of Yorubaland, but was checked by Ibadan at Osogbo in 1838. Later in the 19th century its ambition came closer to realization, but was checked by the British. Muslim Ilorin owed allegiance to Sokoto. We must now review Sokoto history and the motives for the jihad of Uthman dan Fodiye.

In particular, we must ask why the jihad continued unrelentingly towards the sea, while immediate northern neighbours, such as Argungu and Sabon Birni, were left undisturbed.

The Sokoto Jihad: A Historical Resume ³⁶

Uthman dan Fodiye was born at Maratta in 1754 of a Fulani clan specializing in Islamic learning whose origins go back to Futa Toro. His childhood, at Degel in Gobir territory north of present day Sokoto, included an elementary Islamic education under his father. In 1775 Uthman went to Agadez to study under Shaykh Jibril, a Tuareg who had ambitions of carrying out a jihad among his own people. Jibril went on pilgrimage to Mecca and wanted Uthman to accompany him, but Uthman could not get his father's permission. Instead, he returned home and formed a *jama'a*, an embryonic group of followers and supporters, and went on preaching tours around Gobir, Zamfara and Kebbi. In 1788 the Sarkin Gobir, Bawa Jan Gwarzo, invited him to the *Id al-adha* prayer assembly where Uthman's followers outnumbered those of the Sarki. Overawed, the Sarki granted him his five demands:¹) that he could preach without restriction,²) that no one should be prevented from following him,³) that Muslims wearing the turban should be treated with respect,⁴) that Muslim prisoners would be freed, and 5) that taxes should be reduced.

Bawa Jan Gwarzo's successor, Nafata (1801-3), opposed Uthman, forbidding anyone but Uthman himself to preach, forbidding conversion of those whose fathers were not Muslims, and forbidding turbans on men and veils on women. Nafata's son Yunfa (1803-8) began his reign friendly to Uthman but found a chance to retaliate when Yunfa sent out a raiding party to capture a wealthy Gobir man, Abdassalam, who had fled to Gunbara (near Jega) in the reign of his father. Yunfa's men failed to capture Abdassalam but they raided his village and carried off many prisoners. Uthman waylaid the raiding party on their return and freed the prisoners. Yunfa thereupon ordered Uthman to leave Gobir territory.

On 21 February 1804, with the severance of ties implied in a religious hijira, Uthman moved westward to Gudu. His followers, against the wishes of Yunfa, joined him and in May made formal submission (bay'a) to him as their Imam. Afraid of Uthman's build up of strength, Yunfa sent his army against him. Although outnumbered and short of provisions, Uthman's men had the advantage of being in a wooded area next to Lake Kwoto. Because of this position and their better morale they defeated the Gobir army. Uthman then moved camp to Magabshi (near Yabo) in Kebbi territory. Many more Fulani joined him after his victory, but their raids for food alienated many of the Hausa peasants.

In October 1804 and January 1805 the Fulani made unsuccessful attack on the Gobir capital Alkalawa. Then Uthman moved his camp to Sabon Gari in Zamfara territory while his younger brother Abdallah attacked and captured

Birin Kebbi capital, causing its Sarki, Muhammed Hodi, to flee and eventually set up headquarters at Argungu. Uthman's son Muhammed Bello began raiding Gobir and Zamfara villages for food, thereby making it dangerous for the Fulani to remain at Sabon Gari. In July 1805 they moved to Gwandu and fortified the town as a permanent base. In November 1805 a combined army of the Gobir, Tuareg, Zamfara and Kebbi marched on Gwandu. The Fulani went out to meet them and were severely defeated at Alwasa. The enemy pursued the Fulani to Gwandu and might easily have taken the town and ended the jihad, but a delay on their part permitted the Fulani to rally their forces and on the rougher terrain near the town to rout the enemy completely. The Fulani were thereafter in the superior position.

In 1807 Muhammed Bello took Kiawa, the capital of Zamfarsa, ending the independence of that state. On 3 October 1808 he took Alkalawa, but the Gobir Sarki driven from his capital, maintained control of the northern part of Gobir, now in Niger Republic, and throughout the 19th century Gobir harassed Sokoto with frequent raids on its territory. The town of Sokoto was founded in 1809 when Muhammed Bello chose the site as his headquarters. In 1812 Uthman divided the administration of the empire between his son Muhammed Bello for the eastern part, with Sokoto as his capital, and his brother Abdallah for the west, with his capital first at Bodinga and later Gwandu. In 1815 Uthman moved to Sokoto, where he died on 20 April 1817.

When Uthman began his jihad he distributed flags to Fulani leaders throughout Hausaland and beyond. In 1805 they overthrew the Hausa rulers of Daura, Kano and Katsina. At the end of 1808 Zaria fell and its Hausa rulers fled to Abuja (now called Suleja). The Fulani also came to power in areas which never had Muslim rulers. Adama led the jihad in the territory named Adamawa after him, most of which is now in Cameroon. Hamman Ruwa took over Muri, Yakubu, a former student of Uthman established himself in Bauchi, and Buba Yero in Gombe. Other Fulani leaders established themselves in Keffi, Nasarawa, Lafia, Jema'a and Wase. The adventurer Umaru Nagwamatse founded Kontagora, in whose surrounding territory he and his successors conducted intensive slave raiding.

Nupe, like the Hausa states, had Muslim rulers before the jihad of Uthman dan Fodiye. The first was the Etsu Jibrilu (1746-59), but shortly after this death a dynastic dispute led to a division of the kingdom. In 1805 a Fulani cleric named Dendo conspired with Maijiya, Etsu of Raba and the west, to defeat Jimada, the Etsu of Gbara and eastern Nupe land. Once Maijiya secured power over a reunited Nupe land began to fear Dendo's influence and expelled him from the kingdom. Dendo then joined Idrisu, son of the defeated Jimada, and together they deposed Maijiya. Dendo then installed Idrisu as a puppet king in Adama Lelu (near Egan), while he himself held the real power in Raba. Idrisu revolted in 1830 and was killed, leaving the Fulani in complete control of Nupe.⁴⁰ Besides Nupe, the Fulani set up emirates in Agai, Lapai, Pategi and Lafiagi⁴¹

Lastly, as we have seen, a Muslim-Fulani coup was staged in Ilorin, and the heartland of the Oyo empire was incorporated into the Sokoto caliphate. All these emirates were largely independent, so that we cannot speak of a Sokoto empire, but they recognized the primacy of Sokoto, and Sokoto or

either by trading on the way or by God's special favour.

The question we need to ask is: what economic or social advantages could be realized by 'Uthman dan Fodiye's jihad? The following models are some hypotheses that have been advanced in an attempt to provide an answer.⁴⁹

The Ethnic Model.

One of the earliest socio-economic analysis of the jihad made it an ethnic struggle of newly arrived nomadic and virile Fulani against the softened sedentary Hausa. The jihad was simply a question of the stronger taking over from the weaker to exploit the agricultural commodities the Hausa had to offer. As alien herdsmen, the Fulani would naturally take any form of oppression as an attack on themselves as a community. Even before the jihad, separate Fulani risings took place in the future Adamawa with the appearance of an ethnic revolt.⁵⁰

This view has the merit of recognizing that strong Fulani solidarity made possible coordinated and successful jihad action over a very wide area, but it fails to take into account the participation of Hausa peasantry and also some settled Fulani in the jihad. Also the Zabarma people supported the jihad to settle scores with the Gobir.⁵¹

We must also recognize the power of religious solidarity that bound *jama'as* together over a very wide area. Students travelled far to seek out teachers of repute, and the bonds of loyalty thus established made possible the political and military cooperation such as the jihad of 'Uthman dan Fodiye evinced.

Marxist Model

A Marxist theory proposed by the Russian Africanist D. Olderogge sees the jihad as a rising of oppressed Fulani nomads, later joined by Hausa peasantry, to overthrow a feudal Hausa aristocracy. 'Uthman dan Fodiye used the discontent of the stable social stratum of farmers and pastoralists to put himself and his collaborators in the place of the Hausa aristocratic superstructure, continuing the same feudal system.⁵²

This theory was attacked by Jack Goody, who points out that real feudalism hardly existed in Africa, outside Ethiopia, because of the abundant land and low technology. The aristocracy were not landlords, but lords of people, and their power lay in the military means to protect and tax production and trade in their states and to wage war for defence and for booty.⁵³ Moreover, as Marilyn Waldman points out,⁵⁴ the discontented groups who supported the jihad were not merely the Fulani pastoralists and Hausa peasants, but also many clerics, both poor ones and some court appointees, and many of the *Fulani gida*, the settled Fulani businessmen with the Hausa cities. The clerics has a professional religious interest in the jihad, while the businessmen saw fantastic economic opportunities in the success of the jihad, as will be explained later.

M. Godelier⁵⁵ and J. Suret-Canale⁵⁶ proposed a revised Marxist model, to African societies where a centralized state coexists with a village patriarchal society having a communal economy. The latter institution is more stable and it remains should one aristocratic structure replace another, as was the case

Gwandu had a hand in many of their internal affairs⁴²

Theoretical Interpretations

Various models have been proposed to explain the genesis and disintegration of pre-colonial African states in general, or the causes of the Sokoto jihad in particular. Some of these models are mutually opposed, while others can be complementary, as can be seen by examining them one by one:

The Religious Model

For the rise of any reformed Islamic state the religious model gets predominant attention. It was the only model presented by the Sokoto jihad leaders themselves and is the principal explanation offered by some modern writers.⁴³ The religious model, which sees Islamic religious principles as the basic dynamic for the formation of an Islamic state, need not detain us here, since it is described in detail in many general works.⁴⁴ Suffice it to say that a Muslim community ideally is ruled by the Sharia, God's law as revealed in the *Qur'an* Sunna, which covers all aspects of life. In a society where this does not prevail Muslims have the choice of either hijra, moving to another land where Sharia is the law, or jihad, struggle by all realistic means, even shedding blood if necessary, to institute the rule of Sharia. The divine imperative was the explicit compelling motive behind the jihad of 'Uthman dan Fodiye and his companions as far away as Adamawa and Ilorin. Their fight was mainly against compromising Muslim rulers,⁴⁵ and once these were overthrown there was not much urgency about imposing Islam on non-Muslim Hausa subjects, but only an annual dry season jihad against unsubjected pagan peoples outside Hausa land.

The Sokoto jihad leaders were not blind religious fanatics, but were well acquainted with classical works about the constitution of an Islamic state. They expressed their ideas in hundreds of written works, both long documented treatises and popular tracts and letters. We can agree with H.F.C. Smith and T. Hodgkin that the jihad leaders were extremely well read in Islamic literature,⁴⁶ but Tringham's opinion that these writings "show no originality" is also valid, in spite of Hodgkin's criticism, as far as general Islamic thought is concerned.⁴⁷ The jihad leaders wrote in the *asr al-jumud*, the age when Islamic thought was fixed and frozen. It could be rephrased and applied to new situations, but not developed in any real way.⁴⁸ Nevertheless it is to the jihad leaders' credit that they reflected carefully on Islamic theory and applied it to the situation of Hausaland in their time.

We can accept the religious model for the jihad as basically correct, at least during the lifetime of 'Uthman dan Fodiye. Nevertheless this model does not exclude other models based on economic or social factors, but rather presupposes them, since Islam purports to be not only the right way to God but also the right formula for economic and social success. The all-inclusiveness of Islam makes Muslims expect that its establishment will bring a better and more prosperous society and a greater enjoyment of the goods of this life as well as those of the next. We may draw a comparison with the hajj, where along with its spiritual benefits, a pilgrim can also legitimately aspire to come home richer,

with the Islamic jihads of the 18th and 19th century West Africa.⁸⁷

This neo-Marxist model was criticized by Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch,⁸⁸ who pointed out that by eliminating from the Asiatic mode the feature of great public works, such as monumental buildings or complex irrigation works, the state superstructure is deprived of its dynamic and reason for existing. The ruling class may well draw tribute from the peasantry, but this is not the force behind the existence and organization of African empires. For her, trade takes the place of great public works in a specifically African model of political economy.

The International Trade Model

This model, such as proposed by Coquery-Vidrovitch, combines a tribute paying communal patriarchal economy with a system of long-distance trade controlled by a royal or bourgeois aristocracy. Trade, in the broad sense of selling for profit what was procured cheaply, either by peaceful trade or military raids, was once of the motors of history in tropical Africa. It was at the same time the most dynamic but also the least stable element in society, because it was easily disrupted by wars, blockades or changes in demand.

The history of the medieval West African empires confirms the theory that long-distance trade was the fundamental dynamic in the formation of large states in this part of the world.⁸⁹ Whether the exchange was of salt for gold or between any other commodities, the need and opportunity was present for a powerful government to control the routes, eliminating both customs barriers along the way and the threat of highway robbers. Whether the Sudanese rulers engaged directly in trade or, as was more common, simply taxed private trade, their role was of powerful middlemen, and this made them rich. They did not usually control production, and when they tried to do so it led to disaster, as when the kings of Ghana took over the Bambuk gold fields and later the salt mines of Awdaghust. As general pattern, then, any expansion of political and military power took place to serve economic interests. These included security for people's lives and their production and exchange of goods, as well as ensuring a fair distribution of profits. This was an endemic source of conflict, but ideally every party to the trading enterprise had his proportionate share.

So far this model is quite satisfactory, but it requires some further refinement.⁹⁰ Both Coquery-Vidrovitch and the Marxist theorists supposed that the patriarchal peasant level of African society had a "subsistent economy", one which produced all and only its basic needs and did not require or engage in the exchange of goods. J.E. Flint⁹¹ and A.G. Hopkins⁹² have pointed out how fallacious this notion is and how diversified the local economy generally was, in that people specialized in many different industries besides food production, and this was the reason why local markets thrived, quite apart from goods exchanged in long-distance trade.⁹³

Another modification of this model needs to be made to take account of the complexity of the slave trade, which was becoming increasingly important and formed the basis of the economy of some states. We must differentiate between export and domestic use of slaves. In the case of 18th century Futa Jalon under the rule of the Fulani *alimamis*, the aristocratic economy was based almost exclusively on exporting slaves to the Atlantic, while only a few surplus slaves were kept for rice production.⁹⁴ In the Sokoto federation, however, where

slave raiding was equally important, slaves were used in much greater numbers to augment the population of the emirates and thereby increase local production and revenue for the aristocracy.⁹⁵ Export of slaves, nevertheless, was also important, both across the Sahara throughout the 19th century and to the Atlantic up to the middle of the 19th century when the Atlantic slave market ceased to function.⁹⁶ The importance of the Atlantic trade to Sokoto will be clarified in the last section of this article.

A Composite Model

From the preceding discussion of models we can describe a composite model embracing several dynamics, all of which, it could be argued, played an important part in the rise of the Sokoto federation. The absence or weakening of Sokoto power.

The first dynamic is the religious one. To be effective, any ideology must be religious in the sense that it relates man to something of ultimate value which will command his entire allegiance; it must also provide the basis for a community loyalty. Islam clearly does this. African traditional religion does also to a certain extent, especially when it sacralizes authority, but it is limited to a narrow, usually village, society, whereas Islamic monotheism is better adapted to an international social order.⁹⁷

The second dynamic is social, and that consists in an equitable distribution of the national cake. If an ethnic group or economic class, such as the nomadic Fulani or Hausa peasantry, becomes disaffected at seeing the privileges of the law, they will really contribute to a change of regime; but to succeed they must have good leadership. Sometimes a warlord will suffice, but intellectual and religious leaders, such as led the Sokoto jihad, are more effective in the long run.

The third dynamic is economic. The ruler of a small state can aspire to the wealth of tribute or tax from the surplus of the local economy in return for guaranteeing order and security. Avoiding the pitfall of the concept of "subsistent economy", we realize that this tribute can take as many forms as the variety of local production. At a next state, a ruler may desire to expand his domains in order to receive in tax some other product not available locally. Such expansion is equivalent to the creation of a wider common market. In another development trading arrangements may be made with outlying areas without controlling their production of goods. In this case the central state may act simply as a middleman, transmitting goods for re-export. Many variations are possible within this model; so we should not see a sharp distinction between patriarchal local economies and those of large empires. The two are rather extreme points of a continuum, with the possibility of many intermediate forms in between. In any case, wherever an expansion of borders takes place we must ask what is the economic advantage of it. Empires do not come into being simply for prestige, but have something to gain by expanding. Otherwise they stay within their inherited boundaries or even shrink.

In the case of Sokoto, the first two dynamics have been studied and established. The third dynamic was hinted at by Guy Nicolas, who pointed to the interest the business and caravan men of Gobir in the success of "Uthman dan Fodiye's jihad."⁹⁸ R. Horton comments that "there is at least a suspicion that in two of the Jihad commonly regarded as pastoralist-dominated, those of Malik

Sy and Usman Dan Fodio, mercantile interests may also have been of some importance.⁶⁰ To explore how this third dynamic applies to the Sokoto jihad we must look at how Sokoto stood to benefit from extending the jihad in Oyo's direction.

Sokoto's Interest in the Fall of Oyo

Well before the jihad, Hausaland was tied into the slave trading network of the Oyo empire. Robin Law observes that enslavement of Oyo citizens did not become common until after 1810, with a consequent aggravated instability of the Kingdom. Before that time slaves were obtained from outside, with a great expansion in the 1780s of trade in slaves purchased from the north. He concludes that "any political consequences should be sought in Hausaland rather than in Oyo."⁷⁰

There is evidence for considerable slave raiding within Hausaland in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Besides the testimony of Adams mentioned above, 'Uthman dan Fodiye complains of the enslavement of Muslims in his *Masa'il muhimma*, written in 1802, two years before the jihad, and again in his Fulani poem *Tabban hakikan*. His brother 'Abdallah makes a similar complaint in his *Taziyin al-waraqat*.⁷¹ Muhammad Bello in 1812 wrote explicitly in his *Infaq al-maysur* that "the people of that land (Yoruba) import slaves from our land and sell them to the aforementioned Christians (on the coast). I mention this problem so that you may not sell a Muslim slave to anyone who would bring him there."⁷² Further evidence that the supply routes of the Atlantic market went right up to the north is the large numbers of Muslim slaves, both Hausa and Yoruba, in Brazil, many of whom later returned to Lagos and other places.⁷³

Before the jihad slaves were readily available because of the constant wars going on between the small Hausa states. Katsina was at war with Gobir from 1750 up to the time of the jihad, and Gobir was constantly eating away the territory of Zamfara during the same period.⁷⁴ Kebbi suffered attacks from Gobir, Zamfara and the Tuareg of Asben.⁷⁵ Also during most of the 18th century Kano was caught between attacks from Borno and Gobir.⁷⁶ Zaria was more at peace but like Katsina, at the price of having to pay a periodic tribute of slaves to Borno.⁷⁷ These wars naturally yielded good numbers of captives, many of them Muslims. Although many of these were kept locally and others sold to Arabs for export across the Sahara, many also were sold to dealers exporting them to the Atlantic coast.

The wars among the Hausa states, while contributing to the slave market, in reality prevented the development of this market to any considerable extent, because the fighting made the long-distance trade routes unsafe and prevented the tapping of richer slaving grounds further off, especially in Bauchi and Adamawa, where pagans could be enslaved without any religious scruple. Any slave dealer could see the advantage or necessity of uniting Hausaland and the surrounding areas into a single commonwealth, so that traders and slavers could move freely. We can assume that these traders would be prepared to support any jihad that promised to effect the desired political unification.⁷⁸ How explicitly conscious the merchants were of the advantages the jihad offered and how unified and organised was their support for the jihad could be further researched. To be sure, they operated more by pragmatic instinct and business

sense rather than by formal study of marketing opportunities and planned strategy of operation. Nevertheless, they had wide contacts which could keep them well informed about the commercial and political vicissitudes of the whole Nigerian scene under question. They were possibly also aware of the 18th century jihad in Futa Jalon and the lucrative trade in slaves the victorious Fulani secured as a result.⁷⁹ The chances of a similar bonanza in opportunity in supporting the jihad which was worth risking.

The jihad of 'Uthman dan Fodiye answered perfectly the aspirations of the slave dealers. Except for occasional rebellions which the Sokoto authorities had to repress, security for trade movement was assured throughout the emirates. Raids were systematically carried out against the "Middle Belt" pagan areas which provided all the centres of Fulani rule with a rich supply of slaves. What was done with these slaves?

It seems the bulk of the slaves were absorbed locally, either in the cities for crafts or military service or in slave farm villages, increasing the population and prosperity of Hausaland.⁸⁰ These slaves adopted the Hausa language and the Islamic religion, and are estimated to have constituted the majority of the population of Sokoto and Kano. Exact statistics are not available, but a rough estimate of this high number is furnished by the literature written by the Fulani of the period, testimonies of European travellers, oral tradition and some studies of the city population made at the beginning of the British period.

Only newly captured slaves or refractory old ones were normally sold for export. Yet the number exported was considerable enough for slaves to become a standard currency in Hausaland and the surrounding areas, replacing cowries for any larger transaction.⁸¹ Many slaves were exported through the Atlantic market. No doubt the profits and value of the trade in the late 18th century were known in commercial circles of the north, since northern Muslim traders constantly frequented the routes to the coast. The same traders could report the advantage of securing control of these trade routes and integrating them into the Sokoto once this was established. Thus, in spite of their proximity, Sokoto and Gwandu made no serious attempt to conquer Argungu or the remnants of Gobir north of Illela.⁸² On the contrary, all efforts were expended for a thrust to the sea, by a Muslim-Fulani take-over of Nupe and Oyo. Successful coups were engineered in both these states, as we have seen, mainly through the agency of local Muslim forces, but also with some assistance to Ilorin from Gwandu, the headquarters of western part of the Caliphate. The jihad thrust to the south certainly catered for the demand for a workforce in the Caliphate's heart land. But Samuel Johnson's phrase, "to dip the Quran into the sea,"⁸³ summarized the attraction of the Atlantic market.

The mercantile party of the Sokoto confederation had every interest in pushing the conquest to the coast, since from the beginning of the 19th century until 1830 the Atlantic slave business actually increased. This was the result of increased demand from Brazil, Cuba and Southern United States, in spite of the stop of the slave trade by the British in 1810 and the French in 1815.⁸⁴ The Atlantic slave trade dipped sharply after 1840, until it was completely stopped by 1860. So the thrust of Sokoto to the sea was frustrated and merely by the intervening evaporation of the major economic notice. Expansion to the coast

was also blunted by the rise of independent states in the former southern dependencies of Oyo such as Ibadan, Abeokuta and the coastal city-states, so that the southern end of the trade routes was still subject to the exactions of the middlemen and periodic instability and insecurity.

Slaves were also exported across the Sahara. Once the jihad was consolidated, the Sokoto confederation rivalled Borno for the Trans-Saharan trade. Trans-Saharan trade increased throughout the 19th century, in spite of the growth of European trade on the coast.⁸⁵ Trans-Saharan slave exporting thrived, especially after the Atlantic slave market vanished.

Yet the attraction of the Atlantic was later renewed because other advantages became apparent. One of these was the supply of firearms, which in the 19th century became not only more common but also indispensable for survival. Even after the British imposed their rule on the whole of modern Nigeria, the heirs to the sokoto establishment continued to show concern for the route to Lagos and took every available means to assure that it remained open and secure for their trading operations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can present a composite model for the Sokoto jihad which includes three dynamics: the religious ideology espoused by the jihad leaders, the aspirations for social equity of the Fulani and Hausa peasantry, and finally the economic interest of the northern long-distance traders particularly those specialising in slave trade.

The dynamic of large state formation is long distance trade. As I have argued elsewhere,⁸⁶ the trans-Saharan trade gave impetus to the formation of empires in the West African savanna from the 8th to the 15th century (and longer in Borno). The Turkish occupation of North Africa in the 16th century put a damper on trade heading for the Maghrib. So the Songhay empire died and had no immediate successor. The Atlantic trade, especially from the 18th century, gave rise first to coastal empires and then, as its impact was felt further inland, to the jihad states. Oyo was the most important empire to rise in response to demand for slaves on the coast. The Alafins controlled the routes from the northern supply zones to the coastal ports. The Hausa traders, after a risk collection of slaves in war torn Hausaland, had to surrender their profits in tolls passing through Oyo territory. So they supported the Ilorin rebellion.

The on going jihad conducted by the emirates of the Sokoto federation was a systematic slave-gathering operation. Most slaves were absorbed internally. But it is no accident that the Sokoto jihad began at a time when the promise of a rich slave-exporting economy looked brightest, and that the extremities of the jihad farthest from Sokoto were on the one hand the slave grounds of Adamawa and on the other hand the outlet routes controlled by Oyo.

Unfortunately for Sokoto ambitions, just as its hold on the North was consolidated and Oyo destroyed, leaving no major obstacle to the sea. European demand for slaves ended. So the Sokoto confederation confined its attention to the North and the Sahara until trade in other commodities sparked its interest in the Atlantic one more.

Notes

1. See for example J.S. Trimingham, *A History of Islam in West Africa* (London, 1962), M. Hiskett, "The nineteenth-century jihads in West Africa", 4 in J. Finted, *The Cambridge History of Africa* vol. 5 (Cambridge, 1976), and D. Murray Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate* (London, 1976).
2. The best study is that of D. Murray Last, *op. cit.*
3. See in particular M. Hiskett, *The Sword of Truth, the Life and Times of the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio* (New York, 1973), and above all F.H. El-Masri, A critical edition of Dan Fodio's *Bayan wujub al-hijra 'ala l-lbad*, with introduction, English translation and commentary (University of Ibadan Ph.D thesis, 1968).
4. See particularly M. Waldman, "The fulani jihad: a reassessment", *Journal of African History*, 6(1965), pp. 333-355, and "A note on the ethnic interpretation of the Fulani jihad", *Africa*, 36 (1966), pp. 286-291.
5. Notably by P. Morton-Williams, "The Oyo Yoruba and the Atlantic trade, 1770-1830", *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 3 (1964), pp. 25-45, and "The Yoruba Kingdom of Oyo", in D. Forde & Kaberry (ed.), *West African Kingdoms in the nineteenth century* (London, 1967), pp. 36-69, R. Smith, "Kingdoms of the Yoruba (London, 1969), J.A. Atanda, "The fall of the old Oyo empire: are-consideration of its causes", *JHSN*, 5(1971), 477-490, and I.A. Akinjogbin, "The prelude to the Yoruba civil wars of 19th century ODU/1965 1:21965 page pp224-46, "A chronology of Yoruba history, 1789-1840", *Odu*, 2:2(1966), 81-86, "The expansion of Oyo and the rise of Dahomy 1600-1800'ch, 10 in J.F.A. Ajayi & M. Crowder (eds.) *History of West Africa*, 1 (London, 1976), (2nd ed.), and R. Law, *The Oyo Empire. c 1836* (Oxford, 1977).
6. *The Sokoto Caliphate* (London Longman, 1967).
7. *The Oyo empire, c. 1600 - 1836*
8. For this section see R. Law, *The Oyo Empire, c1600.c. 1836* (Oxford, 1977); 1. Akinjogbin, "The expansion of Oyo" (in Ajayi & Crowder), and "The economic foundations of the Oyo empire", ch 3 in I.A. Akinjogbin & S. Osoba, *Topics on Nigerian Economic and Social History* (University of Ife Press, 1980), pp. 35-54.
9. Cf. R. Smith, "The Alafin in exile", *Journal of African History*, 6(1965), pp. 57-77.
10. *Cf. R. Law, op. cit.*, pp. 201-205.
11. *Cf. B.A. Agiri*, "The Yoruba and the pre-colonial Kola trade", *Odu*, 12(1975), 55-68, and "The introduction of Niitda Kola into Nigerian agriculture, 1880-1920", *African Economic History*, 3(1977), 1-14.
12. R. Law, *op. cit.*, p. 198.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93 & 238.
14. *Cf. Law, op. cit.*, pp. 93 & 238.
15. *Cf. Akinjogbin*, "The expansion of Oyo", p. 291
16. *Cf. Law, The Oyo Empire*, pp. 219-220.
17. *Cf. Akinjogbin*, "The expansion of Oyo", p. 397. For a general picture see R. Law, "Dahomey and the slave trade: reflections on the historiography of the rise of Dahomey", *Journal of African History*, 27 (1986), pp. 237-267.
18. P. Morton-Williams, "The Yoruba Kingdom of Oyo", p. 37, *cf. his* "The Oyo Yoruba and the Atlantic trade."
19. R. Smith, *Kingdoms of the Yoruba*, p. 45.
20. Akinjogbin, "The expansion of Oyo", pp. 386-387. J.F.A. Ajayi & Smith, in *Yoruba warfare in the nineteenth century* (Ibadan, 1971), pp. 124-125, also try to minimize the fact and role of slave trade in Yoruba country.

21. *ibid.* p. 409.
22. I.A. Akinjogbin, "The prelude to the Yoruba civil wars", *Odu*, 1:2(1965), p.28, cf. his "The Oyo empire in the eighteenth century - a reassessment" *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 3:3 (1966), p. 457.
23. cf. R. Law, *The Oyo empire*, p.219 and note 127.
24. *ibid.* p.221, note 137
25. *ibid.* p.222.
26. *ibid.* p.223; R. Law, "Trade and politics behind the slave Coast: the Lagoon traffic and the rise of Lagos", *Journal of African History*, 24(1983), pp. 321-348.
27. These were from Oyo's northern and western neighbours, according to Law, who disputes the assertion of Morton-Williams that they were from Ekitiland, Morton-Williams' opinion is repeated by J. Smaldone, *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate* (Cambridge, 1977), p.41
28. John Adama, Remarks on the country extending from Cape Palmas to the River Congo (London, 1823), pp. 221-222 of also pp. 78 & 82-95, cf. Law, *The Oyo empire*, pp.225-227.
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31. J.F.A. Ajayi & R. Smith, *Yoruba warfare in the nineteenth century* (Ibadan, 1971), pp.124-125 See also Paul E. Lovejoy, "Interregional monetary flows in the precolonial trade of Nigeria", *Journal of African History*, 15 (1974), pp.563-585.
32. See the discussion of evidence and presumptive arguments in R. Law, *The Oyo empire*, pp. 234-236.
33. cf. Law, *The Oyo Empire*, pp.246-248
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35. cf. R. Law, *The Oyo empire*, pp.246-248
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Military Recruitment in Eastern Nigeria* During the Second World War

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The second world war, which began on 3 September 1939, largely as a European war, was executed in and suffered by every continent of the world. The Chief Secretary to the colonial government in Nigeria received notification of the war on the very day it started¹ and, Nigeria, being a British dependency, was naturally drawn into the crisis. She donated raw materials, food stuff, money, and, above all, offered about 121,652 soldiers to fight for Britain in all theatres of the war. Many of the young men who fought the war were raised from Eastern Nigeria - a region where anti-colonial sentiment had already developed.

The recruitment of thousands of citizens of Eastern Nigeria into the Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force during the Second World War raises certain significant questions. What were the policies and objectives which informed the recruitment? What problems confronted the exercise? In the light of the problems, what were the methods or approaches adopted to obtain the desired results? And what were the circumstances that favoured it? These are the issues examined in this work.

Policies and Objectives

Penurie de personnel for military service was a major problem which confronted the British government during the Second World War. British military policy in general, therefore, was to recruit, by voluntary or compulsory means, as many men as possible for combatant and non-combatant services in war, leaving intact only those people whose services were considered essential to civil life and war time production.² In Nigeria, the same policy applied. Military policy during, as before, the Second World War was to enlist only the citizens of Northern Nigeria as infantry men.³ Indeed, where Easterners were considered for combatant service, the policy was "to recruit men of the huntertype only."⁴ In a circular

*By this study, Eastern Nigeria is defined to include colonial provinces of Enugu, Ogoja, Abakaliki, Annang, Calabar, Onitsha, Owerri, Uyo, and Port Harcourt which constitute the present-day Anambra, Enugu, Imo, Abia, Rivers, Cross River, and Akwa Ibom States of Nigeria.

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dated 15 June 1940, the Secretary of the Eastern Provinces directed the Residents of Eastern Provinces and the Cameroons to ensure an effective application of this policy in the provinces.

However, the need for tradesmen, clerks, and carriers caused the military authority to look to Eastern Nigeria for the supply of this calibre of personnel. While recruitment policy favoured the enlistment of Northerners into infantry battalions, it considered Easterners for non-combatant service. But given the exigencies of the Second World War, this policy was not strictly pursued. Indeed, the "Roll of Honour" of the Nigerian soldiers who "died in action" especially during the later years of the war suggests that a considerable percentage of the victims were citizens of Eastern Nigeria.⁵ Thus, in spite of the policy of Northernising the infantry battalions, a large number of men from Eastern Nigeria were, in practice, engaged as combatants.

Several considerations lay behind the policies of recruitment adopted for Nigeria in general and Eastern Nigeria in particular. There was a popular theory in British military circles that peoples fell into martial and non-martial groups. Military policy makers in the war Office in London made use of this theory in the organisation of British colonial armies. In Nigeria a division was made between the "races" of the South and those of the North. Peoples of the North were considered to possess martial qualities which were lacking in the peoples of the South. Expressing this notion in 1911, the Inspector-General of the West African Frontier Force described the peoples of the South as

chiefly the descendants of numerous tribes of a cowardly, unwarlike, and feeble nature, which have been forced southwards by more virile neighbours, and have had any fighting spirit, which they may have possessed, knocked out of them by centuries of slave raiding and oppression.⁷

This conception about the southern peoples was, evidently, handed down to successive military policy makers and commanders in the West African Frontier Force, and the exigencies of the Second World War seemed not to have done much to change it. Thus, in later years a similar view about Southerners was reported by Colonel Carfarae, British Army Officer, who served in Nigeria during the war and commanded a Nigerian unit in the successful campaign against the Japanese in Burma in 1943. He wrote:

Lacking martial virtues, however they might be defined, southerners would be found to fail as fighting men... Only as signaller, vehicle driver or the like would Yoruba or Ibo be enlisted; since he spoke pidgin English it was illogically supposed he must have at his command more technical skill than the Hausaman.⁸

In contrast, the Northerner was seen as a Mohammedan who possessed the "dash" that was lacking in the Southerner. Moreover, "he (the Northerner) is a cheerful, kindly-natured, likeable individual and makes an excellent soldier."⁹

The Northerners were moslems and "illiterates", largely untouched by Western influences. They were also considered to be politically naive.¹⁰ It was therefore thought that Northerners could make dedicated and subservient soldiers. But the peoples in the South were seen differently. They were observed

to have possessed a considerable profundity of political knowledge and awareness, having been exposed to Western civilization for centuries. They were "mischiefmakers" and, as soldiers, they would be "too clever!"

Eastern Nigeria in particular was never trusted. Because of its political awareness and contact with Western civilization, uprisings against the colonial administration were thought most likely to occur in the area. The emergence of militant trade unionism in the early 1940s, which found support from Southern elite, and the outbreak of the Pioneers Riots in Eastern Nigeria in 1943¹² confirmed the government's fear and suspicion of the East. It was therefore considered politically expedient to raise an infantry army of predominantly, if not exclusively, Northern elements. The Northerners represented a culture that was mutually antipathetic to the culture represented by the Southerners. Therefore, forming an infantry force, the former could be mobilised most successfully to quell any uprising in Eastern Nigeria. These considerations informed the policies of war time recruitment in Eastern Nigeria.

Whatever its policies, military recruitment in Eastern Nigeria during the war, as elsewhere in the British colonial world, was intended to build up a colonial force with a huge reserve which was to be used locally when the need arose. It was originally considered by the War Office and the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the Nigeria Regiment would remain in Nigeria to keep internal security and defend Nigeria against any enemy attack. There was little consideration, if any, that soldiers of the Regiment should be released for military service overseas.¹³

The British government shifted from this position in 1940 when Italy entered the war on the side of Germany. It was decided that Nigerian troops should fight the war in the tropics and semi-tropical zones to whose climate they were already used. They were to be commanded and supported by British soldiers who had stayed in the tropics and were acclimatized to tropical climate. In the following year, it was decided in a manpower conference held in Cairo that African colonies should supply carriers and artisans "for service in Middle East in order to relieve British personnel who were urgently required elsewhere."¹⁴ As the war raged on, British manpower on the Western Front became lean. This situation and the unceasing Japanese menace in 1943 aroused much concern in the War Office was constrained to decide further that two West African divisions should be raised for service overseas. Military recruitment, whose aim was originally to raise colonial local forces for the maintenance of "internal security", henceforth became an exercise through which the Overseas Force was to be reinforced. This further re-adjustment in the aim of military recruitment was emphatically reiterated in various circulars received by District Officers in Eastern Nigeria:

Recruiting today has only one purpose - that is to keep the Overseas forces at full strength. There are no more units to be raised - the task before us all is to keep our formations fighting on the field of battle. This was the fundamental reason behind the fixing of the quotas in August 1943. It had by then become possible to work out the percentage of re-inforcements required to keep our formations at full strength. This fixed quota appears likely to remain in force until the Overseas Force has stopped fighting.

This was the final, singular objective of military recruitment in Eastern Nigeria, and it was vigorously pursued to the end of the war.

Problems

Given the changing and taxing aims of military recruitment, the British embarked on an all-time and full scale recruiting drive which seemed, in practice, to have ignored the frontiers that were drawn between martial and non-martial groups. In Eastern Nigeria monthly quotas for the supply of military personnel were fixed for every District. The fixing of quotas was made on the presumption that colonies were potential reserves. But the British were soon to discover, as far as Eastern Nigeria was concerned, that there was no thoroughfare to the so-called colonial reserves. This was so because the search for recruits was beset by some problems.

One major problem that faced recruiting teams in Eastern Nigeria was the difficulty of communication. In the 1940s communication facilities were still very rudimentary. Motorable roads were few and far between. A majority of the roads which linked different communities together were footpaths used mainly by porters, farmers, and hunters. Rail roads were also conspicuously absent in most of the region. Motor vehicles and bicycles were in short supply and still very strange inventions in many communities. The radio, as a medium of communication, had a very limited audience in the small group of educated people that possessed radio facilities. The newspaper, too, was hardly read beyond the frontiers of the few urban centres; and even within the urban centres only the literate population patronised it. Given the above-mentioned shortcomings in communication, military recruitment became a problematic exercise. Indeed, neither the recruiting parties nor the media propaganda for military manpower penetrated the remote communities with ease.

The mutual competition for literate, young men between the Army, Police, and civil employment also caused recruiting agents some difficulties in enlisting the requisite quotas. The Nigeria Police needed manpower during the war. Because of the occasional recrudescence of civil crises such as the Amaokwe Disturbances in 1938 in Okigwe and Bende divisions¹⁵ and the Pioneers Riots in Aba and Calabar in 1943, much of Eastern Nigeria was still officially designated one of the "unsettled" areas in Nigeria which required regular and serious Police surveillance. Thus during the war the colonial administration in Nigeria was haunted by the spectre of a possible civil insurrection in Eastern Nigeria. This caused the administration, in spite of its military manpower needs, not only to maintain but also to expand the Police Force through further recruitment.¹⁷ This development mutually antagonised the conduct of military recruitment in Eastern Nigeria especially because, more than forty percent of the recruits in the Police were being drawn from the region.¹⁸

Similarly, the public service attracted many young men who could have enlisted in the Army. Civil service employment, for example, was considered more prestigious than engagement in the Army. The Civil Service had a tradition of respectability and prestige because of the white-collar nature of its services. It was the "right" and "normal" place for literate people who considered them-

selves educated gentlemen. The dream of every youth in school, therefore, was to make a career in the Civil Service. The service became more attractive especially from 1941 when the colonial government made an upward review of the basic salaries of civil servants and, in the following year, introduced cost-of-living allowances to enable civil servants survive the increasing cost of war time life.¹⁹ The preference for civil employment and its impact on military recruitment are evident in the following observation made in 1944 by the Zone Recruiting Officer of the Eastern Provinces: "It is certain there are still people ready to join the Army in Calabar Province but they are kept back by their parents who hope they will secure Posts as Government clerks."²⁰ Civil employment, therefore, competed favourably with the Army for recruits in Eastern Nigeria. As the Secretary of the Eastern Provinces rightly noted in 1943, "the effect of such competition was most noticeable in the search for literate recruits which proved increasingly difficult."²¹

Apart from the competition with the Police and civil employment, the problem of military recruitment also derived from a tradition of dislike for the Army and the military profession - a tradition that had developed in many communities of Eastern Nigeria long before the outbreak of war. Many people hated and disrespected the Army because it was viewed as an instrument of British colonial oppression which drew many of its members from social out-casts, ex-slaves, never-do-wells and nonentities.²² In pre-colonial times there were no standing and professional armies among these communities. Military training was an apprenticeship of socialization, citizenship training, and manhood education. In theory every male usually grew up, matured, and graduated into manhood as a soldier. This, and the fact that tradition did not sanction warfare as a normal and integral element in human relations,²³ rendered any standing and professional army unnecessary. Professional soldiering, in the Western sense, was strange, and it conveyed a meaning which was detested by tradition. In fact, any man who chose the military as a profession was considered a mercenary, who had given up his life for material wealth. Among the peoples of Eastern Nigeria human life, no matter its quality, was valued more than any amount of material wealth. It was not normal, therefore, for families to encourage their members to enlist in the Army as professional soldiers, ready to give up their lives at any time for material acquisition. At the time of the Second World War this notion about professional soldiering was still widely held by many people, and it partly accounted for people's reluctance to enlist in the fighting forces.

Fear, doubt, and uncertainty as to what would become of those who joined the Army during and especially after the war also caused many men not to enlist in the Nigeria Regiment. These apprehensions derived from rumours peddled in many communities about the war, and they constituted a major obstacle to recruiting especially in the last two years of the war. There was the widely spread rumour that government would eventually take the wives of any soldiers who died in the war.²⁴ There were also unfounded stories of adversities being faced by African soldiers who were already fighting on the overseas front. For example, it was said that African soldiers overseas were subjected to untold sufferings and that being overseas was a kind of everlasting banishment. This fear was reported in 1944 by the Public Relations Office in a correspondence on

recruiting. The correspondence stated, in part: "Some reports have been received recently which show that there are a lot of young men in NIGERIA who are not joining the Army because they are afraid that they will be forgotten once they have gone overseas."²⁵ Many people thought that government repeated appeals to "join the Army and learn a trade" was a hocus-pocus. This kind of thinking was sustained by the fact, that on the front page of the recruiting form which a tradesman was expected to complete was "a warning that any soldier may be required to serve overseas."²⁶ Moreover, a recruit was required to take the following oath before an officer:

I, (Name of Soldier) do sincerely promise and swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty King George VI, his heirs and successors according to law, and that while residing within Nigeria I will serve his Majesty, his heirs and successors for the defence of Nigeria against all his or their enemies and oppressors whatsoever, according to the conditions of my service.²⁷

Serving soldiers who came home on leave usually made no secret about this oath. Many young men who were aware of the oath feared and loathed to join the Army, especially after pondering over the implications of the oath on the individual's freedom.

German propaganda also certainly threatened the success of British recruiting campaigns. Since the outbreak of the war, German war propaganda was widespread in British West Africa. For instance, in 1940, as part of their propaganda the Germans broadcast a radio play. The play not only demonstrated the harsh and inhuman treatment meted out to African soldiers by their British counterparts but also disclosed a report from Rome which "states that three Natives in a British Crown Colony were executed because they refused to fight on the Western Front."²⁸ Although this kind of propaganda did not prove a formidable obstacle to British recruiting machinery in Eastern Nigeria, it, nevertheless, confirmed and increased some of the fear and misgivings which some people may already have had about life in the Army.

Methods

Informed by these problems, the military authority adopted various approaches to obtain the requisite men for war service. One of the methods was to advertise regularly in the newspaper for recruits. Advertisements for recruits stressed the opportunities available in the Army. They emphasised, for example, that those who joined the Army would receive training in trades of their choice and "will have a trade when victory is won."²⁹ The advertisements also stressed opportunities for travels and allowances beside normal salaries. It was made known to people that a soldier in India was entitled to an expatriation allowance of five shillings per month. In 1944 an increase in the salaries of non-tradesmen in the Army was also announced. The economic benefits so emphasised by recruiting advertisements attracted many young men into the Army.³⁰ However, from November 1940, Lagos considered it "superfluous" for advertisement to be used as a special method of obtaining non-combatant recruits. Instead, the use of military officers as recruiting agents was being considered as the "most satisfactory and expeditious method of obtaining the

recruits required.³¹

As a result of the war, the peace-time practice of training soldiers in a central regimental depot ceased to exist. The policy that emerged was for the war time battalions, which were scattered all over the country, to find and train their men in the ways they considered best. In Eastern Nigeria, in addition to the system of advertising for recruits in the newspapers, recruiting exercises were carried out by certain agencies organised for the purpose. Prominent among such agencies were recruiting teams. Usually a recruiting team comprised European Army Officers and British and African N.C.O.s (Non-Commissioned Officers). When and where necessary, the team was accompanied by a District Officer or a Zone Recruiting Officer.³² The team carried with it items such as drums, guitars, trumpets, banners, and other musical instruments. Sometimes, as an alternative, the team was equipped with some guns (as from 1944). The guns usually included a Lewis gun, a Bren gun, a Vickers gun, a gun from a tank, and other weapons captured from the enemy.³³ Each soldier in the team was dressed in a ceremonial scarlet. Parties of this kind were despatched to towns and villages, where they displayed military life and demonstrated their privileges as military men before large crowds of people. The audience was usually addressed regarding life in the Army. Usually, the performance of the team attracted some men who, dazzled by the authority of military life, waited afterwards to enlist. The teams also visited schools where they delivered lectures to the pupils. Such lectures were aimed at indoctrinating the pupils into military life.

Some civil officers - both European and African - were authorised to recruit. A special appeal was made and an authorisation given, for example, to all Residents, the General Manager of the Nigerian Railway, Heads of Departments, and Heads of large trading firms to find the requisite personnel for the Army.³⁴ The role of these officers in recruiting cannot be fully assessed. But, generally, they supported the recruiting drive, and some of them did what they could to use their positions either to recruit directly or to encourage civil servants under them to opt for the Army. For example, Mr. Hogan Bassey, a chief civilian instructor at the clerks' Training School for the Army at Enugu raised recruits from Calabar in 1944, and his effort was acknowledged by the government in an official correspondence.³⁵

The most used civil officers in recruiting since the inception of the war were District Officers. Great reliance on these officers was necessitated by the increasing shortage of military officers as the war progressed. The lack of a developed system of reception depots in Eastern Nigeria also justified the increasing use of the District Officers. The main work of the District Officers as recruiting agents was to fix regular days for recruitment in the District Headquarters and organise for the exercise. Information to this effect was usually pasted on notice walls, pillars, or boards in all the native courts and public places. On every recruiting day, people who wanted to join the Army turned up for selection at the District Headquarters. From among them the District Officer selected the men considered suitable for the Army and arranged for them to embark on training.

Despite the adoption of the approaches so far discussed, it was difficult especially after 1943 to achieve the desired results. This stemmed from two reasons. First, there was a lack of liaison and closer co-ordination on recruiting between the civil and military officers. Second, the District Officers were very busy on matters of civil administration and were finding it increasingly difficult to combine, with any reasonable results, the responsibilities of civil administration and military recruitment. The concern to check these lapses and, possibly, to reap maximum results from the recruiting ventures led to the appointment in early 1944 of a Zonal Recruiting Officer for the Eastern Provinces.³⁶ The Officer was Lt. Stanley E. Weller. Weller proved himself an indefatigable officer and performed assiduously on the job of recruiting. He travelled round the provinces, working together with the District Officers to ensure effective application of the recruiting effort. He also advised and encouraged the Chief commissioner to co-operate with District Officers to enable them discharge successfully and effectively their functions as recruiting officers. Weller visited stations outside Enugu, campaigning for enlistment in the Army. He led recruiting teams into towns and villages, where he made speeches in schools and other public places regarding the war and Army life and calling eventually for enlistment.

As the war dragged on, the search for literate young men in Eastern Nigeria began to experience lean times. Bothered by such a situation, the Commander-in-Chief ordered the formation of what was styled the 'Young Soldiers Platoon' to be based at Enugu. By March 1944, Enugu had completed the assignment. The platoon was a military institution established to enlist literate young boys who were below the age of eighteen years. The terms of service of the young soldiers were exactly the same as those of the adult ones, except that the boys were not to be sent overseas until they attained the age of eighteen.³⁷ The policy was to enlist and train not more than fifty young soldiers at any one time. The boys were to receive full military and technical training to qualify as "high-grade" tradesmen in the Army. "It was hoped that these young soldiers would be able to relieve older men who are wanted for service overseas, and when the time came for the young soldiers to go overseas himself (sic), he could be sent at once and no time need be wasted in his training."³⁸ The formation of the Young Soldiers Platoon, with its terms of service which were thought to be very attractive, was advertised in the newspapers. However, this carefully baited scheme failed to operate with the success anticipated by those who planned it. By May, only six young soldiers were training at Enugu, and official report was that "The response to the scheme ... has been very disappointing."³⁹

Conscription was another method of military recruitment adopted by the British. In the war years conscription was not used to obtain combatant soldiers. However, the British, having pre-meditated the crisis, had made contingency programme under which conscription was organised and executed before the war actually began. An official source has confirmed this: "Food rationing, shadow factories, air defence, conscription; all introduced at various stages of the last war (First World War) ... were organised long ago (before the Second World War began)".⁴⁰ Prior to the beginning of the war, the British rapidly recruited men into the Nigeria Regiment, swelling up existing battalions and units to war time size.⁴¹ This was done with an apparent normalcy which did not arouse any

discomfort. Many people enlisted only to discover too late, when the war broke out, that they were engaged to fight.⁴²

However, it became obvious, soon after the war began, that while it was possible to obtain the desired number of fighting men through various non-coercive efforts, it was not so in the case of literate persons who were required to serve in the Army as clerks, medical orderlies, drivers, teachers, and artisans. This calibre of personnel were not volunteering to enlist in the Army in sufficient numbers. In 1940, as it became increasingly difficult for the Army to obtain artisans, clerks, teachers etc., by non-coercive methods, pressure began to come down on the Nigerian government to introduce a "legislation authorising the Governor to exact national service of any kind from any person or class of person, should the necessity arise."⁴³ In 1941 conscription of clerks, drivers, medical orderlies, teachers, artisans, and unskilled labourers serving in various government departments and companies was officially sanctioned and a compulsory National Service Order, "which...must be strictly observed," issued to government departments and companies to second their personnel to the Army for military service.⁴⁴ With the Compulsory National Service Order, various government departments and companies seconded, on demand, their personnel to the Army up to the end of the war.⁴⁵

How Successful?

In spite of the problems which confronted the conduct of military recruitment in Eastern Nigeria, the British government was able to keep the Overseas Force at full and all-time strength. The success of the war time recruiting exercise in Nigeria was mentioned in a Colonial Officer report: "Recruits for the armed forces were, in the initial stages, far in excess of the number which could be absorbed."⁴⁶ Reports on the Eastern Provinces in particular, suggest that although there were some occasional shortfalls in the number of recruits expected, the results of recruitment were, generally, satisfactory in the provinces throughout the war. For example, the Secretary of the Eastern Provinces made the following report on recruiting in 1939: "In Ogoja Province the response to recruiting for Combatants was satisfactory. The African Province the response to recruiting for non-combatants such as Motor drivers, Dispensers, Nursing Orderlies, etc. was also satisfactory. Each province supplied its quota without any difficulty."⁴⁷ In 1943 a report from the same source noted that "recruiting for the armed forces continued to be satisfactory..."⁴⁸

So far, we are unable to determine precisely the number of citizens of Eastern Nigeria who were enlisted during the war. But we may have an insight into it when we consider that the Nigeria Regiment was expanded from its pre-war strength of five to about twenty-eight battalions.⁴⁹ In all, the battalions absorbed about 100,000 or 121,652 Nigerian soldiers as recorded in different sources.⁵⁰ Out of either of these figures, 32,502 were tradesmen,⁵¹ about half or more of whom were drawn from Eastern Nigeria because of its relatively high population of literate men. The region also supplied considerable numbers for the Pioneers Corps and infantry units. At the end of 1944 an official source reported that approximately 3,500 men were recruited from Ogoja Province alone.⁵² If we adopt this figure as the average supplied by the other eight

provinces of Enugu, Abakaliki, Onitsha, Owerri, Port-Harcourt, Calabar, Annang, and Uyo, most of which must have supplied higher figures, we can suggest that about 31,500 men were recruited from Eastern Nigeria for war service.

Circumstances in favour of Recruitment

The recruiting exercise in Eastern Nigeria was favoured by certain factors and conditions. Among them was the impact of British war propaganda. The British mounted formidable propaganda which softened the grounds for recruiting agents. It depicted Germany as an aggressor nation which had no support even from within and was condemned by most of the world. Meanwhile, Britain was projected as a strong, benevolent nation whose genuine effort to stem down the rising tide of Hitlerism had the support and good-will of almost the entire world including even those of German citizens. The propaganda alluded to the support which Great Britain was receiving from India, Palestine, Jamaica, and German nationals in Africa. The nature of British propaganda can be seen in these slogans:

We (the British) know what we are in for and we are prepared accordingly ... We have inexhaustible resources of materials and wealth ... we have the good-will of almost the whole world, tacit or open; what can keep us from victory, however long it may take us to attain it? Certainly not the armed might of the Nazis who cannot even rely on the support of their fellow countrymen ...

Jawahar Lal Nehru has advised the people of India to help Britain against Hitler ... If Nehru thought that Britain was fighting for selfish reasons only, he would be the first to say so: for he is known to be fearless as well as intelligent. Nehru has advised the people of India to help Britain because he believes that there is far more hope for the Colonial peoples in British rule than there would be for them under Hitler: he believes that in opposing Hitler Britain is protecting the progress and freedom of the Colonial people.⁵³

Slogans such as these struck many literate people with a sympathy for the British position and persuaded them to volunteer for the Army.

In general, local chiefs, elders, educated elite, and nationalists sympathised with and supported the British cause. Chiefs and elders talked in favour of the British position and generally encouraged enlistment in the Army. Nationalist newspapers like Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe's *West African Pilot* propagated for enlistment in the Army. The papers frequently advertised the government slogan: "Join the Army and learn a trade," and Zik personally "toured the countryside appealing to people to enrol in the army..."⁵⁴ In a radio broadcast in 1941, Herbert Macaulay, a frontline nationalist cheered: "... Victory for Democracy and Freedom for Mankind depend on our contributions, and our Determination and our Loyalty ... rally round the Union Jack."⁵⁵

What also favoured the recruiting exercise was the prevailing fog of ignorance about the nature of a modern war. The wars which most of the young men had hitherto experienced or heard of were mainly local wars, which were not as sophisticated, mechanised, and devastating as the Second World War. Most of the young men did not take part in any operations during the War of 1914 and were, therefore, not in a position to anticipate what the nature of the war which

they were called upon to fight would be. The crisis was underestimated and oversimplified in terms of its scope and effects. Thus many young men simply enlisted because their fellow friends did.⁵⁶ Some men also enlisted because it was normal and obligatory to do so, given the spirit of the times. Had many of the young men anticipated and fully understood the internecine dimension of the conflict and had they known that they would be at the receiving end of the incongruous combination of arms, the story of their response to the recruiting campaign may have been written differently.

A majority of the young men - literate or non-literate - in the Eastern Region have had intimate contact with the Bible either through the mission churches or schools. It was understood during the war that those who enlisted in the Army could have the opportunity to visit Jerusalem - the "heavenly" and "Holy Land" - fondly mentioned in the Bible. Nothing inspired some young men more than the adventurous desire to see the "Holy Land." No sooner had many of them reached North Africa that they began to request to be taken to Jerusalem. A. M. Gelsthorpe, the Assistant Bishop in charge of Egypt and the Sudan, reporting from Cairo on this situation to the Governor of Nigeria, wrote in 1944: "... I have rather stressed the hope that it may be possible for a considerable number (of the Nigerian soldiers) to be able to go to the Holy Land for leave. That is their very urgent desire."⁵⁷ This desire, which developed during the war, aided British effort to get young men into the army.

Summary

This study has identified the policies, aims, problems, methods of military recruitment in Eastern Nigeria during the Second World War. It has also assessed the results of the recruiting exercise and discussed the conditions that favoured it. It has demonstrated that although official policy was intent on raising an infantry army made up exclusively of Northern Nigeria citizens, the policy was never strictly pursued. In practice thousands of citizens of Eastern Nigeria served in the war as both combatant and non-combatant soldiers. The aim of recruiting was dynamic. At first recruitment was aimed at building a colonial local force for the maintenance of internal security. Later on, however, the troops were dragged not only to defend Africa but also to sustain the overseas force until the end of the war. Difficulties of communication, competition from Police and civil employment, apprehensions and doubts and the impact of German war propaganda antagonised the search for recruits.

Informed by these difficulties, the military authority adopted various approaches to obtain the requisite men for the war. Advertisements for recruits, the use of both military and civil officers, and compulsion were employed in the search for military personnel. Thus recruitment was the concern of both the Army and civil administration. Favoured by British war propaganda, an atmosphere of ignorance about a modern war, general penchant for the Holy Land, and the support of chiefs, elders, and nationalist elite, the military authority was, in spite of the obstacles, able to raise thousands of the requisite men and, therefore, to fulfil the aim of military recruitment.

Notes

1. N.A.E. 9National Archives Enugu, Nigeria) CSE 1/85/9295: "History of the War," May, 1941. The notification was sent to all Residents on the 3rd of September. This was preceded by an earlier telegram, dated 22nd August, 1939, which announced strained relations between Britain and Germany.
2. *Nigeria Gazette* (19390, p.725.
3. See *Colonial Office Annual Report Nigeria 1946*. (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1947), p.96. A.H.W. Haywood, *Sport and Service in Africa*. (London: See Service and Co., 1926), p.1.65. John Reegan, *World Armies* (London: Macmillan, 1979), p.517. Charles Carfarae, *Chindit Column*. (London: William Kimber, 1985), p.28.
4. N.A.E. CSE 1/85/9681: "Applications for Enlistment in the Nigeria Regiment," 1940. In June 1940, the Secretary of Eastern Provinces wrote to the Residents of Enugu province and Cameroons, to inform them "that it is the policy of the Commandant, the Nigeria Regiment, to recruit men of the hunter type only."
5. *Ibid*
6. See *Nigeria Gazettes* (of 1939, 1940, 1944 and 1945). About, or more than half the number of names in especially the last two gazettes are of Eastern Nigeria origin.
7. N.A.E. CSE 7/9/5: CO 649/10: "Scheme for re-organisation of the West African Volunteers," 25th July, 1941. This opinion was expressed in a memorandum prepared by the Inspector-General himself and forwarded to the Officer Commanding, Southern Nigeria Regiment, Lagos. This kind of view, for example, affected recruiting during the First World War, and Lord Lugard had to appeal that "recruiting should not be restricted exclusively to Moslems..." See his *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, 5th ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1965), p.575. The misgivings about the martial qualities of the Southerners further persisted up to the Second World War and influenced military policy towards recruitment.
8. Carfarae, *Chindit Column*, pp.28-29.
9. Haywood, *Sport and Service*, p.165.
10. W.F. Gutteridge, *Military Regimes in Africa* (London: Methuen, 1975), p.33.
11. Carfarae, *Chindit Column*, p.26. European ideas about the martial qualities of Nigerian peoples are also clearly identified by David Killingray in his "The British Military Presence in West Africa: research Memorandum" University of Oxford Development Records Project, 1983, pp.92-96.
12. For details on militant trade unionism see, for example, Wale Oyemakinde, "Michael Imoudu and the Emergence of Militant Trade Unionism in Nigeria, 1940-42," in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* (J.H.S.N.), (J.H.S.N.), Vol.vii, No.3, December 1974, pp.541-561. Wogu Ananaba, *The Trade Union Movement in Nigeria*. (London: 1969). With regards to the riots, Eastern Nigeria witnessed two Pioneers' riots in 1943. The first broke out in Aba on 18th October. The riot stemmed from a mutiny of the Pioneer Corps at Aba. About one thousand, three hundred soldiers boycotted parade in protest against a three days' delay in payment of their salaries. The second occurred on 20th October in Calabar, and it originated from an attempt by a soldier of the Pioneer Corps to resist a Police arrest. For more details on the riots consult W.R. Shirley, *History of the Nigeria Police* (Lagos: Government Printer, 1950), pp.66-68.
13. *Nigeria Gazette* (1940), p.310. See also, Headquarters, Nigerian Military Forces, *Our Military Forces: An Account of the Organisation and History of the Nigerian Military Forces* (Lagos: Federal Information Service, 1957?), p.9. Rita Headrick, "African Soldiers in World War II," in *Armed Forces and Society: An Interdisciplinary Journal*. Vol.4, November 3, 1978, p.503.
14. N.A.I. (National Archives Ibadan, Nigeria) CSO 26:50690/S.I. Lt. Col. H. A. Lilley, "History of the Royal West African Frontier Force", Miscellaneous, 1946.
15. N.A.C. (National Archives Calabar, Nigeria), CSO 396/20 CALDIST 28/1/328: "Recruitment: Monthly Bulletin," 11th March, 1944. Also see Col. A. Haywood and Brig. R. Clarke, *History of the Royal West African Frontier Force*. (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1964), p.374.
16. "The disturbances in Oigwe and Bände Divisions of 1938 provide one of the biggest single set of operations that the force has been called upon to carry out. The area affected was

approximately five hundred and forty-five square miles and comprised the Isukwat, Uuru, Nneeto, Isuochi, Umchiase, Otians and Otanchara clans of Okigwe Division, and the Alayi, Item and Umienyi clans of Bende Division. For this and further information in the Amaokwe disturbances, See Shirley, *History of Nigeria Police*, pp.64-66.

17. Civil Security needs during the war led to the creation in 1939 of the Harbour Defence Unit which kept security in Lagos Harbour. The unit formed part of the Police Force until the end of the war in 1945. After the war it was reduced in size and re-organised as the Harbour Police. See *ibid.*, p.38. Apart from the absorption of new men into the Harbour Defence Unit, many men were also recruited into the regular Police Force during the war. This was confirmed by retired Police Sergeant (now Elder) William Otu Abam in an interview with the author on 20th October, 1987. Elder Abam (aged 63) of the Presbyterian Church of Ugep Urban in Cross River State enlisted in the Nigeria Police in 1945.

18. See *ibid.*, p.40. About recruitment into the Police Force, Shirley wrote: "Recruits are obtained from most tribes in Nigeria and Cameroons ... the Ibo providing the largest numbers of any, 47 per cent." Shirley was writing in July 1947. But his trend of a comparative Igbo majority in the Police Force could not have been much different several years before. My estimate of the percentage of Igbo recruits is based on this thinking.

19. In 1944 the highest paid non-tradesman in the Army after increases in salaries, earned one shilling, six pennies a day, and the lowest paid earned one shilling. The highest paid tradesman earned three shillings, nine pennies per day, while the lowest paid tradesman earned one shilling nine pennies. On the other hand, studies by Wale Oyemakinde suggest that the same categories in the Public Sector earned almost twice as those in the Army. This disparity in remuneration may have influenced choice in favour of civil employment. For details see the following: Oyemakinde, "Michael Imoudu and Militant Trade Unionism", "N.A.E. CSE 1/85/9295: "History of War"; N.A.C. 396/20: "Recruitment Bulletin"; N.A.E. CSE 1/85/9094: "Recruitment of Non-Combatant Soldiers", 15th November, 1940.

20. N.A.E. CSE 1/85/8648: "Recruiting Propaganda," March, 1944.
21. N.A.E. CSE 1/85/9295: "History of War."
22. S.C. Ukpabi, "The Changing Role of the Military in Nigeria, 1900-1970," in *Africa Spectrum: Deutsche Zeitschrift für moderne Afrikaforschung*, (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika - Kunde, 1976), pp.66-67. For the unattractiveness of the Army see Headrick, "African Soldiers in World War II," p.504.

23. S.C. UKPABI, *Strands in Nigerian Military History*. (Zaria, Nigeria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1986). See the chapter on "War and Society in Pre-colonial Igboiland." This is an indepth examination and analysis of the relationship between war and society. The Igbo are the most populous ethnic group in Eastern Nigeria, and what is discussed here about them largely and generally applies to other ethnic groups in the region.

24. N.A.E. CSE 1/85/8648: "Recruiting Propaganda."

25. *ibid.*

26. *ibid.*

27. N.M.C. (National Museum Calabar, Nigeria) File on "Colonial Wars", 1939.
28. *West Africa*, 6 April, 1940. Also quoted in Michael Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule* (London: Hutchinson, 1968), p.492. German propaganda was remarkable in West Africa in the early months of the war. See Wendel P. Holbrook, "British Propaganda and the Mobilization of the Gold Coast War Effort, 1939-1945", *Journal of African History*, 26(1985), pp.349-350.

29. Quoted in N.J. Miners, *The Nigerian Army 1956-1966*. (London: Methuen, 1971), p.239.

30. N.A.C. 396/20: "Recruitment Bulletin."

31. N.A.E. CSE 1/85/9094: "Recruitment of Non-Combatant Soldiers."

32. The system of appointing and using Zone Recruiting Officers was started in the first half of 1944.

33. N.A.E. CSE 1/85/8648: "Recruiting propaganda."

34. N.A.E. CSE 1/85/9094: "Recruitment of Non-Combatant Soldiers."

35. N.A.C. 396/20 "Recruitment Bulletin." Of Mr. Bassey's role it was said: "The Chief Civilian

Instructor from the Clerks' Training School, Mr. Hogan Bassey, was sent to Calabar to recruit young men for the Army. This proved a most successful step, and it will be repeated. Mr. Bassey raised over one hundred young men for the Army."

36. For the purpose of effective recruiting, Nigeria was divided into Sub-Areas in 1943 with Sub-Area Commanders. The boundaries of Sub-Areas corresponded with those of the three groups of provinces - the Northern, Western, and Eastern provinces - so that the Eastern Provinces alone fell exclusively under a Sub-Area of their own called Enugu Sub-Area. In 1944 two Zone Recruiting Officers were appointed for the Eastern and Western Provinces respectively to co-ordinate recruiting activities in the provinces. See, *ibid.*

37. *ibid.*

38. *ibid.*

39. *ibid.*

40. N.A.E. CSE 1/85/8683: "Anglo-German War 1939-News Bulletin from the Publicity Officer, Lagos, November, 1939.

41. General Obasanjo buttresses the fact as he notes: "In 1938, the Nigeria Regiment was again re-organised, probably in anticipation of the outbreak of the Second World War, into three battalions at war strength, two at peace time lower establishment, a field artillery battery on war establishment and an enlarged signal section. When the war eventually broke out in 1939, the regiment expanded from five battalions to thirteen, located at various convenient areas all over the country, to engage in training." See, Olusegun Obasanjo, *Nzeogwu* (Ibadan, Nigeria: Spectrum Books, 1987), p.39.

42. Major Winter I. Obeten (Rtd.), aged 55, interview, 20 December 1987 at Winter House, Egbom, Ugep Urban, Cross River State of Nigeria. Also Capt. Lord Victor Ugboma (Rtd), aged 70, interview, 23 August 1987 at 34 Moor Street, Onitsha, Anambra State of Nigeria. Captain Ugboma was the first Nigerian to be commissioned as an Army Officer in 1948. He cited the example of a pre-war Gold Coast Territorial Force, made up of civilians but commanded by Army officers, which was quickly mobilised into the Army on the outbreak of the war. He told this author: "I had a natural interest and desire to enter the Army. However, we were all conscripted into the Army during the war, that is, those of us in the Gold Coast Territorial Force."

43. *Nigeria Gazette* (1940), p.310. See also N.A.E. CSE 1/85/8683: "Anglo-German War."

44. N.A.I. CSO 26:38215 Vol.II: "Recruitment of Artisans for the Army," 22 January 1942. David Killingray, "The Colonial Army in the Gold Coast: Official Policy and Local Response, 1890-1947," Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1982, p.255.

45. N.A.I. CSO 26:36229, E.G. Morris, Director of Education to the Honourable Financial Secretary, Lagos, 29 May 1942. The evidence here weighs heavily against some existing works which assert that the Nigeria regiment was an all-voluntary force. See, for example, Sir Allah Burns, *History of Nigeria*, 8th ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), p.247. C.R. Niven, *A Short History of Nigeria*, 3rd ed. (London: Longman, 1965), p.232. Ahmadu Bello, *My life*, (Zaria, Nigeria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1986), p.53. Bello headed the government of Northern Nigeria from 1959 until death in 1968. He wrote: "Recruiting was pushed as much as possible, but no pressure was employed: all men were volunteers."

46. *Colonial Office Annual Report*, p.95.

47. N.A.E. CSE 1/85/9295: "History of War."

48. *ibid.*

49. See, Miners, *The Nigerian Army*, p.14. It should be noted, however, that the number of Battalions in the Nigeria Regiment during the War is controversial. Different sources give different figures. See, for example, Burns, *History of Nigeria*, p.247. He notes: "Altogether fifteen battalions were raised." Obasanjo, *Nzeogwu*, p.39. This source suggests any number from thirteen. Major E. A. Ifeajuna, "Nigerian Army After 100 years" in *Nigerian Army Magazine*, vol.3, December 1965, p.6. fourteen is recorded in this source. Further research is required to resolve the differences.

50. For the first figure see Niven, *Short History of Nigeria*, p.252. See also John Barrett, "The Rank and File of the Colonial Army in Nigeria," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 15, No.1, March 1977, p.105. If Barrett drew this figure of 100,000 from page 14 of Miners's

Nigerian Army as indicated by his references, then he quoted wrongly. Page 14 of Miner's *Nigerian Army* is the source of the figure, 121,652.

51. See *Daily Times*, Nigeria, 18 August 1953 or Miner's *Nigerian Army*, p.239.

52. N.A.E. CSE 12/1/249, P.M.Riley, "Annual Report, Ogoja Province, 1944."

53. N.A.E. CSE 1/85/8683: "Anglo-German War."

54. See Mokuwago Okoye, *Storms on the Niger*. (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension, 1981), p.94. Miner, *Nigerian Army*, p.14.

55. Quoted in Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule*, p.491.

56. Ex-serviceman William Adindu, aged 74, interview, 12 August 1987, at National War Museum, Umuahia, Abia State of Nigeria. When this author asked the informant why he joined the Army in 1942, the informant's reply was this: "I see all my friends joining. I say it is a thing to boast of." Adindu provides one example of the many young men who joined the Army in ignorance. In Ugep Urban of the Upper Cross River Region, pre-colonial military institutions were quickly revised in 1939 when the war broke out. A new war leader known as "Onung Ekor" was immediately appointed to lead all the warriors in battle against the Germans. See N.A.E. Minlock 6/1/163, W.J.W. Chessman. "Intelligence Report on Yakuri, Agbo, and Ayiga Clans, 1936," p.31. The fact that some of the warriors were up to sixty years old and were to be armed with clubs, knives, and muskets which required about ten minutes to re-load after every shot demonstrates how ignorant the people were about the nature of the war.

57. N.A.E. CSE 1/85/8642: "Troops Welfare," May, 1944.

Crisis of Accumulation and Democratic Misadventure in Nigeria: A Retrospective and Prospective Analysis

By S. O. Osoba*

The Colonial Origins

From the beginning of colonial rule to the present the Nigerian people have suffered a crisis of democracy, taking different forms and having different specificities at different stages of the country's development from classical colonial rule through alleged decolonisation to the current state of flag independence. This crisis of democracy, in whatever form has manifested itself as the usurpation of the people's sovereign power of decision making on a wide variety of public matters affecting society by a small minority of oppressors and exploiters. This minority was initially made up exclusively of British political officers running the administration of colonial Nigeria, alongside their European collaborators among the foreign Christian missions and the foreign monopoly trading firms operating in Nigeria. This group of usurpers we will refer to as the international bourgeoisie, who persist as major actors on the Nigerian scene, even though they have undergone important substantive and cosmetic transformations over time.

Under classical colonial rule that lasted till the end of the second world war, the mode of government was unabashedly anti-democratic and was characterised by the unrestrained authoritarianism and arbitrariness of British colonial officers. This kind of praetorian rule was based on a mode of capital production, appropriation and accumulation that was dominated by the monopolistic and oligopolistic practices of major European firms which had almost limitless powers of appropriating surplus value from Nigerian peasant and other petty producers via unequal terms of trade; from Nigerian workers via meagre, often below subsistence wages; and from all adults via primitive and exorbitant taxation. The surplus value so appropriated was siphoned out to boost the wealth of the British nation and its Euro-American allies.

The crisis of accumulation generated by this mode of colonial authoritarianism whereby, in the Fanonian sense, "to be white was to be rich and to be black was to be poor" was at the core of the crisis of democracy that characterised colonial rule. This crisis in turn generated the progressively deepening

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contradictions between the British rulers and the up-and-coming Nigerian bourgeoisie or foster elite that forced a change in the colonial project. This, in turn, resulted in the cosmetic changes, both in the mode of accumulation and the style of government, dubbed by historians as the policy of **decolonisation** covering the last decade or so of British colonial rule in Nigeria.

Decolonisation and The Illusion of Democracy

Decolonisation was a stratagem designed, not to eliminate, or even modify in any significant sense, the pre-eminent and dominating position of foreign monopoly capital and the international bourgeoisie in the processes of accumulation and political decision making in Nigeria. On the contrary, it was designed to perpetuate this foreign dominance and pre-eminence by putting in place a power-sharing arrangement or partnership between the departing colonial rulers and their monopoly enterprises on the one hand, and the fledgling Nigerian bourgeoisie on the other. This spurious partnership in power-sharing was cleverly rigged in favour of the international bourgeoisie, as the senior partner and their Nigerian counterpart as the junior, even subordinate partner. This arrangement of partnership, through a series of stage-managed constitutional conferences and projects (Richards 1946, Macpherson 1951, Lyttelton/Boyd 1953/54; Robertson 1957, 58.60) transferred the form rather than the substance of political power to the Nigerian bourgeoisie with their three mutually antagonistic ethno-regional power basis in the Nigerian polity.

The most striking feature of the politics of decolonisation is the deftness with which the British colonialists, having given their Nigerian surrogate bourgeoisie formal legal authority to rule, succeeded in making them acquiesce in the retaining, even consolidating and enhancing of the existing structures of accumulation through monopoly capital's control of all the key sectors of the economy - export-import trade, extractive and manufacturing industry, banking, insurance, shipping etc.¹ The acquiescence of the Nigerian bourgeoisie was bought rather cheaply by international monopoly capital by admitting several key and politically influential members of the Nigerian bourgeoisie into lucrative but honorific and powerless partnerships and directorship in the major foreign enterprises and appointing them as agents, representatives and distributors, thereby enabling them to pick up substantial crumbs that fell down from the dining tables of the almighty international finance capital.

Consequently, it was the implementation of the power sharing arrangement of decolonisation that marked a critical stage in the process of the Nigerian bourgeoisie's rapid growth and active participation, alongside their foreign principals, in the expropriation of surplus value from the labour of Nigerian masses (peasant producers, and workers).

The First Republic and Neo-colonial Dependence

In the immediate post-independence period the Nigerian bourgeoisie enhanced its power to accumulate by diversifying its activities into new, often

dubious and fraudulent forms of primitive accumulation - forms of accumulation that were unnecessary under colonial rule, because the colonial super powers, having a monopoly of power could make laws to legitimise their expropriation of surplus from Nigeria of the bilateral tax agreement between Britain and colonial Nigeria exempting each other's transportation companies operating in the other country from paying tax).² These new forms of primitive accumulation include award and sale of produce buying, and import licences to their clients, the demanding and receiving of bribes to discharge their lawful duties, the inflation of contract values by the awarding authorities, and sometimes the straightforward looting of the treasury.

This intensification of the accumulative process during the First Republic had very important consequences for the conduct of politics and the failed attempt at democratic rule during this period. Firstly, because foreign monopoly capital expropriated the lion's share of Nigerian-created wealth for export to the metropolis, it created for its surrogates in Nigeria a crisis of development and unfulfilled expectations because resources already carted away to Britain and other exotic parts of the world could not be used to address urgent social and welfare needs in Nigeria. In this situation of serious inadequacy of resources for meeting urgent government capital and recurrent expenses, and characterised by progressively worsening adverse balance of payments positions and innumerable ministerial missions overseas to beg for aid, members of the Nigerian ruling class continued to accord top priority to their own accumulative projects at the expense of meeting the basic needs of the people. In this way the Nigerian rulers helped to widen the gap of credibility between themselves and the ruled, and even flaunted their ill-gotten wealth in the faces of the people.

Secondly, since it was clear that the Nigerian state was the main source of phenomenal and rapid private accumulation, competition for political power at all levels of government became increasingly fiercer, more vicious, acrimonious and even violent and murderous. The principal tenants of constitutional, lawful and democratic government - e.g. free and fair elections, freedom of speech and association, freedom from arrest and abuse of one's person without just cause, fair hearing etc. - were inevitable casualties of this unholy competition for power and loot as politicians covered up the crimes of their friends and allies and committed all forms of illegalities, atrocities and arbitrariness against their enemies and opponents.

In this way the crisis of accumulation during the First Republic sharpened the contradictions between the rulers and the ruled, undermined, almost obliterated the credibility and legitimacy of the ruling cabals and eroded the minimal conditions for peaceful and stable competition among the bourgeois political actors, along with the rickety formal institutions of democratic rule bequeathed by the departing colonial authorities.

This deepening crisis of accumulation translated in the 1960's into the Action Group Crisis of 1962, the Census Crisis of 1962/63, the Federal Election Crisis of 1965 and the Tiv Uprisings of 1964-5 to mention a few. It was in this situation of escalating crises and rapidly declining capability of the ruling class factions to resolve their self-generated crises that the military stepped in and

of cement-laden ships waiting for unloading for months at the terribly congested port and running up many millions of naira in demurrage bills for the Federal Government.

In effect, the only cosmetic attempt made by the Gowon regime at modifying the existing structure of accumulation was the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (a.k.a. Indigenisation) Decree of 1972 to take effect in 1974. The decree was officially advertised as a patriotic and nationalist measure designed to enhance Nigerian participation in the country's economy by redressing the balance of ownership and control in the economy in favour of the Nigerian bourgeoisie and against the international bourgeoisie. There is no doubt that the indigenisation decree increased overall Nigerian participation in the ownership and control of certain categories of industrial and commercial enterprises, but this was at the cost of concentrating the newly released-share capital in the hands of very few members of government and their powerful friends in the business community. It also had the undeclared consequence of strengthening and consolidating the power-sharing partnership between the Nigerian and international bourgeoisies over the accumulative process as arranged by the departing colonial authorities. This Gowon's indigenisation decree-conferred even greater legitimacy on foreign monopoly capital as the principal actor in the Nigerian economy, because many companies which earlier on earned the suspicion and envy of their Nigerian rivals and aspiring competitors because they were "foreign" companies suddenly transformed themselves into Nigerian companies because some Nigerian puppets were favoured with inconsequential token share-holding while effective ownership and control remained in the same foreign hands.

The net consequence of the economic policies pursued by the Gowon administration was to redress the balance of power over the accumulation process decisively in favour of the international bourgeoisie and their Nigerian collaborators and to further marginalise the working masses of Nigeria in the process of accumulation. When you take this along with the unredeemed authoritarianism and arbitrariness of the Gowon administration, its utter disregard for the principles of accountability and constitutional rule and Gowon's own escalating megalomania which made him declare unilaterally in 1974 that the promised date of 1976 for return to civil rule was no longer realistic, it is obvious that the Gowon administration was a major set-back for democratic rule and practice in Nigeria.

(b) The Murtala-Obasanjo Regime and Further Deepening of the Crisis

The Murtala - Obasanjo regime that overthrew Gowon in July 1975 is much undeservedly eulogised for keeping faith with the people by handing-over power to a civilian administration on the basis of an alleged democratic constitution. It is often forgotten that many key players in this so-called revolutionary regime served loyally and profitably in the Gowon administration to the very end and until the Young Turks in the army (Like Shehu Yar'adua and Ibrahim Babangida) successfully plotted to overthrow Gowon and handed

established an allegedly patriotic and corrective regime.

Military Rule and the Deepening Crisis of the Bourgeoisies

(a) The Gowon Era

The intervention of the military in the political and economic life of the country has had a profound and devastating impact on the ongoing crises of accumulation and democratic rule in Nigeria. The initial phase of military rule in 1966, in the form of the Nzeogwu-led abortive coup, the seizure of power by Ironsí soon thereafter and the counter-coup that brought Gowon to power six months later injected into Nigerian politics an unprecedentedly high level of violence, bloodshed and brutality culminating in the 30-month internecine civil war between July 1967 and January 1970. Apart from the profound destabilisation of civic life throughout the country and the massive destruction of life and property unleashed on Biafra, military rule up to the civil war and after did a lot to compound the twin crisis of accumulation and democracy in Nigeria.

In the first instance the military rulers did not see any need to alter or restructure the existing mode of accumulation subsisting in the First Republic as an unequal partnership between international finance capital and the Nigerian bourgeoisie. On the contrary they merely enlarged the scope of primitive accumulation which the civilian rulers of the First Republic had pioneered, by introducing new forms and refurbishing old ones. For instance the Civil War witnessed new forms of primitive accumulation like looting conquered towns and villages, including government property therein like the Central Bank branch in Benin; appropriating of dead soldiers' pay for months by their commanders, payment of huge sums of money several times for the same procurement contract or none at all. In the post-Civil war period, especially since the oil boom that started in 1973, the military rulers and their civilian clients having become swollen-headed as a result of their winning the war "to keep Nigeria one" just ran amuck in their single-minded pursuit of primitive accumulation. This was the era of an unrivalled kleptocracy when no kind of graft, peculation, embezzlement and robbery of the state was considered too base or demeaning to fuel the engine of primitive accumulation. It is possible to catch a glimpse of the vast fortunes stolen by the state governors, commissioners, super and not-so-super permanent secretaries and SMG's (Secretaries to military Governments (at Federal and State levels), directors of parastatals, government contractors etc. from the various assets probes and panels of inquiry set up by the Murtala Mohammed government in 1975. The no-holds-barred commitment with which these verminous leaders pursued their criminal purpose is poignantly exemplified by the cement scandal whereby many government functionaries, contractors and layabouts made fat and quick fortunes from massive quantities of cement imported on behalf of the Ministry of Defence that neither needed nor was in a position to use it. One consequence of this ruling class sabotage was that the Apapa Port was invaded by an armada

power to their superior officers, neither Murtala nor Obasanjo as Commissioners for Communication and Works respectively appeared out of place in the morally permissive and libertarian government of Gowon. On the testimony of M.K. Abiola, the friendship and business relationship which he contracted with Murtala as Inspector of Army Signals persisted into his career as Gowon's Commissioner and successor, presumably yielding to Abiola and ITT of America, telecommunications contracts worth several hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars. Obasanjo also, as Gowon's Commissioner for Works was a key player in the contract extravaganza and proliferation for which the Gowon regime became notorious in its last years.

Given the above scenario, it is not surprising that when Obasanjo became the head of government following the assassination of Murtala Muhammed on 13 February 1976, his government pursued essentially the same economic policies as those of Gowon's. If there were any differences, they were differences of style and form rather than of substance and content. Like the Gowon, Obasanjo was concerned with enhancing the indigenous bourgeoisie's share of ownership and control of the economy without endangering the original partnership pact with foreign monopoly capital as the dominant partner - a feat achieved with the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (Amendment) Decree of 1977.

The Obasanjo regime, also like its predecessor, invented and proliferated contracts and consultancies of all sorts, to ensure maximum private accumulation for both the civilian and military members of the ruling class. Of all the extravagant and easily exploitable contractual projects conceived, begotten and nurtured by Obasanjo none has been more absurd than the Federal Capital Project in Abuja, a veritable bottomless pit into which successive governments continue to dump the dwindling wealth of the nation.

There were, however, two significant differences in style between the Gowon and Obasanjo regimes. Both regimes coincided with the period of the oil boom when there was such a vast amount of petro-dollars around that, according to Gowon's Governor of the Central Bank, 'money was not Nigeria's problem, but how to spend it'. This meant that both regimes had the resources with which to buy off some of the pressure of demands building up among organised urban-based workers, professionals and students. With Gowon the Adebo Salaries and Wages Review and Udoji Salaries and Wages Review Awards of 1971 and 1974 respectively were significant, while Obasanjo could boast of his short-lived UPE Scheme of 1976, dramatic proliferation of Universities by creating seven new ones in 1977, the drastic reduction in the tuition and boarding fees of tertiary institutions in 1977 - a reduction which he reversed by imposing a three fold increase six months later with calamitous consequences that have gone down in history as the 'Ali Mun Go' disaster.

In view of the restiveness of the working masses, organised trade unions, professional bodies and students, and the progressive escalation in their demands for a more equitable share of the national wealth, implying a corresponding reduction in the shares of the domestic and foreign bourgeoisies, the military governments' response was to crack down on these perceived

oppositional groups in order to safeguard their historic partnership with imperialism. However, Obasanjo appeared to have a clearer view and sharper consciousness of the forces ranged against his bourgeois accumulative project and the measures, both legal and extralegal with which to combat these forces. Among the measures taken by Obasanjo were various anti-labour laws, the taking over of the central labour organisation and refashioning it as a bureaucratic appendage of his regime, and the use of the Uthman Mohammed Panel of enquiry into the 'Ali Must Go' student unrest of 1978 to dismiss several progressive and militant staff and students from our universities and ban the students' apex organisation (NUNS). All these autocratic and antidemocratic measures are quite apart from the acts of terrorism periodically committed against members of the public by undisciplined hordes of men in uniform - Epe, Ugep, Mushin, Kalakuta and Kano are just a few examples.

Against this background, therefore, it should be clear that in spite of the much trumpeted transition programme of the Murtala/Obasanjo regime for a return to civil democratic rule, the regime by its authoritarian military training, its conviction and inclination was incapable of bringing forth a constitutional order that could guarantee the sovereign rule of the Nigerian people. Everything in the transitional programme was done to safeguard the colonially derived accumulative base of the Nigerian economy and the monopoly of political power by that section of the bourgeoisie belonging to the private sector of the economy. The key plans in the transition platform - the composition of the CDC (Constitution Drafting Committee) that was to produce a draft constitution and of the Constituent Assembly that was to ratify it, the Local Government Reform and the constitution of the LGAs, (Local Government Areas) the registration of political parties and the electoral arrangements for state and federal offices were all so blatantly contrived that only individuals and groups who were financially well-heeled and were committed to the maintenance of the *status quo* had a real chance of participating and winning in the political process. It was not for fun, for instance, that the Obasanjo regime banned from participating in the politics of the transition programme all public officers unless they resigned their positions at least six months in advance, and all registered trade unions.

The second significant difference in style between the Gowon and Obasanjo administrations was that in spite of the huge, indigestible revenue the Obasanjo regime was earning from the export of crude oil, it inexplicably embarked on a gigantic borrowing spree on the Euro-dollar market in the last two to three years of the administration. Whereas Nigeria's external debt to foreign governments and international organisation under Gowon stood at \$478.1m in 1970 and increased slightly to \$560m. in 1975, under Obasanjo's prodigality it shot up to \$3,969.1m in 1978.³

In this way, Obasanjo regime could be said to be the prime initiator of the current debt-trap that is strangulating the nation and is being used by both domestic and external forces to deprive us of virtually all our democratic rights including the right to life and its sustenance.

The Second Republic: Bankruptcy and Debt Trap

Like the wind sower who is bound to reap a whirlwind the Obasanjo regime through its transition programme produced in 1979 successor governments at the state and federal levels which could be relied upon to pursue with fanatical zeal the bourgeois accumulative project handed down from government to government since colonial rule, and to prevent by all means the emergence and coalescence of such popular democratic forces that could successfully challenge the bourgeoisie for political power and thus begin to establish popular democratic structures and institutions in the economic, social and political realms.

The main devices used by the politicians of the second Republic to extend and consolidate their accumulative base amounted to the refurbishing and combining of, and enlarging upon all the known techniques of primitive accumulation previously used in Nigeria. These ranged from spurious and grossly inflated contracts and consultancies, import licence racketeering, the presidential task force on rice, the multi-billion commodity deal through Johnson-Mathey Bank (JMB) of London, the over N300million NYSC rip-off to unabashed looting by National Assemblymen in form of grossly inflated salaries, allowances for maintaining non-existent aides and constituency offices, irrelevant and irresponsible travelling expenses (including estacode) to exotic parts of the globe etc.

As a consequence of this squandermania of epic proportions, which coincided with a sharp decline in Nigeria's oil revenue, the government of the Second Republic found the somewhat reduced national income inadequate for their accumulative project, consequently they borrowed a leaf from their immediate predecessor the Obasanjo government - and succeeded in boosting the external debt of the nation from the level of almost \$5.8 billion dollars where Obasanjo left it in 1979 to about \$15 billion when the military under Buhari-Idiagbon and Babangida seized power again in December 1983.⁴

The spending extravaganza of the governments of the Second Republic boosted dramatically the capacity of the ruling bourgeoisie and its foreign partners to accumulate surplus value - witness the emergence of an unprecedentedly large number of emergency Nigerian millionaires (the rumour mill even suggests that the era produced at least one billionaire in pound sterling) with their proliferation of private jets, stately homes in Britain, on the European continent and North America, a profusion of extremely expensive limousines and regular lavish and bacchanalian parties. While all this was going on the governments had no money to pay public servants, teachers and other workers their legitimate salaries and wages for months on end. When workers protested or went on strike they were threatened with summary dismissal or brow-beaten by 'kill and go'. (A popular term of contempt and abuse for the heavily armed and trigger-happy anti-riot squad of the Nigerian Police Force). In order to weaken the capacity of organised labour to struggle for their legitimate rights, the ruling class produced legal and non-legal stratagems to fragment the central labour movement - NLC - into several ineffective warring factions (e.g. the Democrats and the Socialists).

Furthermore, to prevent the broad masses of working people from exercising their constitutionally entrenched democratic rights of free speech, association, assembly and peaceful protest against injustice and exploitation, the Nigerian police under the command of Sunday Adewusi unleashed on the people a veritable reign of terror complete with armoured personnel carriers and armed police in every street corner.

Consequently, by the beginning of 1983 the governments of the second Republic had lost credibility with the broad masses of the people by demonstrating an unmistakable incapacity and unwillingness to work for towards meeting the basic needs of the people. Right across the country the people were confronted with schools where their children had no books, desks and chairs and teachers who not being paid, went to trade or farm during school hours; hospitals without rudimentary infrastructure including medicines for taking care of the sick - a situation which Sanni Abacha correctly, but opportunistically characterised twice on 31st December 1983 (on behalf of Buhari) and on 27th August 1985 (on behalf of Babangida) as one in which "our hospitals are reduced to mere consulting clinics without drugs, water and equipment".⁵

It was at this stage when the regimes of the Second Republic were ready to collapse under the crushing weight of their own greed, corruption and ineptitude, possibly with only a gentle push from the working people who were the primary victims of their misrule, that the armed forces once again intruded themselves into the arena of Nigerian politics. By this intrusion since 31st December 1983 to date the armed forces *junta* in power have committed themselves to the preservation of the colonially derived partnership for capital accumulation and the arrest of the people's capacity for democratic self expression and struggle for justice and equity.

It is possible that the intervention of the Armed Forces in December 1983 merely coincided with the attempt by international finance capital, through its principal *gendarme*, the IMF, to take the reform of the bankrupted Nigerian economy in hand. But accidental synchronicity of these two complementary moves is doubtful, because two days or so before Shagari fell from power he had put the Structural Adjustment Programme of the IMF on the national agenda in the 1984 budget speech that he delivered before the joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives. Since the standard IMF-SAP remedies -- drastic reduction of public expenditure, withdrawal of subsidies on food and social services, massive devaluation of the country's currency, high debt repayment ratio, liberalisation of imports, deregulation of prices etc. -- usually result in marked decline in the real incomes and therefore, the standards of living and quality of life of the majority poor, low-income and marginally employed people, the strict implementation of SAP measures is bound to provoke popular discontent and violent protests as have happened in recent times in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Zambia and Jordan. The effective quelling and suppression of such "IMF riots" as they are popularly called world-wide require the existence of a firm, unbending and ruthless government. It is clear that the Shagari government with all its faults and weaknesses, especially the hedonism of its top henchmen and their obsessive concern with loot, lacked the qualification to carry out the thoroughgoing repression that SAP demanded. Hence, it is not clear

whether the collapse of the governments of the Second Republic was aided by international finance capital, or occurred as a consequence of the independent initiative of elements in the Nigerian armed forces.

The Second Coming of the Military and the Recolonisation of Nigeria

(a) The Buhari - Idiagbon - Babangida Triumvirate and the Crisis of Economic and Political Clientelism

The Buhari - Idiagbon - Babangida regime came to power on 31st December, 1983 and immediately put SAP and IMF "conditionalities" on the national agenda. It would, however, seem that, in spite of the no-nonsense and brutal posture of that regime, it was not able to commit itself formally and wholly to the IMF - SAP project because its implementation was bound to detract substantially from the sovereignty of the nation and heap intolerable burdens on the sections of the community least able to bear them. The Buhari regime tried everything to convince the IMF of its sincerity of purpose and commitment to economic reform short of mortgaging the nation's sovereignty. For instance, it cut down drastically public expenditure and boosted revenue by embarking on a programme of massive retrenchment of public officers, reduction of subsidies on a wide variety of goods and services, a substantial once-for-all devaluation of the naira, strict tightening-up of foreign exchange control and the issuance of import licences, curtailment of import and the imposition of a large assortment of taxes, fees and levies.

The Buhari administration correctly diagnosed the main problem of the ailing Nigerian economy as one of indiscipline but misdirected itself by concentrating its war against indiscipline (WAI) not at the members of the ruling class in Khaki or civvies in government or out of it. Apart from the mass and indiscriminate arrest and detention of key people who served in the governments of the Second Republic (even though some huge camels managed to pass through the needle's eye) - a measure that earned the regime the wrath of most members of the bourgeois ruling class - the Buhari government left the bourgeois structure of primitive accumulation and fraudulent enrichment intact. While in the name of WAI and environmental sanitation poor toiling people were being harassed and deprived of their means of livelihood through the activities of WAI squads who went about in all towns and cities pulling down motor mechanics' sheds, stalls and kiosks where petty traders displayed their meagre wares for sale, the business and professional bourgeoisie continued to operate as of old, making quick and sensational fortunes from import licence racketeering and the manipulation of the newly introduced countertrade or trade by barter.

Furthermore, the Buhari regime alienated virtually all sections of the population by the harsh and draconian laws it enacted ostensibly to inculcate discipline into the populace. Chief among these obnoxious laws were the anti-

press Decree 4 of 1984 which was transparently designed to gag and emasculate the press; Decree 2 of 1984 which was used arbitrarily to deprive critics of the regime of their freedom and the Miscellaneous Offences Decree under which drug pushers were sentenced to death and three youngmen convicted of drug-carrying were actually executed.

Even though the broad sections of the Nigerian people recognised that the Buhari-Idiagbon - Babangida regime was fundamentally repressive and anti-democratic, it continued to enjoy some benefit of the doubt, especially as it was able to stall for almost twenty months on the issue of signing the hated IMF agreement, and it took the decision after studying the report of its own committee on privatisation, to opt for commercialisation of public enterprises rather than their outright privatisation. The regime also showed some capacity for standing up to a major imperialists power, when after the botched-up and illegal, but popular attempt to kidnap fugitive Umaru Dikko from London in 1985 the British government provoked a diplomatic row which resulted in the mutual withdrawal of ambassadors. For these and other reasons many people were willing to balance what they perceived as the regime's patriotism and capacity to defend the nation's sovereignty vis-a-vis hostile foreigners against the indubitably severe and repressive posture of the government.

(b) IBB's Palace Coup and the worsening Crisis of Economic and Political Clientelism

Consequently, when on 27th August 1985 it was learnt on radio and television sets that the Buhari - Idiagbon regime had been toppled and that Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida had assumed power as President and commander-in-chief of the Federal Republic, popular response was uniformly cool and unenthusiastic. Many people correctly identified the change of government as a palace coup which had nothing to do with public interest or public policy. The credibility of the charges of rigidity and lack of consultation with colleagues levelled against Buhari-Idiagbon by Babangida's spokesmen sounded hollow, given the key strategic position of No. 3 that he held in that government.

Babangida, however, soon overcame this problem of studied indifference on the part of the people by taking certain sensational and populist measures. The first was the immediate release of all those public officers detained by the Buhari government for almost twenty months without being tried or convicted for any offence, and he set up two tribunals presided over by judges to review the cases of all those against whom charges were pending and even those who had been convicted. The second populist measure with which he won people over was the denunciation of the criminal abuse of the power of detention under Decree 2 by Alhaji Rafindadi, the NSO Director, the throwing open of Rafindadi's "Chamber of Horrors" and the release therefore of all detainees. * Add to those the regime of 'panelocracy' and public debate on all sorts of issues, except the introduction of SAP and the "pay cut award", issues ranging from whether Nigeria should take the IMF loan or not to the kind of political order envisaged by the people in the Third Republic.

However, one thing quickly became clear very early in the Babangida

administration- his single-minded, almost fanatical commitment to the IMF-inspired and engineered structural adjustment programme. Some people even suggested, after listening to the inaugural broadcast by Babangida on 27th August 1985, that the coup that brought him to power was an IMF coup. I suspect that after the intense public agonising over the prolonged consideration of SAP by the Buhari regime, some people's suspicion about a possible IMF connection in the Babangida coup was aroused by the following unambiguous statement in his broadcast of 27th August, 1985.

"It is the view of this government that austerity without structural adjustment is not the solution to our economic predicament (and that) to protect the poor and the needy in our society from the danger this poses, steps will be taken to ensure a comprehensive strategy of economic reforms".⁷

Another thing that is crystal clear about the Babangida administration is that SAP, its implementation and perpetuation constitute the *raison d'être* of his transitional programme. Both Babangida and his closest associates and agents do not even bother to hide their fundamental position that the test for the validity of any public policy is its compatibility with SAP. They insist that for the recovery of our economy there is no alternative to SAP. According to IBB in his Kuru Declaration: "It is the one viable option we have as a people". In further elaboration of this position, he claims that "the economic problems we face are a necessity arising from past mistakes and current realities. We have to understand that. The transformation of the economy from weak to strong is a necessity. Structural Adjustment to achieve that transformation is a necessity if we choose to remain free."⁸

It is interesting that in spite of the fanatical trust which the IBB administration has in the efficacy of SAP, not one of the protagonists of SAP associated with that administration, except Sonekan of UAC, has been intrepid enough to cite one country in which SAP has worked. There is the example of Zambia which has been under one IMF SAP programme or the other for some 14 years before it abandoned it last year as a dangerous time bomb. Can anybody say that Egypt, Chile, Tunisia, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Peru, to mention a few, which have been under SAP for more than a decade and have their share of IMF food riots have solved their problem of economic decline or have gained even an iota of freedom whether in the internal ordering of their affairs or vis-à-vis international monopoly capital? In fact, without exception, these countries are unabashed dictatorships or, like Peru, seriously embattled and rickety liberal democratic states.⁹

A perceptive student of Nigerian political economy has correctly noted that: "The core objective of (IBB) transition programme is the remoulding of the social forces in the country to correspond to the demands of the structural adjustment programme."¹⁰ I am in full agreement with this observation because its truth is borne out very graphically by Babangida's deeds rather than his rhetorical pronouncements. And as students of history our assessment of historical actors, while taking cognisance of their pronouncements concerning their motives and intentions, cannot be complete without confronting these with their actual deeds.

On the issue of the relationship between pronouncement and deeds, Babangida by declaring a public debate on the IMF loan scheme and the conditionalities attached to it gave the apparently sincere impression that he was willing to accept the peoples verdict. In the event, there was an overwhelming majority in favour of rejecting the IMF loan along with, but especially because of palpably enslaving conditionalities. But it is strange that the reading of Babangida and his cronies of this unambiguous verdict is that while Nigerians rejected the IMF loan, they pledged to make sacrifices for revamping the economy far more vicious and crippling than the overwhelmingly rejected IMF conditionalities. Yet another fact that calls seriously to question Babangida's claim that he accepted the popular verdict against the taking of the IMF loan is that his regime then opted for the allegedly different and more humane credit facilities of the IBRD (a.k.a. World Bank) for funding the auctioning of the Naira on the foreign exchange market, variously styled as SFEM, FEM and lately as IFEM. This kind of disinformation is plausible only with people who lack information and knowledge concerning the siamese twin relationship between IMF and World Bank whether you consider their common origin in the Bretton Woods Conference in the immediate post-World War II period, or their common board of directors and the strict harmonisation and convergence of their policies by virtue of the overwhelming dominance and control of their decision-making processes by the group of the leading seven Western capitalist countries under U.S. coordination and supervision.

There is also a misleading official propaganda line which equates the pursuit of SAP with a commitment to democracy. In his famous Kuru speech Babangida self-consciously and *ad nauseam* poses as the very apostle of democratic ideals and practice. Hear him: "We have a duty to our people to pursue the social programme (ostensibly to ameliorate the hardship of SAP) because we deeply believe in democracy and democracy is little other than the politics of equality." Later in the speech he asserted that "The Third Republic must be a model of democracy of equality." The problematic about the bandying around of these two concepts of "democracy" and "equality" is that they are not defined theoretically or operationally, and the two entities that are supposed to be equal under this ethereal democratic order are cleverly left unspecified, except that what is probably insinuated is the mythical equality between the horse and its rider, the poor masses and their bourgeois exploiters and oppressors.

Even more significantly, these twin concepts of democracy and equality are vacuous and meaningless at the empirical level of practical political decision-making. First of all there is neither democracy nor equality in the distribution of the burdens of SAP across social and class boundaries. While most wage workers earn starvation wages of between N100 and N200 per month, bourgeois public officers earn 20 to thirty times that as salary in addition to estacode of up to N3,000 per day when they go on overseas official tours. And estacode is not to be scoffed at as the Babangida administration is clearly the most travelled administration in the history of Nigeria. Also, key members of the administration send their children to very expensive schools overseas while their 'equals' among the poor send their own children to local schools without

books, desks and chairs and sometimes without teachers. The rulers routinely go overseas to treat all sorts of minor ailments at public expense while the poor masses routinely die of preventable diseases or their whole families get bankrupted by hospital and medical fees when one of their members has the misfortune of falling ill.

More critically, the alleged democracy and equality appertaining to SAP sound ridiculously hollow when we look at the pattern of recruitment to the various organs vested with the responsibility for acting out the transition programme. While the exponents of SAP make hypocritical and rhetorical jibes at the so-called elites for obstructing the forward march of SAP and broadcast the miraculous transformation that SAP has brought to the living conditions of peasants and other ruralities, all their ground rules, conditions, prescriptions ensure that it is exclusively from among these supposedly discredited and worthless elites that all local council chairmen, members of the Politbureau, Constitutional Review Commission, Constituent Assembly, National Electoral Commission, Population and Census Commission, MAMSER, DFFRI, Code of Conduct, Bureau etc., were either elected or appointed or both. In none of these powerful bodies making far-reaching decisions and taking decisive actions on the lives of all Nigerians are peasants, labourers, artisans, petty traders and the unemployed who constitute more than 90 percent of Nigerians represented.

What is more, because the protagonists of SAP are aware of the deleterious consequences of SAP policies on broad sections of the people, they are anxious to identify these vulnerable sections in advance so as to take preemptive measures to neutralise them. It has in fact been suggested in some quarters, not without credibility that a possible explanation for throwing open the IMF loan issue for debate was to be able to identify clearly the most articulate and determined opponents of IMF in order to cripple their opposition in advance. In the event, the most articulate opponents of the IMF loan and its conditionalities were the NLC, the student movement and the ASUU. Dating from the May 1986 massacre of ABU students by the police and the principled protest of these organisations, several of their members were arrested and detained for trivial or no reasons, the offices of the NLC were besieged in February 1988 and its National executive Council was dissolved and replaced with a government appointed sole administrator for eight months. In the case of NANS, the apex student organisation, and ASUU they were proscribed because they were perceived as a thorn in the flesh of government. The implacable opposition of a SAP-propelled government to the working class is poignantly illustrated by the murderous response to the protests and demonstrations of workers against a sudden hike in the price of petrol in April 1988 in Jos, Kano, Ilorin, Minna and other urban centres in Nigeria. The life sentence imposed on eleven NEPA workers' union leaders in defence of their conditions of work and living is another case in point. The men were later freed and compulsorily retired from the public service.

In dealing with the actual and potential opponents of SAP, government has a vast armoury of legal and extra-legal measures. Among these is the administrative directive given to all the appropriate organs of state to exclude "extremists" and "undue radicals" (disguises for these who disagree in principle

with the official SAP line) from the transition programme. *Ad hoc* and *ad hominem* laws are also passed from time to time to exclude from the political process those they are not able to catch under the rubric of "extremists" and "radicals", Decree 9 of 1989 being one of the examples of this panicky defence of SAP.

By far the most eloquent testimony to the total incapacity of the Babangida administration's transitional programme to contribute to the development of democratic values and practice in Nigeria is that a critical aspect of its SAP package is irrevocably committed, to a far greater extent than any previous Nigerian government (including the British colonial government) to integrating the Nigerian economy with, and subordinating it to world monopoly capitalism. Several SAP policies are specially designed to strengthen the chains of dependence and clientage binding the country to the metropolitan centres of world capitalism. The most devastating of these measures is the daily auctioning of the naira for foreign currencies at rates of conversion that are determined by factors and forces extraneous to the realities of Nigerian economic life. Apart from the consequence of artificially debasing the Nigerian Naira and fuelling galloping inflation in the country, it has also transformed the country into a paradise of cheapness for foreigners with foreign currencies and a veritable hell for Nigerians. It also has an awesome implication for the sovereign integrity of the country and its prospects for economic survival. In the era of SAP, the most strategic economic activity at all levels of society, from the Federal Government to the currency tout at Bristol Hotel, Murtala Mohammed Airport, is not agricultural or industrial production, but the buying and selling of currency notes. This situation has engendered a pervasive psychological disposition whereby many urban-based Nigerians are developing undisguised contempt for the national currency and treating the U.S. Dollars as the official legal tender. Government and some of its agents also lend support to this kind of anti-patriotic behaviour. It is on record that since the Babangida government embarked on the progressive devaluation of the naira, estacode paid to public officers going on official overseas tours ceased being quoted in naira as before, but now in U.S. dollars. Not too long ago the national air carrier, Nigerian Airways, had the cheek to put out an announcement to the public that it would prefer its prospective passengers to pay for their fares in foreign currencies.¹²

Whereas in January 1978 the late Chief Henry Fajemirokun on a business delegation to the U.K. as President of the Nigeria British Chamber of Commerce, was pleading almost on bended knees that "Britain should be pressing hard to regain the trading and economic leadership (in Nigeria) which she seems so tamely to have abandoned",¹³ a whole complex of SAP policies ranging from the supernatural strength of the pound sterling *vis-à-vis* the naira, the debt-equity swap and privatisation to a new package of incentives for foreign investors have rendered Fajemirokun's plea no longer relevant, and have restored Britain firmly to its traditional trading and economic leadership and dominating position in Nigeria. Anybody doubting the truth of this assertion should consider the following euphoric pronouncements made on this subject by the Nigerian chairmen of two major British multi-national companies in Nigeria. Ernest Sonekan, Chairman and Managing Director of the octopoid UAC., addressed the Annual General Meeting of his companies follows on 12

April 1989 on Babangida's new industrial policy:

Let me turn to a topic which has been close to my heart for quite some time. This is the need to fashion a conducive environment for foreign investment in our country. The government announced new industrial policy guidelines in January this year and I must say that this was a welcome development indeed. According to the new policy guidelines, all businesses, subject to certain conditions, are now open for investment by both foreign and Nigerian investors except those regarded by government as of strategic importance. The provisions of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree have been criticised by me in the past many years as not being suitable for the desired inflow of foreign investment into our country. I must say that I am delighted with the new policy which will enable companies, such as our own, to be treated as fully Nigerian companies and can now begin to invest in any new venture.

Garba Ja Abdulkadir, O. F. R., Chairman of John Holt in his own address to his AGM on 20 April 1989, was less euphoric than Sonekan, but clearly jubilant:

Your company is pleased to see that the recent publication by the Federal Ministry of Industries entitled 'Industrial Policy of Nigeria' proposes amendments to the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1977. The amendments, if approved, will enable your company to form joint ventures with foreign companies and utilize their technical expertise when and if the opportunity should arise. We believe the proposed change will attract foreign investment to Nigeria to the benefit of the country as a whole".

It is clear from the foregoing that the Babangida administration is more robustly committed to the preservation of the present partnership arrangement for accumulation in favour of widening and promoting the share of British and other foreign investment capital in this process of accumulation. Some perceptive observers of the African scene have remarked, rightly in my view, that the pursuit of IMF-World Bank policies with the kind of zealotry demonstrated by Babangida administration is opening the African continent to recolonisation by Euro-American capital in a more insidious and devastating manner than the 19th century imperialism did. The manner in which Mrs. Margaret Thatcher commented herself during her brief stop-over in Nigeria and the freedom with which Tariq Hussain, the present World Bank representative in Nigeria and his immediate predecessor (another Hussain) have permitted themselves to make unsolicited and pontifical policy pronouncements on Nigeria's economic affairs all point to a national sovereignty that is at best shared with extraneous entities.

We can now see why the core of the national bourgeoisie represented in the Babangida administration is lacking in any commitment to liberal democratic values and ideals not to talk of the popular democratic ones embodied in socialism. Given the naivety of the Political Bureau in recommending socialism as the state ideology and full nationalisation of the oil industry to a government that is fanatically committed to the unfettered operation of market forces and the advancement of foreign investment, it is not surprising that the regime rejected out of hand these recommendations and others that are incompatible with a free-wheeling capitalist order à la Thatcher or Reagan.¹⁵

In effect, therefore, the Babangida Constitution enacted in 1989 is more concerned with mere bureaucratic and administrative division of powers among the cabals of ethnic and regional notables that would aggregate into one or the other of the two political parties. Since this scenario is essentially a replay of earlier ones in a more acute form, it seems that the Third Republic is not only "already unstable" as Claude Ake perceptively observed,¹⁶ but is also already doomed to colonial slavery, the greatest anti-thesis to democracy.

The Challenge of Democracy in Nigeria

This brief excursion into the chequered history of experiments at democratic rule in Nigeria leads to a number of conclusions.

- (1) The bourgeoisie, severally or collectively are incapable of constructing even a liberal democratic order because the mode of accumulation to which they are committed is not consistent with rapid and diversified economic development that can constitute the basis of a fair sharing of resources among contending factions of the bourgeoisie. Consequently there is a lack of the minimum conditions for an orderly and law-governed competition for, and peaceful transfer of power present in the industrialised liberal democracies.
- (2) If the bourgeoisie cannot construct a liberal democratic order, they are even less able to embark on the construction of popular democracy which implies a root and branch transformation of the prevailing inequitable mode of accumulation in such a way that the poor, marginalised and down-trodden working masses have uninhibited access to the process of accumulation and through that to a share in political power.
- (3) However, the radical transformation of the mode of accumulation is neither easy nor straightforward. It requires the active mobilisation of the classes, pre-eminently workers, progressive intellectuals, students, the unemployed, who have a genuine vested interest in such transformation. The struggle to be waged for economic and political power on the basis of this mobilisation cannot be a quick fix or a one-shot fight, but could be a long, arduous and uncertain struggle characterised by little gains and frequent losses until final or at least substantial victory is gained.
- (4) In conducting such struggle there is no substitute for the formation and persistent nurturing of autonomous people's organisations of those committed to working for the desired change rather than mere chatter boxes.
- (5) The task of building a democratic order is a very complex one and requires the building of bridges and alliances across popular democratic organisations that objectively have the same or similar interests (e.g. industrial workers, unskilled workers, peasant farmers, farm labourers, self-employed artisans, petty producers and traders) with a view to reconciling problematic issues that could be divisive and harmonising positions on strategy and tactics of struggle.

- (6) It is useful as part of the struggle for democracy for the combatants to learn in great depth and at the theoretical and practical levels the lessons that both liberal democracy and popular democracy have to teach so as to be able to evolve a wellrounded and coherent democratic order embracing not only economic and social equity, but also the array of civic and political rights which are traditionally dismissed by socialists as bourgeois freedoms.

Notes and References

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- 1 For instance Ian Macleod, the Colonial Secretary in Harold Macmillan's Conservative GOVERNMENT IN THE U.K., clearly underscored this point in a 1960 statement credited to him thus: "The Prime Minister has recently in a striking phrase spoken of turning an empire into a family. But what is happening is part of the pattern of our heritage. We did not go abroad to govern, we went abroad to trade.... So if we are wise, we can stay in countries that we once ruled - as traders, planters, shippers, businessmen, engineers". (Cited in *West Africa*, 2 April, 1960, p. 390).
- 2 See a detailed discussion of these forms of "legitimate expropriation" in S.O. Osoba, "The Economic foundations of Nigeria's Foreign Policy During the First Republic, 1960-65", in I.A. Akinjogbin and S.O. Osoba (eds), *Topics on Nigerian Economic and Social History* (Ile-Ife, University of Ife Press, 1980) pp. 216 - 223.
3. (i) The World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action* (Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1981, p. 180).
- (ii) Central Bank of Nigeria, *Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for the Year Ending 31st December, 1975* (Lagos, CBN, 1975), p. 89.
- (iii) Plus Okiibo provides evidence to show how by 1979, "prior to the change of Government", the foreign debt accumulated by the Obasanjo government had jumped to \$6.8 billion. (See P. Okiibo, *Sorcerers, Astrologers and Nigerian Economic Recovery* (Kuru, NIPSS, 1986), p. 12.
4. Central Bank of Nigeria, *Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for the Year Ending 31st December, 1983*, (Lagos, CBN, 1983), pp. 81-82.
5. Cited in Toyin Falola and Julius Ihonvbere, *The Rise and fall of Nigeria's Second Republic* (London, Zed Books Ltd., 1985), p. 229.
6. It is, however, interesting that Babangida soon found the need not only for the same Rafindadi's chamber of horrors, but for a more elaborate, some say more vicious, National Security Organisation. On 5th June 1986, Babangida announced a reorganisation in the NSO, whereby it was transformed into three semi-autonomous organisations (SSS, MI and NIA) each with its own director, but with a Director-General supposedly coordinating them.
7. The promised protection for the poor has not been in evidence at all. In fact, what has distinguished the Babangida regime is the arrogance with which his ministers have been dismissing the cries of anguish of the poor masses by publicly announcing that certain essential goods and services are "NOT for poor people" - e.g. "cars are not for the poor" (Lt. General Akinnade (rtd) as Minister of Agriculture, "telephones are not for the poor" (Col Tanko Ayuba as Communications Minister); and "air travel is not for the poor" (Brig. Jerry Useri as Aviation and Transport Minister).
8. I. B. Babangida, *Speech delivered at the 10th Graduation Ceremony of NIPSS, October 1988* (Lagos Federal Government Printer, 1988), p. 5.
9. When in June 1987 at a public speaking engagement in Ife Mr. Ernest Sonelkan, the UAC apostle of SAP, was singing the praise of SAP and its achievements world-wide, I challenged him to mention one country where SAP had worked. He hesitated for a few seconds and then produced Ghana as his example of the success of SAP. The audience filling the huge auditorium spontaneously and unanimously laughed him out of court.
10. Yusuf Bagurea, "The Crisis of Underdevelopment and the Transition to Civil Rule: Conceptualising the Question of Democracy in Nigeria", (Paper presented at the annual Conference of the Nigeria Political Science Association on, *Democratic Mobilisation in Nigeria*, held at the University of Ibadan, June/July 1988). Mimeographed, p. 19.

- 11 I.B. Babangida op. cit. pp. 7 and 14
- 12 I have actually witnessed at the checking-in counter of the Nigerian Airways in Ikeja two separate queues of dollar and naira passengers, the former enjoying undisputed preferential treatment over the latter.
- 13 *West Africa*, 16 January 1978.
- 14 *Sunday Concord*, 16 April 1989.
- 15 See Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Governments Views and Comments on the Findings and Recommendations of the Political Bureau*, (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1987), pp. 14 and 19.
- 16 See Claude Ake, "Government Instability in Nigeria" (Paper presented at the National Conference on *The Political Transition Programme*, N.I.I.A, Lagos, April, 1988), mimeographed.

Revolutionary Era American Foreign Policy: Three Enduring Themes

By Henry E. Mattox*

Three themes under lay United State foreign policy formulation for many decades after the American Revolution. These enduring foreign affairs precepts did not include, of course, the containment of communism, with which the world has become so familiar in this century. Rather, they consisted of a now almost-forgotten policy of political isolation and its related emphasis on neutral rights; a controversial drive for territorial expansion -- the impetus toward empire, that is, and an expressed belief in morality -- idealism -- as a guide in the conduct of foreign affairs. All three of these enduring themes dated from the earliest days of the Republic. The first two remained as foundations of foreign policy for well over a century, and the third named is still with us: Isolationism, expansionism and idealism.

Tracing the Revolutionary-period origins of these remarkably long-lasting U.S. policy principles poses for the scholar the problem of inquiring into complex multiple lines of thought arising not only from leading eighteenth century, but also from intellectual currents prevalent in Europe at the time. One can nevertheless clearly identify elements of all three at the beginning of the nation's existence, in the crucial negotiations with France conducted from mid-1776 to early 1778.

Following by only weeks the Declaration of Independence, the Continental Congress' instructions to commissioners sent to Paris to carry out those talks included the basic premise that, as John Adams put it, America "should avoid an alliance which might embarrass us in after times. "No Political connection," with France he enjoined the emissaries, "No Military connection." The new, barely emerging United States sought aid and recognition from France, but hoped to avoid binding political or military ties under almost any circumstances, dire as those circumstances might be at that initial stage in the struggle against mighty Britain.

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The Congressional strictures did not prohibit a commercial alliance. Quite the contrary; the prospect of trade with the new American state, many hoped, would be sufficient inducement for the French. Indeed, some American leaders saw trade opened up on a reciprocal basis, once the nation freed itself from its links with the British empire, as America's card in her dealings with all European powers. This optimistic view reflected an emerging body of thought that hailed the benefits of free trade to all, even (or perhaps especially) neutral states in wartime, as a basis for the conduct of relations between nations. Thomas Jefferson in particular came to espouse liberalized international commerce as a policy that would further his vision of America as a land of yeomen farmers. As he wrote in *Notes on the State of Virginia in 1785*, he did not want to see Americans "occupied at a work-bench.. It is better to carry provisions and materials to workmen there (in Europe)"²

Whatever arrangements the U.S. Revolutionary era envoys might reach, or strive to avoid, in discussions with the royal government of France, parenthetically we may note that diplomatic practice in the eighteenth century gave a connotation to the word alliance of the sort sought meant then more an agreement for specific purposes than a formal pact built upon mutual defence interests, as came to be the case in later years. Regardless of definitional nuances, the American negotiators faced a formidable task in the period after the Declaration of Independence, even given that France has her own reasons for opposing her traditional foe, Great Britain, through entering into contact with and aiding the nascent United States.

The Americans accomplished their task. In February 1778, two bilateral U.S.-French bilateral treaties resulted from the extended bargaining sessions. One was on commercial and shipping matters, and the other in the political military sphere. America's very first diplomats also managed to adhere reasonably closely to their instructions from Congress. Although prepared at one especially bleak time to enter into broader political commitments if necessary, Benjamin Franklin and his fellow envoys, Silas Deane and Arthur Lee, eventually succeeded in working out acceptably limited terms, aided by the favourable turn of events for America signalled by the defeat of the British at Saratoga in later 1777. A key article of the defensive alliance they signed, agreement not to conclude a separate peace if France went to war with Britain, while obviously entangling to a degree, accorded more or less with the Americans' 1776 guidance. France for its part agreed to fight on in case of war (and hostilities with England soon broke out) until the United States' independence was assured and to renounce all her pre-1763 territorial claims to British North America. Both of these provisions clearly furthered the American cause.

A student of the period has noted that it is "astounding how little the Americans were willing to offer" at the outset of the vital negotiations, as needful of French assistance as they were, and her remarks that the two U.S. French treaties "left an amazing degree of freedom of action to the Americans."³ The course of military campaigns in North America, along with France's view of her own interests, basically determined the outcome of the treaty talks. But the adroit negotiators from the new republic -- although they were not always on the closest of personal terms -- did masterful job in avoiding at that very early point

in the nation's history most of the political links that they and the Continental Congress' leaders believed to be counter to U.S. interests. The principle that the nation should avoid entangling alliances with the Old World thus antedated even George Washington's famed Farewell Address of 1796. The emerging nation began its existence imbued with the belief that international freedom of action -- political isolation, with neutral commercial rights reserved -- were policies appropriate to the uniqueness of the great New World experiment in government, as well as being vital to the country's best interests.

Even in this early period, evidence can be found also to support the thesis that the United States long saw its destiny manifestly as one of expansion. The Continental Congress' Model Treaty, drafted in 1776 by Adams and provided to Franklin and his fellow commissioners as a guide, included a provision in effect reserving Canada, Florida, and Bermuda to America "whenever they shall be united or confederated with the... United States."⁴ All lay outside the boundaries of the thirteen colonies in revolt. At a low point in America's fortunes in 1777, Franklin, a master of suave persuasiveness despite his outward attitude of guileless innocence, further had the gall to ask France for active assistance in the conquest of Canada as a precondition to America entering into a far-reaching political alliance (a line of negotiations which did not come to fruition). And a French foreign ministry official, in describing a decisive stage of the Paris talks in January 1778, noted significantly that he himself "dwelt on the conquest of the whole continent, because Mr. Deane had confided to me that this was, according to (Franklin's) way of thinking, the most definite reason for forming ties with France."⁵

The former colonies attempting to extricate themselves from the grasp of Britain and to form a new political system consisted at that time mainly of scattered, thinly-peopled settlements on the eastern seaboard of North America, settlements which did not penetrate far inland on the vast continent, a huge area with untold natural resources, a native population of unknown size, and competing European claims to territorial supremacy. Yet, the nation's leaders were already raising the conquest of all of North America as an idea for discussion at the negotiating table, even before they had achieved independence. Jefferson, as President in the early 1800's, can be considered an expansionist par excellence because of the Louisiana Purchase, the accord with Napoleon's France which doubled the size of the United States. Later, in 1845, a New York newspaperman articulated the almost mystical notion of "manifest destiny," the belief that a higher power ordained American conquests in the West in the soon-to-come war with Mexico, 1846-1848. These foreign affairs initiatives, and the subsequent acquisition of overseas colonies after the Spanish-American War of 1898, clearly were nothing new, however, expansionism had a central place in the thinking of American policy makers from the outset.

In conducting the Revolutionary era negotiations which culminated in the two critical agreements with France in 1778, the emissaries from America held the view that they were representatives of a new democratic form of government. They presented themselves as practitioners of the "New Diplomacy," as it was called in eighteenth century Europe, or of "militia diplomacy," in Adams' apt phrase. The world-renowned Dr. Franklin wore (somewhat ostentatiously,

to be sure) a shabby brown coat rather than court dress and he ignored the fashion of wearing powdered wigs. The very first envoy to arrive at the court of Louis XVI, the unfortunate Deane (who later fell from grace over accusations of improprieties in his official accounts), privately disapproved of pomp and ceremony; he apologized at an initial interview with the French foreign minister, the Comte de Vergennes, for his lack of knowledge of diplomatic niceties.⁸ But the strait-faced future President, Adams, who joined the overseas delegation in 1778, most nearly personified the honest, ethical diplomat, at least in his own self-conscious estimation. Presuming to instruct Vergennes at one point, he asserted that "the dignity of North America does not consist in diplomatic ceremonials or any of the subtleties of etiquette: It consists," he continued, "solely in reason, justice, truth (and) the rights of man."⁹ One wonders what the aristocratic foreign minister thought of Adams' lecture.

Truth, justice, openness, the rights of man -- in the context that Adams raised such concepts, they represented the idealism reflected in a body of contemporary European philosophical ideas that included, in reacting to older methods of power diplomacy, an emphasis on a "natural order" of mutual global interests and a call for the unfettered rule of reason in foreign affairs. His reference to the "dignity of North America" and Franklin's affection of homespun simplicity were intended to highlight what they saw as America's relatively innocent colonial experience, far removed from the intrigues and corruption of European courts. The envoys to France thus consciously adopted these lines of thought on morality and simplicity in the practice of diplomacy, albeit each in his own individualistic style. President Woodrow Wilson therefore, early in the twentieth century, by no means initiated a national commitment to idealism in the conduct of foreign policy. America's militia diplomats had begun the advancement of such ideas long before, at the dawn of the new country's existence.

In 1783, five years after the end of the negotiations leading to the much needed French support of the Revolution, the Anglo-American Treaty of Paris formally acknowledged the United States' independence. The terms of the pact resulted from further diplomacy conducted by Franklin and Adams, joined this time by John Jay. We can again identify the three themes of isolationism, expansionism, and idealism as important parts of American policy. Playing one side against the other in the swirling currents of international trade-offs and the pursuit of national interests, the American envoys in effect re-established freedom of action -- a form of isolation -- for the nation: They extricated the United States from the binding ties of the 1778 defensive treaty with France. The Americans accomplished this feat by secretly entering into talks and, in late 1782, signing preliminary articles of peace with England (the envoys reached final agreement nine months later). The Americans thereby ignored Congressional orders that they subordinate themselves to the views of the French court on all questions, save that of independence. Franklin and his colleagues -- Jay in particular -- decided on their own responsibility to avail themselves of opportunities that presented themselves on the spot, even if they had to go against their instructions.

At stake among the new nation's interest was not only peace and independence but also the all-important location of her western boundary. The

question was whether London would recognize the frontier at the range of the Appalachian Mountains, the limit of effective settlement by the former colonists, or whether Britain would concede that it lay farther to the west at the Mississippi River. The Shelburne ministry in London reflected the war weariness of the British people and the prevailing domestic political turmoil by agreeing to the latter, more distant frontier, despite the near-absence of Americans that far west and the presence there of England's Indian allies. This advantageous arrangement led the American negotiators based in Paris to punch their luck by proposing the cession also of Canada. They failed with the British in that ambitious initiative, however, France saw neither development -- a western boundary on the Mississippi or the acquisition of Canada -- as in her interest; such territorial settlements would encourage the growth in the 'New World' of a potential rival on the international scene. The American emissaries nonetheless succeeded in furthering the nation's interest, notwithstanding Congressional instructions and bilateral treaty with France still in force.

Congressional leadership apparently had based its almost unprecedented restrictions on the envoys' freedom of action on a concern for the moralistic New Diplomacy. It was a naive decision that placed almost total trust in Paris' good intentions toward America. Perhaps fortunately for the emerging nation, the pragmatism of the negotiators on the spot counteracted this extreme example of morality in foreign policy. Realism -- or as it might be called in this instance, expediency -- won out over idealism. When faced with the diplomatic *fait accompli* which effectively ended the United States' participation in the war, and which disengaged America from the aims and presumed wishes of France (an action artfully rationalized to Vergennes by Franklin), by Franklin), the government of Louis XVI had little option but to go along.⁸

This formulation which cites three main features of Revolutionary era policy shows as well that the conduct of foreign affairs rarely if ever is devoid of complexities. The experience of Dr. Franklin and his colleagues in the off-again, on-again negotiations in the years from 1776 to 1783 demonstrates how a blend of ideas and a mix of circumstances can affect the conduct of diplomacy. The real world intrudes into idealized concepts. Practical considerations overtake even formal obligations. National interest not surprisingly rule supreme. The generation of the Founding Fathers included many thoroughgoing realists, notwithstanding the Paris commissioners' protestations of adherence only to moral precepts, and despite instances such as the Congress' apparent innocence in issuing instructions for the peace talks. In general, policy makers and diplomatic approach on the basic issue of achieving independence, at as little cost to their national freedom of action as possible, and with as great a territorial advantage as could be arranged. The scholar therefore can over stress the prevalent nature of any one theme in the foreign policy of the day. The influence of power politics and national interest did indeed have an impact on the thinking of the early U.S. Diplomats and policy makers, and unanticipated circumstances presented key opportunities in the achievement of national goals.

Nevertheless, the student of American diplomatic history may note the fundamental policy considerations evidenced at the time of the American Revolution and trace their lineage through the years, down to the twentieth

century. First, isolationism:

Until nearly the middle of this century, most Americans believed that their country's leaders formulated foreign policy basically on an undertaking to avoid political involvement abroad, especially in Europe, a requirement attributed to the first President's injunction to avoid entangling alliances.⁹ This idea of isolationism fit in well with America's nineteenth century concentration on the settlement and development of the contiguous lands of the continent; prior to the end of the 1800s, the United States found itself too busy "at home" in North America to become involved overseas. The nation avoided signing any defensive treaties whatever, following is 1778 pact with France (which was terminated in 1800), for 169 more years, until 1947 with the conclusion of an inter-American defense pact, the Rio Treaty. Other formal alliances followed, importantly including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 and bilateral defense treaties with the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan, all signed by 1960. Pearl Harbour was the catalyst for America's final emergence from its isolationist shell, and the Cold War following immediately upon the Second World War ensured the country's continued involvement abroad. Isolationism, the policy principle which in the early twentieth century had kept the United States out of the League of Nations, and which held the nation aloof from the buildup to Hitler's war, was no more. After well over a century and a half, America became fully committed to an internationalist stance in world affairs. And so it remains as the twenty-first century approaches.

The sidelight to isolationism, what has come to seem an esoteric concern with neutral rights in wartime, partially caused the conflict with Britain in 1812-1815 and remained a policy pre-occupation for another century, until the First World War.¹⁰ In 1914-1917, Germany's submarine campaigns ran directly counter to the firmly-stated U.S. belief that nonbelligerents such as the United States should have access to European markets for trade, even while standing aloof from the conflict being waged on the Continent. The loss of American lives and shipping which resulted from submarine attacks was an important factor in President Wilson's decision to go to war with imperial Germany. Since that time, however, the nation has dropped completely any such interpretation of neutrality. America's experience in World War I showed that insistence on those rights counteracted efforts to stay out of conflicts abroad. The Congress in the 1930s went to some lengths to pass restrictive legislation designed to head off just that kind of problem, in light of the the-current buildup to another World War. The question of neutral rights thus has been a dead issue during the past half century.

America's attitude toward expansion of its territory, exemplified by the phrase Manifest Destiny, raises questions of interpretation for the historian. Expand, the United States assuredly did throughout the nineteenth century, and by leaps and bounds. First, as already noted, came the Louisiana Purchase; then the acquisition successively of what was called West Florida, itself, Texas, and the Oregon territory, all by essentially peaceful means; next, the vast lands of the Southwest and California by conquest from Mexico, and later by purchase from Mexico, an added strip of land mainly in present-day Arizona. The list goes

on: Still in the nineteenth century, the United States bought Alaska from Russia and claimed tiny Midway Island in the Pacific. As the 1800s closed, in a climactic, brief war with Spain, America acquired the huge Pacific archipelago of the Philippines with its nine million people, and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean, while coming to dominate the latter region. Additionally, the expansionist drive shortly before and after 1900 encompassed Hawaii, the Panama Canal Zone, and other small island holdings in the Pacific and the Caribbean.

No one disputes these facts. Scholarly explanations vary, however. Interpretive questions arise as to whether the nation pursued, and continued later to pursue, regional and even international hegemony primarily in the economic sphere, not on the political plane, if so -- and the point is debatable -- can an effort to attain trade and investment predominance, not political control necessarily, be equated with the colonialism exercised by the European powers in, as an example, Africa, or by the United States itself in the Philippines?

Discussion of such issues incorporates various theses designed to account not only for America's strong drive for the expansion of its territorial limits throughout the 1800s, but also for its activism abroad in the twentieth century. Scholars' explanations range over geo-political considerations, ideology, commercial interests, domestic U.S. opinion, chance causal factors, the nation's view of its world role, planning and strategic concepts, and yet further reasons. Controversy presents itself not so much on the evidence that America long followed an expansionist path, virtually from the time of independence; rather, arguments centre on motivation and whether or not those policies were consciously designed for aggressive conquest and the building of empire. One school of historians, which we might call the "traditionalists," has presented a picture of a nation imbued with pietistic notions of its destiny to enlarge its boundaries and domination over others, even beyond the North American continent, with the effect of improving the lot those population view the expansionist flurry at the turn of the twentieth century, however, as virtually accidental: It was not a planned march empire. "Revisionist" historians writing during the past 30 years hold that design was present throughout the process, that America's foreign policy leadership reacted to rational, self-interested domestic pressures and knew well what it was about. That school of thought emphasizes the economic factor in the expansionist equation and attributes motives of trade and investment promotion to continued twentieth century activism, including later initiatives that did not result in territorial gains. Scholars continue the debate in the search for a generally satisfactory consensus.¹¹

Finally, morality in the conduct of foreign affairs is a factor often cited by American statesmen. A line of thought easily demonstrated in repeated expressions through the years of reliance on international law and a need for arbitral rules, it is also an amorphous element making susceptible to a lingering doubt policy makers' sincerity. Students of American diplomacy who stress the need for hardheaded primates in the formulation of policy decay what they see as a tendency toward excessive morality -- softheartedness, if you will -- in the pursuit of the nation's interests. This dispute over "idealism" as contrasted with "idealism" points up the prevalence of judgment-laden morality as a staple of policy pronouncements. The scholar can indeed find numerous instances of

apparent cant, of repeated invocations of idealistic motives, in state papers and speeches. The ultra-sincere Wilson, to cite again one outstanding example, in a speech just prior to the First World War, stressed in famous words that "morality and not expediency is the thing that must guide us."¹² Similar phrases could be spoken public by any senior foreign affairs official of today. Another prime recent instance of this approach was the Carter Administration's emphasis on human rights as one of the very bases of its foreign policy. Yet another was the Reagan Administration's condemnation for years of the "evil" Soviet state and empire. Idealism generally is present in the articulation of American foreign affairs, regardless of how much pragmatic considerations in actuality may have entered into policy formulation on given issues. The practice continues.

To sum up, whatever best provides an explanation now for the United States' record of territorial aggrandizement, particularly in the nineteenth century, that expansionist impetus began at the beginning. Along with this outward thrust came, very early, a wariness about becoming involved in Europe's recurrent troubles, along with a tendency to inject moralistic concepts into international affairs. Despite often profound differences of interpretation, and notwithstanding disagreements on tactics and goals among American statesmen (and although other overriding concerns such as the containment policy eventually emerged), these three foreign policy themes stood as abiding legacies of the long-ago Revolutionary period. All--isolationism, expansionism, and idealism, were evident before the nation even really achieved nationhood, and all long remained important elements of America's international outlook.

Notes

1. John Adams, *Autobiography*, quoted in Gerald Stourzh, *Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy* (Chicago, 1969), 123.
2. Quoted in Felix Gilbert, *The Beginnings of American Foreign Policy: To the Farewell Address* (Princeton, 1961), 53.
3. Stourzh, *Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy*, 145.
4. Worthington d. Ford, ed., *The Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789*: 34 vols. (Washington, 1904-37), v. 770.
5. Benjamin F. Stevens, ed., *Facsimiles of Manuscripts from European Archives Relating to America, 1773-1783*, 25 vols. (London, 1889-98), XXI, no. 1831.
6. See Deane's memorandum of the conversation in Carlemagne Tower, *The Marguis de La Fayette in the American Revolution. With Some Account of the Attitude of France Toward the War of Independence*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1895), 1, 316.
7. Adams to Vergennes, Jul. 18, 1781, quoted in Gilbert, *The Beginnings of American Foreign Policy*, 67.
8. Vergennes had his own reasons for acquiescing. Tied to Spain by an awkward agreement which promised British-held Gibraltar to the Spanish Crown, France was not too unhappy to use the Americans' unilateral action as a way out. The preliminary agreement was signed on Nov. 30, 1782, and ratified by the Continental Congress on April, 15, 1783; the final agreement was signed on Sept. 3, 1783. France and Britain also reached separate accords on the dates of the final Franco-American agreement. A useful source for the treaty texts is Clive Perry, ed., *The Consolidated Treaty Series, 1781-1783* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1969), vol. 48, 225-29, 488-98.
9. Washington had more measure advice to the nation than "no entangling alliances," a phrase actually first used by Jefferson. Burton Ira Kaufman, ed., *Washington's Farewell Address: The View From the 20th Century* (Chicago, 1969) shows that scholars have challenged a strictly isolationist interpretation of the first President's injunction.

10. Ironically, during the Civil War, 1861-65, the Union under Abraham Lincoln argued diplomatically against the right of neutrals, such as Britain, to trade with the Confederacy. With the war won, however, the United States returned -- for the next half century or so -- to its historic position in favour of such rights.
11. William Appleman Williams pioneered a revisionist view of American diplomatic history in the late 1950s and 1960s stressing the economic bases of American expansionism. The group of historians following his lead, sometimes called the "Wisconsin School," included, among others, Walter La Feber, Thomas McCormick, Gabriel Kolko, and Thomas G. Paterson. Prominent among those who have interpreted U.S. policies in more traditional political context are Samuel Flagg Bemis and Julius W. Pratt of a generation ago, and in more recent years, Thomas A. Bailey, Norman A. Grabner, Ernest R. May, and John Lewis Gaddis. Categorization of scholars in the field is difficult in many cases, especially among recent writers seeking consensus on the question of the primacy of economic vs. Political foreign policy determinants.
12. Quoted in Stourzh, *Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy*, 233.

Review Article

Origins Of The Nigerian Economic Crisis: A Review Of Recent Studies

By Anthony Enisan Akinlo*

By the beginning of the 1980s macroeconomic performance in the developing countries had witnessed a serious decline as evidenced by both domestic and external imbalances. This was the consequence of chronic and fundamental economic structural weaknesses and severe external shocks. In Nigeria, for example, distortions and imbalances such as an overvalued exchange rate, high protection across sectors, highly controlled financial system, over concentration on exports of oil and importation of consumer and producer goods, were prevalent. With these distortions and imbalances pervading the whole economy, major indicators point to deteriorating economic conditions in Nigeria. The balance of payments deficit was increasing, *per capita* income deteriorating, inflation skyrocketing and there were excessive fluctuations of foreign reserves.

Various explanations have been put forward in the attempts to explain the origins of the Nigerian economic crisis. Some of these are even conflicting. This explains why various management measures have been adopted at one time or the other, by the government. However, these policies have not produced the desired results of restructuring the economy. This essay is not concerned with making a detailed assessment of these various policies, rather, the purpose is to review the various explanations of the origins of the Nigerian economic crisis as proffered by analysts and provide a better insight into the origins of the current crisis in the economy.

In the first part, we identify the main categories of available explanations and the substantive foci of some of the views on the crisis are set forth. The second part discusses the analysts' views on policy measures so far adopted, the alternative policy prescriptions put forward, and the ways their policy prescriptions have been affected by the theoretical perspectives which they bring to bear in understanding the crisis. There is also an evaluation of their policy prescriptions. The final part is the conclusion.

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Perspectives on the origins of the Nigerian economic crisis can be classified into three schools, namely, the Keynesian-structuralist, the managerial-efficiency, and the Marxist. The Keynesian-structuralist school perceives the Nigerian economic crisis as emanating from the excessive openness and distorted structures of the economy. The Marxist theorists see the crisis not as a simple recession or debt crisis resulting from openness or otherwise of the economy but, rather, as a complicated crisis of the capitalist system. The last explanation of the origins of the crisis, the managerial-efficiency school, traces the origins of the crisis to mismanagement of the economy, indiscipline and corruption in the society, the contract system, low domestic productivity and the like.

The Marxist perspective is firmly rooted in the three component parts of Marxism, namely, political economy, dialectical materialism, and class struggles. The Marxist vision is derived from the basic proposition that class societies have in-built tendency to generate contradictions and crisis is the material production of use values in which labour produces value beyond its subsistence - the surplus of which is appropriated by the owners of capital. In fact, to the Marxists, this appropriation of the surplus value which results from the socialisation of production, by the owners of capital constitutes the primary contradiction which is often manifested in class struggles of both reformist and revolutionary types.

Bangura, an adherent of the view espoused above, in his article "Overcoming some Basic Misconceptions of the Nigerian Economic Crisis", sees the integration of the Nigerian economy into the capitalist orbit as being responsible for the Nigerian crisis (pp. 53 - 54). Bangura highlights the various channels through which the Nigerian economy has been integrated into the capitalist orbit the most important being the activities of the multinational corporations (pp. 54 - 55). He states that the contradiction between the socialisation of production and private appropriation of surplus, has manifested itself in the ongoing struggles of the working class since its creation in the colonial period (p.55). Bangura then concludes that the contradiction mentioned above affects the development and resolution of the other crisis the Nigerian economy has had to contend with (p. 55).

In the same way, Adebayo Olukoshi in the "Origins, Dimensions and Consequences of the Nigerian Economic Crisis 1982-85", sees the integration of the Nigerian economy into the world capitalist system as being responsible for the domestic crisis (pp. 25 - 31). Olukoshi tries to show how the crisis escalated and soon became a crisis of Nigeria's import substitution industries themselves. Apart from the collapse of the import substitution industries, the crisis led to balance of payments deficits and, flowing from that, debt problems, unemployment, inflation and deteriorating standard of living of the people (pp. 25 - 36).

To a considerable extent the works of Eskor Toyo, "Recovery from Economic Decline: Lessons for a Developing Economy", and Bade Onimode,

in his book, *A Political Economy of the African Crisis*, do not differ from the views of Bangura and Olukoshi ex-rayed above. They, however, in addition provide thorough critiques of the IMF and World Bank explanations of the origins of the Nigerian crisis (rooted in the classical-monetarist vision of near perfect competition, smooth convexities, significant price elasticities and frictionless price and wage adjustments), and the efficiency of the current adjustment programme in addressing the economic crisis. Eskor Toyo comments that for the IMF and the World Bank to attribute the current crisis to 'petroleum decline' 'Policy', and 'Underlying forces', etc., is erroneous and misleading (p. 5). In his words.

Nigeria is a peripheral capitalist country sharing the global economic experience of the world's capitalist block of countries. The current crisis of her economy is neither abnormal nor due to any particular set of policies (p. 6).

He shows the nature of economic crisis in the capitalist world and their relevance to the Nigerian situations.

The one important criticism which is often made of Eskor Toyo and other studies noted above is their ideological undertone. This criticism is couched in terms of Mabogunje's view (cited in Oyejide *et al.* p. 81) on the relationship between ideology and under-development as expressed thus:

I am aware of the close interrelation between a given ideology and the set of appropriate strategies needed to translate it into a practised reality. I am conscious that there have been many attempts at an ideological interpretation of our under-development. I must also confess to having derived tremendous inspiration and gained considerable insights from the work of a multitude of Marxian scholars or intellectuals of various shades of socialist conviction. Nonetheless, I must aver the existence of many African leaders who in spite of declared, professed and dogmatized claims to being socialist have been unable to engage in transforming their countries into socialist states. Thus, I am more concerned with strategies than with ideology; with methodology rather than philosophy. My position stems from the belief that we do not look for the ideologies of development in our midst but that there is a grave shortage of managers of development.

The argument here as it relates to the origins of the crisis, is that the issue of Nigeria being an integral part of the capitalist system should not have been of serious concern if the economy has been properly managed. This is to suggest that the problems of the economy go beyond the global capitalist crisis. As summarised in the work of Onoge, "On the Cultural Configuration of the Current Crisis", the factors behind the current crisis are mismanagement and indiscipline (pp. 4-10). Mismanagement and corruption were seen as prevalent in the Nigerian economy. This is manifested in the implementation of many public investment projects without sufficient attention either to their economic viability or to the capacity of government agencies and public enterprises to implement them. As noted in Nils Borje Tallroth, "Structural Adjustment in Nigeria", during most of the period of the 1970s, budgetary expenditures exceeded the rapidly rising revenues from oil (p. 20).

Related to this is the corrupt nature of public officials and private entrepreneurs who openly loot public funds or make illegal transaction in the

foreign exchange market; the arguments of contract and consultancy. This view is summarised in M.M. Modibbo, "The future of Education in Nigeria: Implications of re-introduction of school fees and other Taxes", and Yusuf Bala Usman, "Middlemen, Consultants, Contractors and the solutions to the Current Economic Crisis". Their contention is that while the role of external factors in generating crisis cannot be contended, the domestic problems such as inflated contracts, 10 percenters and consultancy are factors to reckon with in the discussion of the origins of the Nigerian economic crisis. Implicit in the arguments of Onoge, Modibbo, Usman etc., is the idea that many of the problems in Nigeria relates more to the deviant behaviour of individuals and leadership quality than to Nigeria's incorporation into the world's capitalist economy.

But Bangura (p. 58) would not concede to the arguments of the "Managerial-inefficiency" school. In fact, in the last part of his paper (p. 58) he tries to dismiss what he calls the "myth" of mismanagement, corruption, contracts and consultancy, as causes of the economic crisis. Though, he sees the Nigerian economy as one of the most mismanaged in the world which undoubtedly has compounded the crisis; he fails to see how the economy could have been managed as to permanently avoid crisis (p. 58). This is premised on his view that the best managed capitalist economies, the United States, Britain, France, etc., have experienced profound economic crises at one time or the other (p. 58).

Somewhat related to the Marxian school in terms of the external oriented nature of the crisis is the Keynesian-structuralist view as expressed by Oyejide *et al.*, in the book, Nigeria and the IMF, and by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), in the document *Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-economic Recovery and Transformation* (AAF - SAP). These works have in common the fact that they both identify the structure of the Nigerian economy as the major source of its crisis. Oyejide *et al.* believe that domestic factors could be important sources of domestic crisis but external factors could be more important. Oyejide *et al.* write (pp. 71 - 72) that the origins of Nigeria's current economic crisis are firmly rooted in the country's external sector payments disequilibrium, which, of course, is a fundamental disequilibrium (p. 72). Since these problems were fundamental and structural in nature, the previously adopted short-lived and palliative measures could not work (p. 72). Hence, the need for a more thorough-going structural adjustment programme (p. 72).

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) document, AAF - SAP (pp. 1-20), along a line similar to that of Oyejide *et al.*, emphasises the structure of the economy as being responsible for the crisis. The exchange oriented nature of the economy, weak productive base, various forms of inequalities, its openness and dependency, etc., are catalogued as the major factors responsible for the Nigerian economic crisis.

What could be inferred from some of the works reviewed above is that the origins of the Nigerian economic crisis are not uniformly perceived by analysts

as various explanations belonging to three different schools have been put forward.

While it may be correct that the Nigerian economy is an appendage of the world capitalist system and as such, prone to contradictions and crises, it would be equally naive to attribute the source of the Nigerian crisis to this factor alone. There is no reason or existing empirical evidence to suggest that a well-managed, resource-endowed country cannot survive the current economic crisis. In the same way, the role of distorted structures and the like in perpetuating the crisis cannot be over emphasized, but its effects/ potency can be reduced if not eliminated with proper domestic management and good foresight. These, the economy lacks.

This author would want to believe that while the external factors as noted by the Marxian and the Keynesian-structuralist schools are important, however, the domestic factors such as corruption, mismanagement and the like can serve as major intensifier and multiplier of the crisis. This tends to suggest that these three view of the origins of the Nigerian economic crisis cannot be separated into watertight compartments. Rather they are self-reinforcing. In view of this, this author would suggest that further research on the origins of the domestic crisis should focus on the relative contribution of both domestic and external factors to the Nigerian economic crisis with a view to determining the appropriate blend of micro, macro and structural policies needed to combat the crisis.

II

Most of the studies so far noted in this essay also take positions on the current Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The Marxists do not see how the economic crisis could be solved by the Structural Adjustment Programme. For Bangura (p. 59), crises cannot be permanently eliminated from a capitalist economy. Likewise, capitalism is incapable of reconciling the fundamental contradiction between social production and the private appropriation of surplus (p. 59). Thus, to him:

the question on the agenda is how to steer the country away from the unfolding repressive capitalist order by focusing on the concrete problems of the working people in their current struggles against retrenchment; job insecurity, and repressive labour and civic law; prepare the ground for the strengthening of the working class movement and the construction of a popular alternative to end capitalist crises.

The major problem with Bangura's position is that it is not specific in terms of policy prescriptions. One would expect a detailed policy prescription to achieve the various laudable goals referred to in his statements above.

Adebayo Olukoshi is also of the view that the current adjustment programme cannot solve the Nigerian economic crisis. To him, structural adjustment represents an attempt to restructure the basis of accumulation in Nigeria away from a state-led pattern of accumulation towards a market oriented system (p. 85). Like Bangura, he is also not forthcoming in terms of policy prescriptions

for solving the crisis. This, of course, constitutes a major criticism of the work. When no specific suggestions are forthcoming, one may be tempted to conclude that the basic position of the two authors is that the Nigerian economy is permanently doomed. This conclusion is based on their argument that no country, while going capitalist and remaining linked with imperialism, can solve the problems on its own.

Eskor Toyo's "Recovery from Economic Decline: Lessons for a Developing Economy", apart from providing a systematic critique of the current adjustment programme (pp. 34-43) as ascertained in his statement, that the IMF conditionality cannot pull any developing countries out of the current depression or provide the basis for such an escape, went further to prescribe specific policy measures for overcoming the crisis (pp. 43-45). Measures proposed by Toyo include curtailment of imports, drastic reduction in middle-class consumption and adoption of economic planning.

This author would agree with Toyo (p. 43) that the economy is not permanently doomed simply because of its linkages with the capitalist world. He, however, disagrees with the set of policy measures prescribed by Toyo to solve the problem. Curtailment of imports without adequate domestic measures to augment domestic supply could result in more problems than envisaged. In the same manner, it may not be easy to reduce the consumption of the middle-class as each class in the society will always try to maintain their share in the economy. Finally, considering the experience of Nigeria with planning since 1960, one may find it rather difficult to subscribe to the idea that the fundamental economic instrument for sustained and stable development is planning as claimed by Toyo (p. 44). In fact, he himself notes that economic planning has not been successful in any capitalist economy (p. 44).

The structuralist-Keynesian view articulated in the work of Oyejide *et al.* and ECA's AAF-SAP document perceives the structure being addressed by the current adjustment programme as ephemeral or auxiliary in nature. This implies that the adjustment programme presently being articulated will not produce the desired result of restructuring the economy. This is why AAF-SAP not only takes account of the dynamic relationship existing among all major elements related to adjustment with transformation, but also emphasises full mobilisation and efficient utilisation of domestic resources and the need to establish an enabling environment for sustainable development and to adopt a pragmatic approach between the public and private sectors. However, the modality of creating an enabling environment for mobilising domestic resources for effective utilisation, remains big problem in the economy.

III

All the works which have been reviewed above provide interesting insights into the origins of the Nigerian economic crisis and the appropriateness of the current adjustment programme. While the Marxist perspective as summarised in the works of Bangura, Olukoshi, Eskor Toyo, etc., sees the integration of the Nigerian economy into the world capitalist system as being responsible for the crisis, the managerial-efficiency school sees the deviant behaviour of

individuals and leadership quality which often manifest in mismanagement, corruption etc., as the main forces behind Nigeria's economic crisis. The last group, the structuralist-Keynesian school, traces the origin of the domestic crisis to the structure of the economy. Generally, the three schools of thought do not see the current adjustment programme solving the Nigerian economic crisis. And when considered individually, the policy prescriptions of each school raise more questions than they tend to answer.

One must, however, observe here that to attribute the origins of the Nigerian economic crisis to a particular source as claimed by some of the adherents of each school of thought would appear preposterous. A close examination of Nigeria's experience with development efforts since independence would show that the crisis is a product of many factors both internal and external. Economic mismanagement, corruption etc., excessive government intervention and distorted structures as well as the integration of the economy into the world capitalist system among others, are major forces behind the Nigerian economic crisis. As such, a purely Keynesian-structuralist, managerial-efficiency or marxist prescription will only beg the question rather than solve it. This, therefore, calls for a proper blend of policies that can address both the internal and external factors precipitating the crisis in Nigeria. This is where, in this author's view, collaborative work of IMF/World Bank in the formulation of the structural adjustment programme (a combination of both macro and micro economic policies) is commendable. But the major flaw and of course, the reason for the tardiness of Nigerian economic crisis in responding to the adjustment programme, is the non-incorporation of Marxist policies and other human basic needs such as housing and food. A very useful way of achieving a proper and adequate policy alignment needed for solving the Nigerian economic crisis is to conduct thorough empirical researches into the importance of each source (internal and external) to the crisis as recommended in section ii. This should constitute an area of future research in Nigeria.

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Reviewed by Matthews A. Ojo*

Since the pioneering study of Geoffrey Parrinder on religious groups in the city of Ibadan in the early 1950s, other studies have emerged on what later became known both in academic and religious circles as the Aladura churches or movement. Though there is a growing corpus of literature on religious movements in Nigeria, such works have concentrated on the Aladura movement. Thus, the present volume has come to meet a felt need in presenting some other religious movements in the country.

This book, a collection of twelve articles contributed by scholars from Nigerian and foreign universities, deals with varied or diverse religious groups or topics ranging from the Celestial Church of Christ in Western Nigeria to the Maitatsine movement in Northern Nigeria and to the Brotherhood of Cross and Star in South-Eastern Nigeria. The articles reflect the diversity of the geographical areas in the country.

Each chapter focuses on a specific religious group/movement or theme. There are eleven identifiable themes. For instance, Chapters 3 and 8 are on the Celestial Church of Christ. In chapter 3 by Jacob Olupona, the establishment of the church specifically in Ondo is highlighted, while chapter 8 examines the growth of the church in Nigeria since its inception in 1947. In her article, Dr. Hackett attributes the growth of the church to its founder-leader and to the dynamism of the transition from a sect-type to a church-type religious group. Olupona also attributes the phenomenal growth to the founder's life history and states further that members of the church were able to share a common milieu with the founder because his life history reflects both traditional religious cosmology and biblical world-views. These authors however did not provide a comparison of CCC with other Aladura churches in Nigeria to indicate clearly the actual growth of the church.

Chapters 2, 6, and 7 centre on religious groups found in Isokoland in Mid-Western Nigeria. In chapter 2 E. Samson Akama surveys the Anglican Adam Preaching Society (AAP), a mass evangelistic organization founded by Evangelist Adam Igudu in the late 1920s. Of interest is the influence of the group within the Anglican churches in Isokoland and how the organization has served

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within the Anglican churches in Isokoland and how the organization has served as a springboard for the emergence of other religious movements, e.g. the Ole-Ezi movement. Regrettably, Akama failed to show how any of the other religious groups arose from the AAPs. In chapter 6, Akama again discusses a traditional and syncretistic cult known as Igbe in Isokoland.

Chapter 7 is a study of the God's Kingdom Society by Daniel Ilegu. This religious group which has its headquarters in Mid-Western Nigeria has strong emphasis on the second coming of Jesus Christ and the subsequent establishment of His Kingdom on earth. There are some areas of agreements and disagreements between the GKS and the Watchtower Society of Jehovah Witnesses. Among the agreements are similarity about the personality of Jehovah, on the Second Coming, the Millennium and the chosen 144,000, agreement on the rejection of Christian festivals like Christmas etc. On the other hand GKS considered Jehovah Witnesses' method of house to house preaching as primitive and instead use open air preaching. In addition, GKS does not set dates for the Armageddon whereas Jehovah Witnesses do. The growth of GKS, according to Ilegu, can be traced to its millennial message and the way it has utilised the mass media to convey its message to the Nigerian public. It would have been interesting to know if Jehovah Witnesses are widespread in the major areas in Mid-western Nigeria where GKS could be found, but this fact is not given.

Three articles (chapters 4, 9 and 10) deal with religious groups from South-eastern Nigeria. In chapter 9, Essien A. Offiong describes the Brotherhood of Cross and Star, founded in Calabar in 1956 by Olumba Olumba Obu. Offiong centres his discussion on a schism that occurred in 1977 within the church. Since no statistics of the membership of the break-away is provided, we do not know how important the schism was. In addition, the reader is not provided any clue about how BCS reacted or coped with the schism.

In chapter 4, Gabriel I.S. Amadi describes the Spiritual Healing Church of the Lord (SHCL), an aladura-type movement. Because of the church's flexibility, 'clients' have consulted Prophet Michael Wobo, the founder, with diverse needs ranging from future partners, to marital disputes, to healing, to future predictions and generally to success in life. In chapter 10, Dr. Hackett examines the role of women in the 'spiritual churches'. She used a number of case studies of religious groups mostly from Calabar to demonstrate the diversity of roles of women in the spiritual churches.

Peter Clarke's article on the Maitatsine movement in Northern Nigeria (chapter 5) is unique in its content. It is the only article in the book that deals with an Islamic movement. The Maitatsine movement first came to public attention in December 1980 following a bloody rioting by members of the sect in Kano when more than 4,000 people were killed. In this contribution, Clarke provides much information about the movement and its founder, Mallam Muhammadu Marwa, a self-proclaimed prophet and a mahdi. Drawing on the mahdist tradition in West Africa, Clarke shows that the mahdist orientation of the movement was largely responsible for the aggressiveness and violence of the movement. The

socio-economic conditions of post independence Nigerian also aided the quest for 'redemption' by Marwa and his disciples. However, Clarke devotes much space discussing the mahdist movements to the detriment of a fuller description of the Maitatsine movement.

Chapters 11 and 12 are general conclusions. Friday Mbon in chapter 11 analyses the ambivalence of responses to the Aladura churches by the Nigerian public. His analysis are beneficial to a certain extent, but it would have been more helpful if the responses have been objectively obtained e.g. through a questionnaire or survey, rather than relying mostly on his won personal observation. In chapter 12, Hackett summarizes by stating that the quest for religious self-determination is a major theme that could link the movements described in the book.

Hackett's efforts in getting these contributions together and having them published is commendable. All the contributions indicate the dynamic nature of many religious movements in Nigeria. However, there are a number of shortcomings. Statistics are generally lacking or inadequate. For example, Olupona did not provide any figure about the membership or branches of the Celestial Church of Christ in Ondo, yet he talks about the church's phenomenal growth. Likewise, Ilegu gives statistics about the GKS in 1952 and none for the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Secondly, there is lack of consensus about terms used in describing the churches. Terms used include spiritual churches, aladura churches, mission churches, independent churches, mission-related churches, etc. It is hoped that in future, some scholar will be able to take up the issue of typology of religious movements in Nigeria. Valuable as the book is, it is not available in the country. It is hoped that the publishers would see to this. Whatever the shortcomings, Rosalind Hackett deserves our praises for this publication.

Profile

Kenneth Onwuka Dike: Pioneer, Africanist and Historian

*Funso Afolayan

Kenneth Onwuka Dike was a man of many parts. Born in 1917, he grew up at Awka under the inspiring influence of his insightful grandfather, Dike Nwanchoo, a title holder and a community leader. His early education took place at Dennis Memorial Grammar School Onitsha, Achimota College, and the famous Fourah Bay College, Sierra Leone where he emerged as the first in a role of first class honours. Thereafter, a British Council Scholarship took him to Aberdeen University in Scotland for a Master's degree in history. This training career was consummated at London in 1950 where his doctoral thesis *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830 - 1885* which was published by Oxford in 1956, was a significant landmark in the evolution of African historiography.

At a time when western scholars were still arguing that Africans had no history beyond the activities of Europeans, Dike insisted on the antiquity of African history and demonstrated, through his pioneering effort, the existence and validity of African historical tradition independent of an antedating European advent in Africa. Rejecting the usual little 'British Policy towards... Dike insisted on a study making the activities of Africans its main focus and the use of oral sources as the corner stone of its methodology. Though he was not the first to make use of oral material for historical study he was the first to get it accepted as an authentic and a sufficient source in itself for scholarly study. This idea thereafter gained ground inspiring and influencing several generations of scholars and revolutionizing the concepts, perceptions and practice of African history and historiography the world over.

Dike's deep commitment to the autonomy and integrity of African study took him to the Department of History of the University College, Ibadan, in 1950, where he rose rapidly to become its first African head and the first African Professor in 1956. Along with such eminent scholars as H.F.C (later Abdullahi) Smith, J.F.A Ajayi, C.C. Ifemesia and J.C. Anene, Dike worked assiduously to make the contents and the practice of history education in Ibadan more relevant to Africa. Ibadan became the first University in the world to institute a degree programme devoted solely to the study of African history.

Under this inspiring leadership, the Department was able to successfully initiate and undertake far-reaching research programmes into several areas of African history with special focus on the Africans and with the use of oral sources. The department broke new grounds on many fronts. The Ibadan History Series which resulted and of which Dike was its first General Editor recorded spectacular successes in an impressive output of standard volumes and numerous articles. Ibadan became the pioneer and the torchbearer of a vigorous and brilliant African historical scholarship and the forebear of other programmes of and series on African studies in different parts of the world.

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Onwuka Dike was eminently a pioneer in many areas. In 1955, he founded and became the first president of the Historical Society of Nigeria, a professional canopy for promoting the study of African history. A report he submitted to the government led to the setting up of the Nigeria National Archives, a historical centre dedicated to salvaging and preserving for posterity, documents of historical and national significance. In addition, he also played leading roles in the establishment of the Department of Antiquities, the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, the International Congress of African Studies and the Ibadan Institute of African Studies.

In 1960, Dike became the first Indigenous principal of the University college Ibadan, at a very crucial period of the institution's history. His tenure witnessed the transition of the institution from a college of the University of London to the first full fledged indigenous university in the country. From 1962, as the first Vice Chancellor of the 'new' University, Dike had the singular honour of once again pioneering the nurturing of the university in its first few years as an independent institution. With consummate skill and adroit statesmanship Dike was able to attract generous grants from inside and outside the country which set the university on a course of rapid expansion and consolidation that led to its emergence by the late 60s as the leading centre of academic scholarship in sub-Saharan Africa and the leader in Africanist Studies in the world.

The early 1960s witnessed the establishment of four additional universities in Nigeria. To forge a sense of oneness and cooperation and to provide guidance as well as intellectual and manpower assistance for the emerging new universities, the inaugural meeting of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors was convened at Ibadan in December 1962 at Dike's instance. Leaving the stage in 1967 amidst the unfortunate inter-ethnic crises and political turbulence of the era, Dike disappeared from the national scene. The nation appeared to have forgotten him until 1980 when he was recalled from his self-exile at Harvard (where he was the Director of the African Studies Centre) and appointed the first President of the Anambra State University of Technology. Similarly, in 1981 he was conferred with national honours by the President of the federation.

His untimely death two years later in November 1983 at a time when the nation was just beginning to recognise and acknowledge his sterling qualities and contributions was received all over the nation with a deep sense of loss and regret.

Professor Dike will however, continue to be remembered not only for his intellectual abilities, his dazzling careers, his pioneering initiatives, his competence as an administrator and his commitment to the nation but more for his distinguished scholarship, his crusading commitment to the study of and viability of African history and historical tradition, his pioneering effort in professionalizing African Studies and laying the sound foundations for its effective dissemination on a world wide scale as well as his intellectual breakthrough as to the meaning and relevance of history in African societies.

Dike, many years ago, in what amounted to a highly commendable foresight, had recognised what many today sadly do not know and continue to deny: the need to create, in our people, a more enduring sense of history if we will ever make any meaningful progress as a nation. Introducing his *Eminent Nigerians of the Nine-*

teenth Century, Published by Cambridge University Press in 1960, the year of Nigeria's independence, he had insisted and warned:

It is necessary to look back at the past in order to see today's events in their proper perspectives... We cannot understand the present unless we understand the past from which the present emerged (p.9).

The direct relevance and even timelessness of this statement cannot be over emphasised at a time like this when we as a people continue to behave as men who have no sense of history, and who believe that we can make it as a nation while continuing to disregard the values and the accumulated experience of the 'horsemen of yesteryears. 'It is no wonder then, that we continue to repeat the same mistakes again and again, while our lives continue to be dominated by the politics and gains of the moment.

It is for this and many other reasons that, many years after his exit, Kenneth Onwuka Dike continued to be remembered as a distinguished and highly resourceful scholar, an outstanding and pioneering Africanist and a remarkable and inspiring historian.

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